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LIKE A MIGHTY RIVER

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Crozer Theological Seminary

UNOBTRUSIVELY appended to the group of seven parables in the central chapter of our first gospel stands a most instructive word. Some have seen it as an additional parable, an eighth; others regard it as a modest self-portrait by the author himself. It reads: "Therefore every scribe who hath been made a disciple of the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is a householder, who bringeth forth out of his treasure things new and old.[1]

Whether this word is a colophon is at the moment of little consequence. For nearly twenty centuries it has been an accurate description of a fundamental quality of Christianity, one which has been one of its great sources of power. To no small degree it has been responsible for the fact that in contrast to many other cults and religions which have risen and waxed strong, only eventually to wane and die, Christianity has steadily increased in strength and influence, constantly reaching farther and farther around our little globe and proving able to take root and grow in the most different and varied soils and climates. The quality to which I am referring is its ability to adapt itself to different circumstances; while preserving certain qualities very persistently, to nourish them and add to them from its new environs.

Or let me change the figure of speech. Christianity has been from its very start a river flowing steadily, if often with wide curves and not infrequent backsweeps, onward to the sea. In the early days it was a very tiny stream. Fed by many springs, wells, and—very important—many tributaries, large and small, it has constantly been swelled, has constantly flowed on. This has sometimes been overlooked. Many would prefer to think of it as a lake which just is because it was created that way. Thus they have referred to it as "the faith which was once for all delivered to the saints." As such, it is to be guarded, kept free from all which might dilute or contaminate it.

Such a view seems to me utterly untrue to the facts—and fortunately so. Lakes which are not fed constantly by new and fresh water must

[1] Matt. 13:52.

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in the very nature of things eventually dry up and disappear. And, I might remark in passing, lakes which are fed by springs and streams but which have no outlet eventually become stagnant and bitter. The Salt Lake in our own West, the Dead Sea in Palestine, are cases in point. But the river flowing steadily on, fed by a multitude of tributaries, large and small, keeps itself pure and fresh and makes what would otherwise be an arid and parched desert blossom and bear fruit.

No figure of speech is perfect. It is a commonplace that it is dangerous to attempt to make them fit too exactly, to make them go on all fours. Yet with proper cautions it appears to me entirely proper to speak of Christianity in terms of such a river. It could not be contained in the little land of its origin, but cut for itself a channel out into the larger Græco-Roman world, and on and on and on. And no one who has had the slightest acquaintance with its history can deny that it has been fed by many, many springs and streams which were not digged on Palestinian soil and which did not flow down Judean hills.

The more crusading a religion is, the more it absorbs; the more it conquers, the more it is in turn conquered. This is a fundamental law of life, universal in its scope; but of nothing is it truer than of religion. And Christianity from its very beginning has been a crusading religion. "Go out into the highways and hedges, and constrain them to come in, that my house may be filled" has been from the first its watchword. It has always sought, in sober literalness, to win the world for Christ in this generation. It has always had the sense of immediacy: so much to do, so little time. In the earliest days, there was the flaming conviction that in the most literal sense the time was short. Soon the Lord would return. Would he find faith in the earth? On them was the responsibility that the answer should be Yes. As many ears seemed deaf to their call at home, they pushed out in increasing confidence that the word of old, "I will give thee the gentiles for thine inheritance," referred to them and their crucified Lord. Work while it is still day; the night cometh—and speedily—when no man can work: that was their theme song. And stark tragedy would be the fate of those who did not hear and heed. Upon them was the responsibility of the watchman, charged with the task of warning the sleeping city. Should the watchman be derelict in his duty and fail to sound the warning, the blood of the slain would be required at the hands of the watchman. Thus with urgency and a sense of overmastering compulsion they carried on their crusade.

The result? In three centuries from the time their Lord had died, abandoned by all—it had even seemed for the moment by God himself—it had conquered the Græco-Roman world. That Constantine actually had a religious vision in which he saw the oft-quoted words *hoc vince*

on a cross against the sun, as he later told Eusebius, may perhaps be questioned; that the cross was emblazoned on the shields of his troops as he marched to victory at the Milvian Bridge, that the next year saw the Edict of Milan which established the principle of religious toleration, and that after his victory over his once ally, Licinius, ten years later, the once despised religion speedily became the sole official religion of the empire—this cannot be gainsaid. Their Master had been reported to have said, "I have overcome the world." In sober literalness this is what his followers seemed to have achieved. And no sooner had the emperor Julian died than Christians, remembering his zealous if temperate attempt to reëstablish the pagan cults, were circulating the story that as he lay dying in far-off Persia he had filled his hand with the blood gushing from his side and had flung it into the air with the cry, half in surrender, half in final blasphemy, "Vicisti, Galilæe." That Julian made that so-to-speak deathbed confession is utterly improbable;[2] that it was sober and incontrovertible truth is very clear.

And how did Christianity conquer? Much as is always the case: by displacing and absorbing the big gods and under other names adopting and adapting the more persistent little ones. Greek religion was never blotted out, nor was the very different religion of the Romans, nor that of the Teutons, the Celts, the Druids. Each made its own and lasting contribution. Without them Christianity would not have become what it is today. Values which have seemed real to people, to which they have become deeply attached, are not destroyed overnight. The convert—be it due to the prick of the sword, the desire for rice, or to what is generally deemed more respectable motives—may seem to embrace the new worship with eagerness; his zeal for the new may well be far more conspicuous and vocal than that of those who are, to use the old word, "to the manor born." If you would have a real high-church clergyman who glories in the bells and the incense and all the rest of the sacred paraphernalia, make a convert of a Quaker or a Baptist. And before too many months he will likely preach a ringing, if amusing, sermon from that tried-and-true text, "Whereas I was blind, now I see." And yet, equally true it is, under that surface change there are other elements that defy change and which persist and will eventually evidence themselves. The more a religion spreads, the more it is itself changed and transformed. It were well to realize this as we send out our missionaries. It is idle to expect to gain China, Japan, and the rest of the so-called non-Christian lands, and to have the religion

[2] The earliest form of the story is given by the fifth-century Theodoret (*Hist. Eccl.* iii, 25 [20], 7). Montaigne (*Essais* ii, 19—"Of Liberty of Conscience") discusses it in some detail but concludes sensibly that the silence of Ammianus Marcellinus and Eutropius renders it most unlikely. Swinburne adapted the word to the well-known "Thou hast conquered, O pale Galilean; the world has grown grey from thy breath" (*Hymn to Proserpine*). The story may safely be ascribed to that limbo of pious wishful thinking from which most deathbed confessions are extracted.

which wins them remain unaltered and unchanged. Every veteran missionary who has had the welfare of those to whom he has ministered upon his heart, who has sought to live with them on a common plane, and who has seen them not as prospective converts but as brothers for whom Christ died, must, I think, agree; nor can he in honesty wish it were otherwise.

So it was in Greece, to choose one example long dear to me, when early missionaries entered. Old faces constantly meet us in new garb. Asclepius, the god of healing, is displaced but not the needs to which he had seemed responsive; in his stead Sts. Damien and Michael speedily appear. And of them precisely the same stories and myths are told and believed. It is impossible to read the stories and legends of St. George without catching glimpses again and again of Apollo of the silver bow, of the gallant Perseus and the ravished Andromeda. Is it simply a striking coincidence that it was St. Dionysius who gave the vine to Naxos, quite as his lusty forbear, Dionysus, that early tree spirit whose worship aided men to find their oneness with the divine, had been believed to have done? And St. Hippolytus, is he to be dismissed with the easy reply, "There is nothing new under the sun," or can we see beneath the legend of his tragic fate—torn apart by his horses—the older and deathless story of the other Hippolytus, the ill-omened son of Thesus and Hippolyte, the object of Aphrodite's wrath who perished in the self-same way in dreadful consequence of Phædra's despair and of his father's too hasty curse? And what of Athene, the virgin goddess of wisdom, the divine protectress of Athens? Is it again simply coincidence—a string that gives a brassy sound when plucked too frequently—that her temple, the all-loveliest Parthenon, successively became the Christian church of St. Sophia, a Christian virgin goddess of wisdom, and eventually of the Panagia, Virgin Mary and Mother of God? Is it simply coincidence that in Crete legende are still told of St. Paul freeing the island of wild beasts, as Patrick was later to do for Ireland? That Paul had ever visited Crete is most unlikely. But for centuries before Christianity spread into this fabled land of the once mighty Minoan sea kings, these stories had been told of the local Heracles. And as Heracles waned, his mantle once again descended upon his Christian successor even as it had centuries before on the Philistine coast upon the Hebrew Samson.

Read once again the immortal story of Rip van Winkle, American legatee of Peter Klaus of Sittendorf, himself a direct descendant, as every classicist knows full well, of Epimenides who slept for nearly thrice that long in the fabled Dictean cave. Do you remember that when Rip, returning from his long sleep, came back to the village he found many changes? Among others was the swinging sign above the door of the tavern. At first it seemed familiar. But even it had been singularly metamorphosed. Rip

recognized the ruby face of George III under which he had smoked so many a peaceful pipe; but "the red coat was changed for one of buff and blue, a sword was held in the hand instead of a sceptre, the head was decorated with a cocked hat, and underneath was painted in large characters, General Washington." Precisely: there had been a good many changes, but the same rubicund face was there. No longer was he called "King George"; now he was "General Washington."

In Athens expectant mothers frequent the church of St. Eleutherios to pray for easy childbirth even as their early sisters had begged the aid of the goddess Eileithyia. It were surely unnecessary to attempt to discover the origin on an alien shore of this Eleutherios and to ponder the reason for his tocological prowess. The gentle art of derivation of names can lead up many blind alleys; at times to disdain its aid is silly. And their husbands and brothers exclaim when it rains, "Theos brechei," precisely as their forbears two thousand years before had said "Zeus huei." The Greek peasant of today believes as devoutly in nymphs who frequent springs and groves and the sea—though he styles them all by the term earlier reserved for the sea nymphs, Neraids. They haunt the same places and they have the same stories told of them though they now are styled saints. Their queen is the "Great Lady" or the "Fair Lady" or the "Queen of the Mountains." And one wonders if she is Artemis, but lightly clad in diaphanous Christian garb or whether we have here but an interesting recurrence of that still older process whereby Artemis, foremost of the nymphs, eventually reached the stature of a great goddess on Olympus. On the north side of Colonus, hard by Athens, were visible a few years ago the ruins of a church in honor of the "Safe Saints." Surely it is no overstress of the historical imagination to see these direct descendants of the Eumenides ("Gracious goddesses") who had once, as every one who has read Æschylus knows, had a grove there.

Every student has been struck by the similarity between the earlier venerated heroes and Catholic saints. The effectiveness of each is tied securely to his relics. Surely the decree of Delphi that if a man's relics should show clear evidence of being invested with supernatural power, a hero cult should be devoted to him is distinctly in line with the practices of the Vatican. Many statues have been found about which it is very hard to say whether they are of Hermes Kriophoros—Hermes the Rambearer —or of Jesus the Good Shepherd; of the grieving Demeter or the Christian Mater Dolorosa. In parts of the Cyclades a coin for Charon, dread ferryman of the Styx, is still placed in the dead man's mouth—although the son of Erebus and Nyx is now known as Charos or Charontas.

One of the most striking persistences of all is to be seen in the offering of mixed fruits and grains which play an important part in modern cere-

monies, as in the offering to the dead in cemeteries on the Psychosabbaton, modern Greek equivalent of our All Souls' Day, even as they did on Chytroi, the third day of the Anthesteria—a flower festival in honor of Dionysus—when the souls of the dead were believed free to visit the upper world. Not infrequently in Greek churches along with the communion rite of bread and wine a *koluba*—a cake prepared from different kinds of grain—is brought to the church and eaten with greetings from one Christian to another after crumbs of it have been scattered inside the altar rail. Few who have examined the modern votive offerings so commonly found in Greek churches would be inclined to question their genetic and unbroken descent from the dim prechristian past.

So it would be possible to continue almost endlessly. No religion which has met men's need is uprooted and destroyed. Zeus may absorb and take to himself many earlier local divinities when he is brought in by his worshipers, and may as a consequence come to be addressed by many different and seemingly unrelated epithets and to be decked out with a lush mythology in which stories, to us shocking, of his many amours and alliances are prominent. The indisputable fact that in Greece—centuries before the advent of the Greeks—a mother goddess, not a father god, was all-powerful may well be a more significant item in the explanation of why Zeus and Hera were always wrangling than the assumption that the latter fact was simply a cynical reflection that in Greece, as in America, even prominent families were frequently disturbed by marital infelicities. And when one stands in Olympia, site of the Olympian games and dedicated to the venerable and illustrious son of Kronos, and views the ruins of the two temples, side by side, the one to Zeus, the other to his consort Hera, his first impression of the appropriateness that in a man's world the larger and more magnificent had been built in honor of the Father of gods and men, speedily gives way to other reflections as he notices that the temple to Hera is far, far the older.

Yes, Zeus may absorb and take to himself many earlier divinities; he also in turn may well be absorbed by his successor, the god of the Christians. But, and this is the significant fact, the resulting Christianity cannot fail to be affected. As it changes and transforms others, so it is changed and transformed itself.

To many this is a most unpalatable fact, and they have struggled to deny it. Their task is as hopeless as was that of King Canute. To me, on the contrary, it is no source of disillusion but rather an indication of the life and vitality of Christianity. And some of its most precious treasures it has acquired in precisely this way. It would be absurd to deny that it brought much of the most profound value with it as it started its quest. The evidence is too clear to need argument. It is equally absurd

to attempt to deny that it received much of real and lasting value during its years of service.

At its festival times, I am always especially aware of this latter, and am deeply grateful. How undeniable it is of Christmas, with all its rich and lovely treasures: its tree ablaze with candles, its dolls and other toys which delight the heart and open wide the eyes, its mistletoe and holly, its gifts, its stockings hung up with care, its Santa Claus or St. Nicholas, its star prophesied to come forth out of Jacob, its lovely and haunting carols and cradlesongs, its manger and blessed baby choired by angels who will continue their song as long as love is enshrined in the human heart.

Yes, Christmas is a very composite affair. It sometimes comes to us with a start when we realize that Christmas, the mass of Christ, the festival in memory of the birth of the one destined to write his name so indelibly into all subsequent history that to remove it were to end history, is not one of the early Christian festivals. Just as it was centuries before his advent was made, even by his devout followers, the starting point for reckoning dates—it was not until the sixth century that the supposed year of his birth was suggested as more appropriate than the traditional year of the founding of Rome; and it was Charlemagne who apparently was the first secular authority so to use it—just so, for centuries no especial interest was felt in observing or trying to discover his natal day. At the end of the second century Clement of Alexandria refers to several speculations as to the date of his birth, but dismisses them as fruitless and profitless superstitions. A half century later his great successor Origen protests heatedly against keeping the date of Christ's birth as if he had been a Pharaoh. Nor was there any agreement as to what the date was until well into the fifth century. January 6, March 25, and December 25—all three, and several others: January 2, April 18, and May 20—had been suggested. The earliest known mention of December 25 as his natal day is in the so-called Calendar of Philocalus, which is dated A.D. 354 and reads: "Year 1 after Christ; the Lord was born on December 25, a Friday and fifteenth day of the new moon." It scarcely need be said that this was a simple speculation. Actually December 25 in A.D. 1 fell on Sunday, not Friday.

The two great Christian feasts were Epiphany and Easter. The former, Epiphany, marking his baptism and illumination in the water of the Jordan, when he was designated as God's son, was kept on January 6, and in the East it continued to be regarded as his birthday, even after the West began to emphasize December 25. In the West Epiphany, the Feast of the Light in the Jordan, came to attract other incidents too; thus it came to be regarded as the occasion of the arrival of the Magi, for the commemoration of the first manifestation of the gospel to the gentiles, and eventually as Twelfth Day. And this day was also celebrated as the anniversary of the

turning of water into wine at Cana and of the multiplication of loaves to feed the five thousand.

Eventually, as I said, in the West December 25 came to be chosen as the time of his actual birth—in distinction from January 6, the day of his spiritual rebirth in the water of the Jordan. And there can be little question as to the reason for the choice. Every boy and girl knows that this is the time of the winter solstice; December 25 marks the beginning of the lengthening of the days—then at their shortest span. But this was no new Christian discovery. For centuries this day had been venerated as *Natalis invicti solis,* the birthday of the unconquered sun, and had long been one of the great festivals of Mithraism, for many years a neck-and-neck rival of Christianity for popularity in the Roman empire. Thus there can be little question that the choice of December 25 as the date of Jesus' birth was the result, not of Christian memory—accurate or hazy—but of the feeling that this was the appropriate time: God's son appeared in the dark; his coming marked the lengthening of the days, the breaking forth in triumph of the divine light. But while it soon became popular in the West, for another hundred years Eastern Christians hotly denounced the West as being guilty of sun worship and idolatry, and continued to observe January 6. By A.D. 400 an imperial order made it, together with Epiphany and Easter, one of the three great feasts on which theatres must be closed and business cease.

But how about gifts which in all Teutonic countries[3] have long been a part of this gala occasion? Here, too, we see the adaptive power of our religion. There can be little question that these come primarily from the Roman Saturnalia, the great festival of Saturn, the Roman god of sowing and seed corn. This feast was first celebrated on December 19, gradually being extended to last seven days. It was apparently connected with the winter sowing, extending in Italy from October to January. During the Saturnalia all business was at a standstill, schools were closed, slaves were temporarily freed, many restrictions were slacked off, and a gay carnival spirit maintained, with many liberties, not otherwise tolerated. The kiss beneath the mistletoe which still persists is safely to be ascribed as a memory of this time of carnival laxity, as people roamed the streets, often in masks and costumes, greeting total strangers with a hearty "Io Saturnalia," much as we do "Merry Christmas." Presents were exchanged, especially dolls (*sigilaria*) and candles (*cerei*),[4] not improbably themselves milder substitutes for human sacrifice which had earlier been an element in the feast to ensure fertility for their fields and abundant harvests.

[3] See (below) note 6.

[4] These were explained on the basis of an old prophecy to the inhabitants of Latium to send φῶτα to Saturn, heads to Pluto. The populace thought it meant human sacrifices, but Hercules advised understanding φῶτα not from φώς (man) but from φῶς (light).

And Santa Claus? When did he make his appearance? So far as that form of his name is concerned, he does not antedate the Dutch colonists in New York and is a definite product grown on American soil; but in all save name he is far older. In the early fourth century there was a Christian bishop Nicholas in the city of Myra in Asia Minor. A host of colorful legends are told of him.[5] He seems early to have become the patron saint of Christian sailors, supplanting Poseidon who from his "glistening mansion, imperishable forever in the deeps of the mere" had guided and guarded—for a price—their forbears,[6] and today Greek ships bear his icon on their prows or sterns. From the eleventh century on, when once his relics had been transplanted to Bari in Apulia and interred in a basilica built in his memory, he has been the object of great veneration. Hundreds of churches, many of them, as in Athens and on the isle of Tenos, replacing older shrines of Poseidon, have been built in his honor. In Russia he was long the patron saint as is George in England.

His connection with Christmas giving is said to be the consequence of one of his many kindly acts as a humble Christian bishop. Three daughters of a poor man were about to be sold into shame by their father who was too poor to provide them with dowries necessary for marriage. The kindhearted bishop, learning of the impending tragedy, surreptitiously provided them with dowries. From this generous act is said to have arisen the habit of giving presents secretly, especially to children, first on the eve of his day, December 6, then later on Christmas Day. (And I cannot forbear to remark in passing, the conventional portrayal in art of this gracious act of the kindly bishop—he is regularly represented as standing in a tub with three children at his side—gave rise in its turn, through conventionalizing the scene, to the three gold balls which are as familiar in an American city as their classic origin is hidden.) Santa Claus is, of course, simply the American corruption of the Dutch *Sant Nicolaas.* And the other figure, so often identified with him, Kris Kringle, is the similar corruption of the German *Christkindl* (Christ child), who had replaced Saint Nicholas in Germany after the Reformation as the good genius of giving.[7]

[5] For example: As soon as he was born, he stood up and thanked God for the boon of existence. He observed the canonical fasts on Wednesdays and Fridays from the very first, abstaining on those days, as an infant, from sucking his mother's breasts. At an early date he toured Palestine, visiting devoutly the holy sites. He could predict storms when the sky was cloudless and could and did stay the fury of the storm when his ship was menaced. When once a sailor fell headlong to the deck from a mast, he promptly healed him. At the Council of Nicæa he roundly boxed the ears of Arius.

[6] The precise way in which Nicholas came to occupy this rôle is uncertain. Apparently, still earlier than Nicholas another saint, Phocas, himself also said to have been a sailor, had received Christian veneration. Actually Nicholas may well have been more closely connected with Artemis—of course, as a supplanter—than with Poseidon. In Myra he was a vigorous opponent of her cult. In Anatolia, where later he was bishop, a ruined chapel of St. Nicholas stands on what, as an ancient inscription makes clear, was originally a temple of Artemis. Eventually he came to occupy the place of Zeus' tempestuous brother.

[7] Though the giving of gifts on Christmas Day is common only in Teutonic countries it has its counterpart—itself another survival—in the New Year's gifts in France and other Latin countries.

So it would be possible to continue, and the story would be fascinating. The fir tree—*Tannenbaum,* that indispensable element in our all-loveliest day—comes from the forests of Germany: remember the exquisite story of Henry Van Dyke, "The First Christmas Tree"; the mistletoe, called by the ancients the "golden bough," symbol of authority of the King of the Wood and plucked by Æneas before entering the underworld, from the Druids, perhaps in England; the yule log from Scandinavia; the star from the prophecy of Balaam, and the widespread belief in the ancient world that at the birth of every child destined to achieve greatness a new star rose. And eventually the stories in our gospels—the one with its Magi bearing gifts and the guiding star; the other with the birth in a manger and the chorus of angels (both so complex and composite in origin)—came to be woven into the exquisite and complicated fabric. It is said that the custom of setting up a Christmas crèche in Latin churches was started by none other than St. Francis of Assisi.

Is this disillusioning? It does not seem so to me. I love every detail of it. To me there is something very fitting and appropriate that in this day toward which we look with such anticipation, for which we plan and scheme to give joy and gladness; which epitomizes and makes fragrantly beautiful so many fine and lovely qualities which too often get choked and suppressed in the daily round of life—to me, I say, it seems very fitting that so many different elements have been blended, that so many peoples have brought their choicest offerings. In a very real sense it is but another example of the gifts of gold and frankincense and myrrh.

And, as I said at the beginning, it is so typical of Christianity. What is true of its festivals[8] is equally true of its theology. Christmas affords a parable of Christianity's very genius. For Christianity, I say it most reverently, is not typified by the seamless robe; rather it is far more like

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In fact the name of these gifts, *étrennes,* is but a transparent modification of the Latin *strenæ,* literally, *signs* or *omens,* and so "New Year's gifts for the sake of the omen," presented under the good offices of Strenia, who presided over them. Ovid (*Fast.* i, 185 ff.) describes the ancient custom. Some of the actual presents still exist, *e.g.,* a cup and a lamp, each bearing the inscription *Anno novo faustum felix tibi,* and suggesting a not unlikely origin for our "Happy New Year." Coins were frequently given, a gold one being the best omen. Poorer folk had to content themselves with giving copper coins to represent the gold, while gilded nuts were often employed. Tiberius disliked the practice—it cost him too much to return (in a wise proper for an emperor) the many lesser gifts he received—and so did Claudius who abolished it; but of course it was revived and has persisted in the French *étrennes* quite despite the fulminations of church fathers who dubbed it pagan.

[8] Christmas has been used as one revealing example because of its especial interest. An almost equally suggestive story might be told of Easter. In the Greek world the modern form of celebration of the death and resurrection of Christ from Good Friday to Easter Sunday is, as many students of antiquity have pointed out, strikingly reminiscent, at least in tone and temper, of the ancient Eleusinia, reënacting or depicting the departure of Persephone, the grief of the anguished mother Demeter, and the ecstatic joy at her return. Nor will the serious student fail to be struck, and perhaps eventually even to be a bit disquieted, as he ponders how ironically appropriate it was that the death and resurrection of Jesus, so early identified as God's first born and true passover lamb, took place at precisely this season—itself the vernal equinox—when the Jews were celebrating the institution of that feast in commemoration of God's goodness in sparing their first born sons.

Joseph's coat of many colors. And in this I see no cause for alarm. Quite the contrary.

To those not convinced that this is strength, not weakness; who view with ill-disguised concern the unmistakable evidences of the swelling of the early rivulet by the numberless streams and springs and who would seek to reverse the process, to filter out or, if need be, to distil out, as pagan contamination all that cannot be unquestionably labeled as coming from the Galilean lake, and who talk, with what seems to me unthinking and shortsighted reverence, about "going back to Jesus," which would mean the disavowal of the labors of all who have toiled subsequently in the world's vineyards, be they Paul or Augustine or Martin Luther—I would urge that they read again that haunting and unforgetable story by Nathaniel Hawthorne, "The Birthmark," and would realize that it is more than a lovely tale of the yesteryears, that it is a parable of life which we disregard at our peril. As the days went by, Georgiana found the gaze of her adoring and gifted husband, Aylmer, fixed on the tiny birthmark, rosy like an elfin hand which, it had seemed to her earlier lovers, was the actual impress of some fairy's hand upon her cheek at birth. Insistent upon perfection, unwilling to see in the loveliness of his adored bride anything alien, anything suggesting a flaw, Aylmer finally persuaded her to allow him to remove it. In the end she acceded, for what had earlier seemed to her a charm had now in the reflection of her husband's eye, become to her too an ugly blemish. And in the laboratory finally Aylmer concocted the purifying draught of a liquor "colorless as water, but bright enough to be the draught of immortality." A few drops of it poured in the soil about a withered and yellowed geranium caused the unsightly blotches to be extinguished in a living verdure. She drank, and the mark began to fade. But as the stain disappeared, as the left cheek, on which it blazed with such disastrous brilliancy as to scare away their happiness, became as the other, she spoke: "My poor Aylmer, you have aimed loftily; you have done nobly. Do not repent that with so high and pure a feeling, you have rejected the best the earth could offer. Aylmer, dearest Aylmer, I am dying!" It was too true! The tiny hand had grappled with the mystery of life, and was the bond by which an angelic spirit had kept itself in union with a mortal frame. "As the last crimson tint of the birthmark—that sole token of human imperfection—faded from her cheek, the parting breath of the now perfect woman passed into the atmosphere, and her soul, lingering a moment near her husband, took its heavenward flight." Do not the words of another master of parabolic speech seem the only possible conclusion to this more modern parable: "He that hath ears, let him hear"?

As the worship spread in widening circles, or—to repeat again the figure I have employed—as it flowed out as a rapidly running river, it

brought many new and profound values. Do not misunderstand me. I have stressed the fact that it received much. I do not see how this can be denied. But it brought much too. To many in the larger world outside little Palestine, disillusioned, discouraged, for whom skies were overcast with clouds, anchors dragging, enmeshed in what Gilbert Murray so wisely styled "the failure of nerve," this new gospel of hope and confidence, this proffer of strength to nerveless hands, this ringing challenge of assured victory, brought new life.

But to be appreciated and realized it had to be understood. It must speak the language of man. Thus the early preachers—Paul and the many other Christian Agamemnons who never found a Homer—could not use the Aramaic of Palestine; they had to speak Greek. But far more than that: they had to translate their ideas as well as their words. The hopes and dreams of little Palestine were not the hopes and dreams of the larger world. Jesus had spoken to his fellow countrymen, and the common people had heard him gladly. His message was the outgrowth of the hopes and longings, the memories and the dreams, of a distinct and different people—a people, it may be remarked in passing, of whom a not dissimilar story of a river fed by many alien springs could be told. But outside Palestine many of his words would have fallen on deaf ears; for there were many, like Gallio, who "cared for none of these things." Salvation, a feeling of security, hope amid the seemingly crumbling ruins of the old religions which had been hamstrung by the merciless criticism of the philosophers—after all these did the gentiles seek. And it was because the new religion could break away from—or be thrust outside of—the older Judaism which, despite its own so significant, if unacknowledged, history of adaptation and borrowing, would not change or seek, that it triumphed as it did. Unhampered by traditions from the past—tradition which can both steady and constrict—it was far-sighted enough to see that the longings of every human heart were legitimate—that it was not necessary for gentiles to banish their hopes and longings or to express them in the terms of Judaism, but that the gospel was broad enough to meet the longings of every human heart. That was the profoundest lesson the early church could have learned, and it ensured its triumph. It were a pity were our modern leaders to forget it. Thus, to use a convenient phrase, the pew molded the pulpit, as it has in every successive age, as much as did the pulpit the pew. By adapting itself to the needs of men, of course it changed, of course it borrowed, of course it both transformed and became transformed. This was the proof of its strength, not the sign of its weakness.

And through the years this has remained its treasure: things old and new. I am told—I do not know how true it is—that every individual is completely and literally transformed, remade, every seven years; every

cell, every tissue. I would like to believe it to be literally true. So in a real sense it has been—and must continue to be—with our religion. Constantly it must be renewed and revitalized: not change for the sake of change, but development to meet and answer the growing demands and needs of life. Nothing which is essential to life can be to her foreign or suspect. Gladly must she continue to adopt and incorporate all values. Some will prove to be of only transient worth; these she will gradually drop as she has through the years such yellowing leaves as footwashing, the holy kiss, closed communion, earlier cosmogonies and cosmographies, and dogmas which dishonor both God and man. Others will remain ever young and virile; these she will keep and cherish.

If we really believe that our religion is a religion for the world, we will not try to make it the cult of one people. We will gladly prize that comprehension of the wholeness of life which was so natural and unstudied to those who lived beneath the skies of Greece, that refused to distinguish so meticulously between *sacred* and *secular*. We will cease the fretful insistence upon this cleavage which is being piped again by many of today's would-be prophets. We will awake, if somewhat belatedly, to what would seem good logic—even theologic!—that if the church were to be more in the world there might very likely be more of the world in our churches. We will not want our religion to be a lake without inlet or outlet, stagnant and bound eventually to disappear. Rather we will glory in the fact that it has been, and will bend every energy to see that it continues to be, a mighty river, constantly fed by many tributaries, sweeping onward, purifying itself as it advances, and making fertile the land as it flows onward—ever onward—to the distant sea.

ATTENTION ALL SOUTHERNERS

J. RAY SHUTE
Monroe, North Carolina

Call it by the name "democratic," and you can foist on the Southerner any form of government under the sun, from socialism to dictatorship. Call it "Methodist" or "Baptist," and you can preach humanism, pantheism, or metaphysics from your pulpits and be called blessed. The Southerner, unfortunately, is a slave to tradition and places far more stress on terminology than on the content of both politics and religion. To question a single word in the "Word of God" or cast aspersions on Jesus or Franklin D. Roosevelt means running the risk of being completely ostracized or viewing a burning cross in one's yard! Most outsiders completely underestimate the solidarity of human values in the South: the cause and effects of an intense unity in every section of Dixie. We all realize that this narrow view has hampered and retarded progress below the Mason and Dixon's line, and yet very few have gotten beneath the surface and tried to discover what makes a Rebel click and tick.

For half a century after the infestation of carpetbagger and scallywag, the South was economically poverty-stricken. It was conquered soil and open territory for exploitation and despoliation. Unable to recover without help, which the Congress refused to give, Dixie had to start the slow, uphill climb on its own battered, bruised, and bloody knees—a prey to every economic pirate abroad, and their number was legion. Education was forgotten in the bitter struggle for food and clothing, and health was a simple matter of keeping alive. Not many have been able to see the picture of a once proud aristocracy reduced to poverty overnight and fighting one of history's most spectacular battles for survival. Little wonder that the road back was so difficult to negotiate and required so much time. It is a miracle that so much has been done in this short time. While New England gloried in the intellectual liberalism of her great literary, religious, and moral leaders, the South was trying to raise two ears of corn where one grew before. Mother of the nation's greatest mental giants during the first half century of our existence, the South felt the heavy hand of defeat as it wiped out every vestige of social, economic, literary, and political leadership. While Boston listened to sermons on transcendentalism from the Emersonian school of religion in beautiful churches with plush-back pews, Southerners were listening, in brush arbors and framed churches, to hell fire and brimstone from uneducated backwoodsmen whose only authority or training for the ministry was a loud voice, a "call to preach," and a sincere hatred of the "Damnyankees." Is it

any wonder, then, that Boston became the centre of the liberal religious movement and the South the most orthodox of all of America?

In his years of privation and despair, the Southerner found much to comfort him in the lamentations of the Jews of the Old Testament, whose situation was uniquely similar. Intellectualism in religion was impossible in the South before the second decade of this century, and with half a century of intense conditioning and prejudice much time will be needed to reform the most lovable people on earth—the Southerners.

The economic strides of the South during the twentieth century have been the marvel of the world, and industrialism has advanced to the point that it has become a source of alarm to some other sections of America. In education, road building, public health, and housing great strides have been taken. In religion, alone, the South is at least half a century behind the rest of the country, and this one factor has the most undesired effect on the section imaginable. There are many encouraging signs that there is a real awakening down South, and many of us are most hopeful. However, the task of "converting" this section to liberal thinking in religion will be herculean in scope. Traditionally, this people love the democratic way of life in everything except in religion. It is socially improper to belong to any but the Protestant churches, and all the other denominations are tolerated but unwanted. There are signs that this attitude is slowly changing; however, the change appears to be more of growing indifference to religion generally than of a more liberal disposition. In some quarters, noticeably in larger cities—where fifty per cent of the population are unchurched—there is a favorable reaction to liberalism in all things, including religion.

A mass liberal movement is completely out of the question, but in our cities small groups can be formed and will find a vast field for fruitful activity. There are thousands of liberals in the South, and this number will increase. It is, moreover, a diversified lot of liberals: theists, humanists, plain unorthodox, social reformers, agnostics, and liberal Christians. The social gospel is having the most difficulty just now, as may well be expected. However, progress *is* being made consistently. There is no part of America where liberalism is more needed than in the South. However, such movements as "Operation Dixie," which the Roman Catholics have launched, will not be the answer. Nor will movements spearheaded by Northern liberal ministers, unless they are very unusual men, well trained in the history and tradition of Southern culture.

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As I watched the reaction of the Catholic people of the Irish Free State, on a recent visit there, to Protestant Irish from the Northern counties, I saw all too clearly a similar picture of the situation in our South. And these problems cannot be solved by adopting resolutions, passing laws,

or directing an intensified "outside" campaign. It is, unfortunately, not that simple. Things like the poll tax, antilynch laws, civil rights, labor organizing, and other reforms, must and will be solved by the local areas in their own manner. Much progress is being made, and if overenthusiastic people will stop needling Southern States, all of these problems will be solved on a permanent basis. No one can know better than the Southerner himself just how to bring about lasting reforms. Any outside efforts are not only abortive and ephemeral, but they retard and hamper permanent improvements. Many well-intentioned reformers have not learned this lesson and as a result are wasting their time and actually hurting the cause they espouse. This is particularly true of many liberal ministers who come to serve microscopic liberal churches, usually composed of cells of outsiders who have moved into Southern cities, and these groups do nothing more than delay a real liberal movement in the South when they prematurely start a "tempest in a teapot." Nothing permanently good is accomplished by these would-be reformers; on the other hand, while they might carry their point and in doing so even destroy their churches, this satisfies only one thing: their ego.

The native Southern liberal wants all of the reforms that his fellow liberal from outside wants, but he wants them on a permanent basis. He does not want a process of revolution; he wants a process of evolution. He has lived with these many problems and intends to remain with them until they are solved—and then some. Consequently, the average Southern liberal will not follow the leadership of either minister or laymen from outside in an effort to "blow their tops" on the race question, or the labor question, or the political question. He knows, from a lifetime in the area, the answers to most of the problems which are academic only to others. Therefore, any liberal movement which is to endure in the South must have one fundamental characteristic: honesty. Honesty to both races, both parties, both factions. Honesty to those who join a liberal church and who do so without the desire to start a race riot the following week. Honesty to the Negro who wants and deserves a better fate than to be the cause for mob violence, the reopening of old wounds, or the court action facing him if he and his white friends violate State laws forbidding mixed meetings and fraternizing. All of these problems are high on the agenda of the liberal churches, but there are ways and means of accomplishing those things in an orderly, lasting, and democratic manner. Far too many liberals are too impulsive to get the job done permanently. They want action now and seem to care not if they injure far more than they help those in whom they are interested, by their hasty and, more often, illogical rushing in "where angels fear to tread." Putting laws on statute books does not immediately solve problems, either, as the prohibitionists can

attest. In the process of education there are no royal roads to knowledge. It is a long, hard road, and often we despair, but we must press on—ever on. Liberals quite often need to learn the patience of the early Christians. If we would serve those who really need us, we must not further handicap and hurt them by trying to take short-cuts to save time. "The long way round is the short way home." So, our goals must be temporary, and as we achieve these, we move on to greater and more lasting ones.

There is a desperate need in the South for a liberal religious movement to rid these people of many handicaps under which they are living. As the situation now stands in the vast rural areas, uneducated ministers hold the people in a thralldom reminiscent of the Middle Ages. These clerics, often rude and crude, are consulted on every phase of life, and they speak with finality on such matters as politics, economics, and social welfare. Without any training whatever in sociology, psychology, or economics, they answer with all authority on these matters—and they are believed and their advice followed by the uneducated masses. Many of these ministers are giving advice on social problems that is dangerous, and there is little that can be done until requirements for ordination are raised to an educational level of some reasonable proportion. In some of the fundamentalist churches only a "call to preach" is needed, and three ministers can, without examination or any apparent restriction, ordain a new minister "on the spot." The South is filled with such unqualified "spiritual leadership."

When and if orthodox churches themselves raise their standards for the ministry, this will be a long step forward. The Methodist and Presbyterian churches have done this to a degree, but in the largest of all Protestant churches—the Baptist—we find the most deplorable conditions; this is true of many of the smaller denominations too. The host of small, independent churches maintain a very low educational level for their ministry.

It is thought by many who have carefully studied the problem that any liberal movement in the South must come from within the framework of orthodoxy, but this is highly questionable if present-day neoörthodoxy is to be taken as the criterion of liberalism within fundamentalism. It is simply a retreat from both duty and reason and solves no problem at all. Reformation is not an academic process, but rather it is one of real change and progress all along the line. The shifting of authority which resulted from Luther's reforms accomplishes little and unfortunately did not actually reform. Unless we are sincerely interested in perpetuating religion on a permanent basis, there is little hope for survival as we now know the term. We surely can see all about us evidences of the unwillingness of educated people to continue with orthodoxy as it now is; the other alterna-

tive appears to be a rejection of religion completely. And there are many very serious people who honestly recommend such a course. It would seem, therefore, that the real choice in this century is not between orthodoxy and liberalism, but between liberalism and atheism. It appears just that simple.

The South fits into this over-all picture in a rather big way, because here is the great bulwark of orthodoxy and here change will come last and slowest. It is a wonderful area for experimental work in religion and should be tried. Thousands of leaders in this empire have been working hard for generations on the basic issues involved, and while we see little on the printed page about these efforts, the work continues apace and substantial gains can be reported. This type of reform is permanent, and these people are quietly working with governing boards, state legislatures, school boards, election officials, and social and welfare agencies. These are the people who are really getting the job done on the racial problem and other vexatious situations. If it were not so pathetic it would be amusing to note so many young liberal ministers who come into the South with a fervor reminiscent of Theodore Parker and who are determined to solve the race problem the first year. Their religious commitments are most commendable, but their lack of knowledge of the problem, their impetuosity, and their willingness to risk everything on one throw of the dice are hardly to be considered sound. The Southern liberal is absolutely unwilling to gamble on losing the hard-earned gains of many years of heartbreaking effort on a simple plunge—the odds are too great against him. True liberals should be less interested in today and more interested in permanent reform.

We note increasing numbers of Negroes in the polling places, we note the disappearance of the poll tax requirement for voting in many States, we note more and more Negroes on juries and in public office in the South. Great strides have been and are being made. These gains have been won by eternally working and planning for the permanent good and are not the result of revolutionary or arbitrary methods. The South is on the march, and once true liberalism in religion becomes more widespread, results will become accelerated. We must not overplay our hand and we must be more intelligent than the opposition—this will win!

Many of us in public office have fought the good fight, quite often at a very dear price, and we will see the battle through. It is still considered "bad taste" to be a religious liberal in Dixie, but many of us are willing to take the abuse and keep fighting for that brotherhood of man so dear to our hearts. We know full well that the great battles are in the future and, like good soldiers, we are extremely anxious to prepare properly for those historic engagements. We must build up our churches and buttress them for many battles which lie ahead; we cannot weaken them

with premature skirmishes, which at the moment are inconsequential. We suffer from a statistical deficiency at the present time and we need to fill in our ranks and train our troops. We cannot commit our raw forces against crack troops; we must gather strength and experience and must perfect our logistics. The battle that really counts in any war is the final one—with that encounter the war is won or lost. We are determined to win that battle.

So, we look as always to the future and we hope and plan and work and pray. Some of us have broken heads and hearts, but those bloody heads are unbowed. We are ready, willing and, I hope, able for the task which is set before us, and when the battle starts there will be one who may be numbered amongst those fighting—he is the only one for whom I can speak.

THE TRAGEDY OF EDUCATION

F. W. BUCKLER
The Graduate School of Theology, Oberlin College

One of the main—if not the chief—difference between the Orient and the Occident is to be found in their divergent views of the nature of reality and of their corresponding different attitudes towards the problem of good and evil. (In this consideration I omit the spheres dominated by China and Japan, whose philosophies I am not competent to discuss, although I have often listened to utopian estimates with more than a little skepticism!)

In the Orient, the problem of good and evil is ultimately not merely metaphysical, but, rather, physical; in the Occident it is mainly ethical—a much more superficial view, in which the idealist's criticisms of the Creator's achievement are laid at the door of the creature, man. It was faced by Omar Khayyam:

> "When He first moulded into life my clay,
> The works that thence proceed in black array
> Full well He knew; no sin but He ordained it;
> Why burn me, then, on Resurrection Day?"

(Theologians, however, have usually spoken with more attention to ethical and homiletic potentialities.)

The term *docetism* is used by the theologians of the West to describe the heresy—particularly associated with Marcion of Pontus—that Jesus Christ was not flesh and blood, but—the evidence is confined to his critics—only appeared or "seemed" to be on earth. The criticism and the form it took reveal not only the ignorance of western theologians but their crudity also. By "western" I refer to both Greek and Latin. The spell of Euripides' dictum, "It is fitting that the Greeks rule the Barbarians," was mighty yet. The real position of the Docetæ, as these Orientals were called, was to be found in their view of the nature of matter, and so of flesh and blood.

The origin of the Oriental belief in the evil nature of matter arises from the view that it is either a mixture of the light and the darkness or the capture and enclosure of the light in pockets of darkness, for darkness is not: "Privation mere of light and absent day," as Milton, following in the wake of Aristotle, described it, but a sticky, tarry substance notable for its overwhelming formlessness. It invades the area of the light, of which it carries off portions enclosed in its own being, or holds in a mixture of the two the area we call matter. To the materialistic West, however, be it Greek, Roman, or Teutonic, matter constituted tangible reality, and the Persian ultimate reality of the good—the light—appeared as mere

seeming, inasmuch as it lacked *real* substance. Hence, the "perfectly good" Christ, "in whom was no darkness," becomes first phantastic in the Greek sense, then fantastic in the modern sense, and the Oriental concept of the Oriental perfect Christ had no *objective* foundation in truth to the Westerner, who needed, for the satisfaction of his objectivity, an element of tangibility. The West, therefore, rejected what it called the gnostic Christ, because he merely "seemed" to be, as docetic and branded the Persian-minded Christians as Docetæ and their heresy as Docetism; or he rejected him as a Gnostic. Each represents a fundamental and fatal error of understanding, with consequences far reaching in the quest of reality, and they have continued to the present day, for the rot that set in, in the field of Neoplatonic, patristic, and mediæval theology, has been transmitted to modern science, philosophy, and scholarship, where the standards set by the Enlightenment and *Aufklärung* are at one with the standards of the Christian councils—*mirabile dictu*—so that the modernist theologian in his quest for realism becomes as unreal as the patristic theologian whose method he disdains. I distinguish between the two modes of thought as docetism and philodocetism. One denotes the early description of the phenomenal unreality of Oriental thought in the eyes of Græco-Roman or hellenistic thought and philosophy; the other describes the modern homœopathic resultant and its sequel, objectivity, which is the outcome of the revolt against docetic views and ends in a position, which might be described by the Latin form *accidentalism*, whereby the quest for the substantial is abandoned. Without admitting the validity of the scholastic method of approach, which is ultimately external, it is valid to recognise its teleology, which seeks, however vainly, a formula on which ultimate understanding can be based. And the scientist, having set out towards that end, appears to have abandoned the chase. Indeed, it is not without significance that the leading physicists, *e.g.*, Jeans, Eddington, and others, have reached a position on the nature of matter so closely akin to early *docetism* that in the five centuries following the death of Alexander the Great it would have been branded as such.

Accompanying *docetism* in the categories of ecclesiastical anathema is the word *gnosis*. Not only is *gnosis* the victim of epithets implying arrogance, but also ridicule in the form of gnostic genealogies, whereby matter came into existence and likewise the process of salvation. The use of transliterated Oriental terms suggests the impression to be created—gibberish and balderdash. But, the fundamental concept of *gnosis* is *absolute* knowledge, directly acquired by recognition of the fact in opposition to knowledge acquired by deduction from evidence, accidents, and symptoms. It has, too, a sense of completeness and finality. It is best illustrated again from Omar Khayyam:

"The Ball no question makes of Ayes and Noes,
But Right or Left as strikes the Player goes;
And He that toss'd Thee down into the Field,
He knows about it all—HE knows—HE knows!"

The real modern equivalent of gnosticism is mysticism, which is the opposite of anything "misty," as Max Nordau attempted to show. The gnostic is one who has achieved certitude by complete apprehension, and his triumph is expressed in Arabic by the term *wahidiyya*, which means unity of knowledge with and within himself. In the words of the *Book of Common Prayer* it is "the spirit of wisdom and understanding." It was this certitude—the acquisition of which was individual—that the early church rejected (despite the efforts of Clement of Alexandria) in favor of the lower range of knowledge derived from philosophical or scientific deduction. On the whole, it must be admitted, the rôle of the philosopher is to undermine the truth by attempting to prove it and to reject the truth which will not submit to his dialectic; in this respect the scientist is the child of the philosopher, with this difference that he mistakes the deductions from limited experimental accidentalism as the attainment of finality, and that consequently his knowledge is a pseudognosis of no ultimate validity. What is true of the natural scientist is true of the theological scientist, who has in recent years tended to seek shelter in Thomistic scholasticism, or in some of the mare's-nests provided by certain German schools of agnostic criticism. In the whole process—I might say in the illusion of progress in modern knowledge—we are faced by a pathetic mimesis of theology: the establishment of a hypothetical and practical gulf between the learner and the apprehension of the knowledge he seeks—in the name of *objectivity*. The result is not merely a sense of the unreality of knowledge and science but also an unreality of language, and a consequent lack of certitude in the realms of knowledge and understanding—and most important, mutual understanding—so that thought passes from grappling with a subject to mere external contemplation of certain aspects without any intention of attainment of finality, but rather that of balance. Here lies the innate evil of modern scientific method and history.

The effect of objectivity on learning and scholarship can, perhaps, be best illustrated by the effect on the singer of an accompaniment on the stopped diapason. The pipes of this stop are half the length of an open diapason and are plugged. The effect is to give it the same pitch as its companion, the open diapason, with what old-fashioned books called "great sweetness," but at a cost. The plug or stop at the end of the pipe kills the overtones, which are the unheard sound waves which keep the singer in tune. These are "stopped"; hence the singer first sounds flat and then goes flat.

In the plausible attempt to eliminate dogmatism, the fundamental duty of decision is shirked, and scholarship and science are thus degraded to the successful straddling of antitheses on a pragmatic basis, *viz.*, "after all it works," and the coefficient of its pragmatism is its financial and publicity potential. Impartiality passes from the refusal to show favoritism in judgment to refusal to give judgment at all.

Similarly the *indefinable* overtones of the conscious and the unconscious mind having been cut off from the definable intellect, the result of the process called intellectual suffers the same sense of the untrue as the note of the singer. It is not without significance that the impact of the intellectual approach to music—clearly from its name the realm of the *muse*—and likewise to poetry, has produced such (musically) cacophonic nonsense. There is, however, nothing new or "modern" in this neosophistry, the mental vice of the age, for it was recognized by St. Augustine as *fornicatio fantastica.*

Here we have the great moral abdication of the academic institutions of our age, whereby the word *academic* has been reduced to the rank of a synonym for unreality and futility in the eyes of the efficient by the pride of those whose aim is to be intellectual, instead of intelligent. An appeal to the wisdom of St. Paul may not be inappropriate, by changing one word, which causes no violation, but rather the completion of the sense: "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part (*i.e.*, imperfect) shall be done away" (1 Cor. 13:10).

I wish to apply this maxim grammatically to two words which are the affliction of the modern educational world and the bane of modern academic institutions, except when they are used in a mechanical or psychological sense, respectively: they are *efficient* and *intellectual.* A philological application of St. Paul's dictum reveals strange results, which are nonetheless important. First take the word *efficient.* The word is derived from the imperfect participle of the verb *efficere:* to make complete, accomplish, execute, perform. The perfect participle gives us the word *effective.* If St. Paul is right, efficiency is an imperfect form of the effective; in other words, the boast of efficiency is the confession of failure to be effective! In the case of the word *intellectual*—that precious goal of the pseudo-academic pretender—we get a similar result but in a contrary direction. *Intellectual* is derived from the perfect participle of *intelligo; intelligence* from the imperfect participle. When that which is perfect has come, that which is imperfect passes away: the intellectual is one who has ceased to be intelligent! *Si monumentum requiris, circumspice!*

But to return to the place of docetism in thought, this time in modern thought and education. It is an excellent example of a desperate remedy.

The mood starts from the Enlightenment in France, but particularly in that form mediated by Germany. Religious prejudice and its conservation had for centuries blinded men to the nature of truth. Instead truth, particularly in matters of religion and politics, had been distorted for the purpose of the maintenance of authority in church and state. It was not peculiar to Christianity, for the Greeks had already sentenced Socrates to death. In its place was born modern science, with its experimental proof; and mathematics took over the functions of a misplaced logic. Instead of regarding anything from the authoritative point of view, men were urged to look at it first of all as an *object*. So far, so good. But the Enlightenment produced its philological philosophers too, and to regard a thing as an *object* came to be decribed as "to take an objective view." Here there lies an unconscious metathesis, and the *view* of the observer instead of the object observed, becomes the recipient of a pseudonymous quality—our third step—*objectivity*. The process is a perfect specimen of scientific scholasticism, for *objectivity* having become the *substantia* of the view, instead of the reality of the object, we have a perfect case of transubstantiation, the product not of the theologian but of the scientist. The result, however, is a subtle psychological change which comes over the observer, whereby the sense of reality departs, and with it the sense of dealing with a concrete entity. (Even the science of statistics resolves itself into an escape from facts to figures, and is therefore in quality phantastic.) The transubstantiation in the process produces transaccidentalism in the result. This change appears in the externalism of the account: fact upon fact in histories with only mechanical links, as though the mere accumulation of facts was the final object of the historian and the processes of causation, evaluation, and understanding were no part of his task. This element of mere tactuality deals only with the arena of appearances; so it is really a form of docetism, and as it has become a philosophy of learning and science, it is better called *philo-docetism* than *philo-sophia*, for *sophia* implies "wisdom," which is excluded by the docetic view. Moreover, the docetic view carries with it the implication of that nervous substitute for an affirmative, "it appears to be so," or, "it seems to be so," "it may be"—in other words, the safe, noncommital attitude which lies at the root of academic and official incertitude, irresponsibility, and lack of conviction. In personal and public ethics, it produces that indifference to distinction between good and evil that paves the way for pragmatism, which is the denial to act or thought of all quality, save that of mechanical efficiency. It was in no small part the development of this pragmatic mood in Germany that has led to three wars in three quarters of a century.

We have reached the headquarters of the modern cult, whence have sprung the Scottish, American, and English imitations. Dean Hodges, of

Harvard, is recorded as having remarked, "I prefer papists to apists," and the wisdom of his remark applies to the cult of philodocetism. In an age and mood of ecclesiastical orthodoxy, heresy was described by words or hybrids ending in *-ism*, suggesting the propriety or a term—or the philosophy of countries by them—*ismisticism*—the science of creating *isms*, or the religion of the *ism*. The greatest menace arises, however, not from this climacterical *-ism*, but, in an age of initialitis from the mark borne alike by the devotees and victims of the cult—ΦΔ or colloquially, Phil. Doc. or Ph.D. Here we reach the heart of the subject, for the doctrine of baptismal regeneration has produced no more fanatics than has this particular cult of *la régéneration illuminatique;* for, while baptismal regeneration has flourished in the realm of the fertility cult, *la régéneration illuminatique* has flourished in the realm of mental sterility and thrives on the dessication of the intelligence by the process of mimeticism, vulgarly called imitation—and still more vulgarly, by Dean Hodges, "apism."

The ramifications of this cult, spreading from the university—which is a name but with a changed significance, having passed from a home of sound learning to a Ph.D. factory, based on the highest principles of what the Germans call *Der Fordismus*—reaches down, I am reliably informed, to the kindergarten, where we find the first strains of nominalistic dissociation. This result is not surprising, as all "the best institutions" are classified as such on the basis of the percentage of Ph.D.'s on their faculties. In the English tradition, which lasted until Harvard set the fashion in this country, it was not so. The standard mediævalists' reviews of Kenneth Rand's book, *Founders of the Middle Ages*, expressed disappointment, but the reviewers had failed to see its real object. It was primarily an attack on the changes introduced by President Eliot in Harvard. A contemporary of his, George Foot Moore, was once asked (in my presence) where he was "trained"—a word more suggestive of the nursery than that of academic life. "Trained!" he said, "What do you mean?" "Under whom did you take your Ph.D.?" "Never had one! My only degree is my M.A., all the rest are honorary. I was lucky. I got in before that racket began; otherwise, I should never have been a professor, for I should never have had enough patience to obey the orders necessary to obtain that degree and I should have been certain to have quarreled with my supervisor, and *that* would have been fatal."

In addition, it has become a source of revenue for universities, whereby professors succeed in delegating the wearisome chores of proof of portions of their own work to pupils, who are expected to reach the prescribed result! If they fail to do so, or reach a different conclusion, they are liable to jeopardize their degrees. There was once a young instructor in Oberlin College, who pursued the truth to conclusions opposed to those directed

by his director of studies in a certain university, and his doctorate was seriously jeopardized through the invocation of red tape in chronological extremity.

Its great *use* is to ensure a sufficient degree of economic dependence of young teachers to guarantee their docility, as a distinguished American critic of American academic life has pointed out.

There is a further evil. A former pupil of mine told me that he was appalled at the extent to which seminar room criticism of papers was limited to criticism of word and phrase. "It would be all very well," he said, "if it was aimed at the improvement of the English, but it appears to be aimed rather at the production of the style of a scientific textbook or a bad literal translation of German"—all in the name and for the sake of the unseen god, objectivity, and the suppression of all evidence of human intelligence. Indeed, in one large university, I have been informed, on excellent authority, that the main duty of departmental instructors is to rewrite Ph.D. theses in style appropriate for inclusion in their official publications!

A final interlude: Many years ago—in 1922—I was discussing the introduction of the Ph.D. degree with a well-known Oxford dean. Both Oxford and Cambridge had passed the necessary ordinances in order to comply with the request of the U. S. State Department, transmitted through the British Foreign Office, to provide the degree so that young American students need no longer be corrupted by German ways of thought in their quest for that hallmark of *Gelehrtigkeit*. Oxford already had the postgraduate B.Litt., B.C.L., B.Sc., and B.D.; but they were only baccalaureates, not carrying the glamor of the title doctor. Cambridge had only the LL.B., LL.M., and B.D. (I omit medical degrees). My friend proceeded to explain the superior merits of the Oxford plan—although Sir Charles Oman saw no merit in a degree which called for no evidence of residence in the university that conferred it, and so of no chance to absorb its culture and atmosphere. Oxford decided to put the degree on the level of her full doctorates: D.Litt., D.Sc., D.C.L., and D.Mus., giving it the form D.Phil., with "full scarlet." In other words, she made it a first-class doctorate in proper English manner. The result has been, on the whole, justified, for in Oxford the degree has not tended to undermine the M.A. Cambridge took the orders literally, and placed the Ph.D. in order of precedence, "somewhere between" a B.D. (a senior degree in the University), and a M.A., stipulating that its status should never be permitted to encroach on the rights of the Master of Arts. My Oxford friend described the step as a mark of the Cambridge inferiority complex which was bound to prove disastrous. I regret to have to admit that his prophecy appears to have come true, as the degree of teutonification that Oxford has suffered appears

to have been so far less than that of Cambridge, where a retiring vice-chancellor, in his valedictory speech before the senate, advocated the building of a large graduate college. *Monstrum horrendum ingens!* The proposal was attacked at once, but time has yet to show whether the indecencies of the scientific mood will or will not prevail over the essential academic decency of the place. If the scientists triumph, Cambridge will emerge as our leading German University and Oxford *autarcheia* will emerge completely satisfied: to a Cambridge man this would prove, perhaps, the most galling of the sequels to her Great Betrayal.

The real bane of the degree and its course arises from the false analogy of arts and science, and the sense of inferiority so frequently found among arts men in the presence of the *superbia* of the scientist. The root of the trouble is to be found ultimately in the substitution of utilitarian standards in science for those of sound academic standards which it is the main function of the arts to maintain. T. R. Glover once said to me: "The scientists would betray the whole University for a mess of pottery or a single erection in brick or stone." That was of Cambridge. I have found the same case true in every university or college I have known. They have their museums and laboratories, where visitors may be shown their dainty little tricks of legerdemain accompanied by appropriate tricks of *léger d'esprit.* The arts side is *relatively* free from these innocuous sources of attraction; therefore the academic utilitarians, on account of their attractiveness to the Sons of Midas, can obtain the funds which real education needs. Even the members of the arts side have been known to succumb to the jugglers' magic wands. Then comes the statistician, to reduce achievement to the form of numerical chaos—called by its devotees, *nota bene*, "order," and illusion is perfected in the docetic. Quantity supplants quality, because quantity can be measured, and quality implies the use of the "subjective" judgment, which is anathema to the apostle of objectivity. That is probably the reason why the standing of colleges is so often determined by the coefficient of Ph.D.'s contained in its faculty—as an easy method of objective assessment of quality for tabulation in the records of corporate mercantile "generosity" in quest of an escape from the grasp of inland revenue authorities. The use of the most objective of modern degrees as the magic wand to transmit the curse of the ancient Cretan king to the services of academic life is, perhaps, as characteristic as it is ironical.

Furthermore, it involves a canon of orthodoxy—*horresco referens;* shade of Voltaire!—in fact a sacramentalism, which reached its climax of impudence when Shailer Matthews wrote an article in 1929 or 1930 on the topic of God in Chicago Theology and proceeded to state, amid graphic descriptive detail of an appropriate anthropomorphic order, that "in Chicago we put God on the dissecting table." The canon of orthodoxy appears

to be *experimenta docent,* and the new sacrament of the Deity himself on the altar of science can be best described in terms of scientific relapse into primitive magic or the triumph of divisectional publicity. I refrain from comment on the potential theological product!

Sacramentalistic development calls for the assurance of sacramental validity and a philodocetic succession—it should be remembered that the originial Gnostics or docetics started the idea of successions to which the doctrine of apostolic succession, it has been suggested, was devised as the antidote—and the cult of the *Aufklärung,* "protesting that she'd ne'er consent, consented" to become an *ecclesia,* with all the paraphernalia of ordination, not excluding her own pretensions to papal infallibility, buttressed by the dogma of progress.

Then came the cataclysm, as Dean Inge pointed out fifteen years ago:

> The secular religion of progress is a house built on the sand. It has no real support from the study of biological evolution; and modern physics, of which, according to Eddington, the dismal law of entropy is the corner-stone, seems to present us only with a dysteleology of an absolute kind. We have time, ample time, for social reforms, no doubt; but the old claim that 'the universe is friendly' is not easy to substantiate. Science itself is ceasing to be dogmatic, and shows a curious tendency to play with mentalism, cutting itself loose from the concrete facts on which its whole fabric is based. A panmathematical universe contains none but hypothetical entities. Science, in fact, is withdrawing more and more into its own domain. It no longer speaks pontifically, like Huxley and Herbert Spencer; and with increasing specialisation comes increasing divergence, as in the conflict between biology and physics on 'emergent' evolution. . . .
>
> We have therefore a civilisation no longer directed by any external authority, and uncertain of its foundations.[1]

With objectivity, the object of learning—*viz.,* understanding—vanishes. for as Aldous Huxley has pointed out in a recent work,[2]

> Confronted by the data of experience, men of science begin by leaving out of account all those aspects of the facts which do not lend themselves to measurement and to explanation in terms of antecedent causes rather than of purpose, intention and values. . . .
>
> Human beings, it is more or less tacitly assumed, are nothing but bodies, animals, even machines; . . . The political consequences of this "nothing-but" philosophy are clearly apparent in that widespread indifference to the values of human personality and human life, which are so characteristic of the present age.

The sorry truth that emerges is that education has lost its bearings and that the scientist has raised in its stead the work of his heroic predecessor, Frankenstein. Lady Mary Shelley forecast the peril, in slightly different form. What she really forecast was the creation of the modern conscienceless scientist, so trained as to kill both his conscience and its governor, his intelligence, in the name of objectivity. As I have written

[1] "The Future of Protestantism," *Modern Churchman,* XXII (1932), p. 236.
[2] A. Huxley, *Science, Liberty and Peace,* (Harper, 1946), pp. 35, 37.

elsewhere, the essence of objectivity is to be found in the elimination of intelligence from the exercise of what are called "the intellectual processes." The arts side, having been starved by the products of the utilitarian movement and the industrial revolutions, appears to have developed an inferiority complex. The consequence has been that they have become apists of the scientific papists. Progress has passed from a doctrine of sacrifice to a magic shibboleth to serve as a *quietus* to thought. It has developed the cult of objectivity to the exclusion of intelligence and wisdom, with the result that thought is reduced to reflection—an *external* process—whereby the mind, whatever it may be, is annihilated save as a topic for philosophic discussion. Intellect, that corpse of the living intelligence, has been embalmed and, like the corpse of Lenin, placed in a glass case for adoration by the idolaters of the modern cult of the dead, the intellectuals. With the capture of the educational machine by the priests of this cult, the *cogency* of belief in a living god or a living knowledge has passed away, and with it, language has lost its force, cogency, and meaning to degenerate into a jargon of academic diplomacy. By the irony of fate, the final blow was delivered by the philosophy of pragmatism.

Initially an attempt to rescue philosophy from its legacy of unreality, it has emerged as the keystone of the edifice I have called philodocetism, for it has declared the bankruptcy of all tests save that of the superficial concept: "It works." The strategic use of untruth or partial truth also works, and by pragmatism is thereby justified. It is not my intention to discuss the ethical aspect of the consequences of this mode of thought, for the appeal to ethics is the declaration of bankruptcy by the mentally inert. I am more concerned with the ultimate effect on knowledge and understanding. In politics, pragmatism begets fascism, for the concepts of liberty and freedom undermine the "efficiency"—I use the word strictly in the sense of mathematical or mechanical efficiency—of organized society, be it a state, university, college, or church. The doctrine of human liberty becomes, thereby, the game preserve of the political scientist and the politician: to the politician it is the bait; to the political scientist, the sport. In the meantime both politician and political scientist have received sufficient doses of the antitoxin against reality—called by the proprietary name "Education"—to render both immune, even when honest, to political reality. Their audiences have been similarly immunized at every grade of their education from kindergarten to university. It is not strange, therefore, that modern fascism emerged from logical Italy to be nurtured in the atmosphere of *gelehrte Deutschland* to be adopted by its Anglo-Saxon mimics as the *idolum sæculi*. It may well be significant that the strength of Mr. John L. Lewis is derived from the fact that his native intelligence

and courage have not been sapped and emasculated by the process of modern education.

In place of this toxic brew of modern witchcraft and wizardry, the laboratorical counterpart—or offspring—of the coven and the heath, and of Dr. Faustus, whether it be the scientists' nursery, the theological classroom, or the church, where arise, as Whittier said:

> "Some fever of the blood and brain,
> Some self-exalting spell,
> . . . .
> The cloister madness of the monk,
> The fakir's torture-show!
>
> And yet the past comes round again,
> And new doth old fulfil;
> In sensual transports wild as vain
> We brew in many a Christian fane
> The heathen Soma still!"

—in place of these, if education is not to die of the fevers of illusion and philodocetism (the proper title for that modern perversion of reality called "realism"), it will be necessary to turn to that seventeenth-century document, *The Book of Common Prayer*, where we find invoked "the spirit of wisdom and understanding," "that [as to the Scriptures] we may in such wise hear them, read, mark, learn and *inwardly digest them*"; or to Arnold of Rugby: "Strengthen the faculties of our *minds*[3] and dispose us to exert them"; or to Lucretius, writing two thousand years ago, and wiser in his day and generation than the children of the Enlightenment:

> I say, first, that the mind, which oft we call the understanding, that in which is placed the guidance and government of life, is no whit less a portion of a man than hands or feet or eyes are portions of the total living thing . . . . that the mind's sensation is not placed in a fixed part, but is a certain vital habit of the body called in Greek a harmony.[4]

A year ago, the president of the Classical Association in London said that he held the opinion that one of their principal allies in defence of the humanities must be science itself. They of the classics often forgot and those of science often forgot, or perhaps they had not yet realized, that science was itself a great humanity. Were the scientist and the humanist incapable of reconciliation? Surely not. Aristotle and Leonardo da Vinci knew better than that. And was it not the great humanist (just quoted) himself who wrote: *Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas?* Science, if it were to be true to itself, must possess integrity of mind; it must follow

[3] It were well to remember that the mind and the brain are not the same.
[4] Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* iii, 94-101.

the argument; its thought must be accurate, its approach critical, its language precise; it must shun superficiality as the lie in the soul. Here, then, was a battle half won, for what were these characteristics but some of those which Greece and Rome had contributed to the life of man? But these characteristics would make up but half a man. They must be warmed and illumined by the human quality of man himself. A race that knew and cared for nothing but science and its practical application would, if left to itself, become as soulless and mechanical as the formulas that it invented and the engines that it created; just as a race that knew and cared for nothing but the humanities would end its life in dreams or in some cloister of the mind. Neither the perfect scientist nor the perfect humanist could hope to reach human perfection. To his warning the words of a modern engineering scientist may be added: "Better general education, with emphasis on *wisdom* rather than inconsequential knowledge, is essential to human safety and progress."

Or we may with profit turn back to the Orient, to a story I read many years ago: A faqir was once sitting in contemplation, and a wise young fool asked him what he was doing. He replied, "Contemplating God." The young man ridiculed him and said, "Show me God; and when I have seen him, then I will believe what I have seen." The old faqir said nothing, and the young man eventually moved on from boredom. Then the faqir picked up a stone and with unerring aim hit him on the middle of the back of the head. The young man came back in a rage and asked him why he had hit him with the stone. The faqir asked him how he knew he had hit him, his back had been turned and he was looking the other way. The young man replied, "By the pain." The faqir answered, "Show me the pain and then I will believe."

That is an abbreviated form of the story, but it brings out the essential point—the difference between wisdom and knowledge on the one hand, and experimental pragmatism on the other. The story shows the illusion of progress in knowledge from the thirteenth to the twentieth century: from reality to symptomaticism, from *gnosis* (real knowledge) to docetism; from wisdom to laboratoricism; one might say from common sense to prevalent nonsense, from East to West. It illustrates that loss of touch with reality which comes from learning *in vacuo*, which is the prescribed outcome of the cult of scientific certitude and intellectual objectivity. The results have been disastrous, and the measure of the disaster has appeared in the last decade in the triviality with which the Munich crisis was handled, the world war, and the triviality shown in the conduct of the peace negotiations—a sandwich of disaster. But for German objectivity and intellectualism, the Germans would not have been so easily duped by Hitler. In that sense, the war was due primarily to the preparation of German

philosophy and theories of reality. The quest for the phantom *Gründlichkeit* has taken the feet of men from the dull solid ground of experience and wisdom.

Outside Germany, *le monde intellectuel* has followed the path of apism. Although the Germans have twice suffered the military defeat in war, they have gained the decisive victory in education and learning, and "the mark of the beast" is no longer 666, but ΦΔ or Ph.D. Alexander Pope once described a bishop as "Much divinity without a *nous*." It is the perfect description not only of the heresy of Apollinarius, but it is also of the heresy of modern objectivity. With her decisive victory in the field of education, Germany's ultimate victory elsewhere would appear—with the help of Anglo-Saxon "objective" diplomacy—to be finally assured. For mankind, having been deprived by the forces of modern education of the ability to *think*, has become the fit victim of the illusions created by dictators for the advancement of their own dark causes.

Some years ago I addressed a graduating class in a seminary on the need of each to *think*. The next morning one of the best brought to a climax seven years of modern education with the question: "But sir, what do you mean when you use the word 'think'?" He told me he had never heard the word used in school or college except in the form: "I think this," or "I think that," that is, as an expression of opinion.

In conclusion: it were well to remember the wise words of Remy de Gourmont:

"It is necessary to take into account that man is not responsible for the laws of nature, since he obeys them as a little child; but those (laws) that he promulgates (himself) recoil some day, not only on his body, but also on his intelligence."[5]

The tree of knowledge of good and evil was Jehovah's precious mystery, just as the secret of fire was Jove's; and the history of religion and philosophy is one long epic of the dire penalties of the thefts of that fruit, which is the seed of education. The history of education is the process by which the scientist has succeeded in annihilating the theft by the substitution of objectivity for intelligence. The irony emerges when we realize that the scientist, by the triumph of his philodocetism, has restored the supremacy of the priestly writer's deity, where theological apologetic had failed completely. In despair, the theologian has sought a philodocetic escape by the acceptance of the sin of Eve and Adam, (here sheltering behind the scientist), and aims, quite logically, to reërect magic, under the name of ethics, as a substitute for religion. His process is a docetic

[5] Remy de Gourmont, *La Culture des Idées* (ed. 18), p. 228.

idealism, devoid of any metaphysical taint save in his language and pretensions. His quest is for a moral Christian worshiping a supermoral God —ever unmindful of the warning of the Mystic Blake:

"If Moral Virtue was Christianity,
Christ's Pretensions were all Vanity,"

and,

"The Moral Christian is the Cause
Of the Unbeliever and his Laws."

In the meantime, the Promethean epic is still alive, and Jove remains supreme, having in these latter days, lest Shelley's dream come true, rendered impotent Prometheus, man's sole champion among the Titans, by means of the fruit of the phantom doctoral tree which knows not good from evil, so that the Enlightenment of man has been turned to darkness by the passing of intelligence from knowledge and education. So, too, the scientist has restored to wayward Jove his thunderbolts, in the form and substance of atomic bombs, the *dernier cri* of the politician's vanity, the exploiter's scientific pride, and the preacher's belated eschatological homiletic hope. Jove remains eternally constant—save to Juno—in all his former pride and vindictive oppression of the Titan champion of independent man, for while repentance may be the way of man's salvation, it is a luxury divinity cannot afford even to contemplate. Jove's modern demigods, our scientists—even on their own assessment at times, self-endued with the *autarcheia* of their own self-assumed infallibility, emancipated from all sense of reality and responsibility, the victims of the pride of their self-induced *miasma philodocetica*—have given to these latter days their own eschatological hope, in which heretofore they have professed disdain.

> And so a war of first beginnings, undertaken from eternal time, is waged with equal strife. Now here, now there, the vital particles (atoms) have mastery and then again are mastered. With funeral cries is mixed the wail that children raise when visiting the coasts of light; no night has followed day, nor morning night, that has not heard, mixed with the infant's feeble wails, the lamentations that accompany death and dark burial.[6]

These are not the words of the Christian Scriptures, or the modern humanist, but of Lucretius, the poet of atomic beginnings, who died probably two thousand years ago. They join with the hymn of St. Thomas of Celano, thirteen centuries later, and Saxon poets of eleven centuries ago and more. They join, too, the creators of modern scientific eschatological reality, the scientists, now linked with the fundamentalists, whose prophesies they have endorsed by the provision of a *terminus ad quem* for the

[6] Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* ii, 574-580.

scientists' illusion of progress by its own inherent *reductio ad absurdum*, summed up in Thomas of Celano's hymn:

"Dies iræ, dies illa
Solvet sæclum in favilla,"

which may be fairly translated:

"Day of wrath, that day of days,
Slays the world in death's own rays,"

when "death is stunned and nature too"; when Jove, by science rejuvenate complete with bolts as of yore, mocks the church of Prometheus, bound anew in the shackles of Jove's curse, to the dismay of Æschylus and the grief of Shelley; in the hour of the truimph of science, bereft of reality's sense and disdaining alike intelligence and responsibility; in the darkness of the New Enlightenment, whose sole illumination is the flash of the atomic bomb, the new Light of Asia—a light to lighten the gentiles, the Light of the West! whereby we pass from the grim verdict of Tacitus: "Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant," to Schweitzer's despairing hope of the solution of our moral and intellectual dilemma, born of the illusion of progress; when modern education and its bitter fruits of soulless speculation and experiment have perished in the schism of its own mind and we no longer see through the glass of illusion darkly, but face to face, with intelligence, no longer burdened by the scientists' quest for illusory objectivity, seeing true learning seated once more on the throne of her own glory, so long usurped by her sterile reflection—infallible intellectual pride, decked in all its brazen academic *kenodoxia*, to hide her debilitation amid the scientific fumes of its own toxic exhalations and simoniac greed.

The deposition of the intelligence from her proper supremacy is the unpardonable sin of modern education with its futile philodocetic pose, and the capital sentence was pronounced by Nietzsche: "Values will not yield themselves to the detached observer," and "Cold grey eyes do not know what things are worth." It is the true picture of the modern academic mood, which at the moment appears to have passed beyond hope of cure. If that is so, then although Germany lost the military battle, she has won the war of education in the Anglo-Saxon world, and has crept into our schools leading captive our silly leaders, laden with their sins, ever learning and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth. There was never a greater need for the rise of an academic Luther to preach the doctrine of justification by faith and to condemn the quest of justification by laboratorical works.

THE MYSTERY OF THE HEBREW SCROLLS

SOLOMON ZEITLIN
Dropsie College

SINCE the wires flashed the news of the discovery of ancient Hebrew manuscripts in the desert near the Dead Sea we have been constantly hearing of further discoveries of all kinds of books, apocryphal and sectarian.

The first detailed report on the discovery of the scrolls was published by Dr. John C. Trever in the *Biblical Archæologist* in September, 1948. Another report by Dr. E. L. Sukenik was given in *Megillot Genuzot,* published towards the end of 1948. A further description was set forth by Archbishop Mar Athanasius Y. Samuel in the *Biblical Archæologist* of May, 1949. G. Lancaster Harding gave his account of the discovery in the London *Times* of August 9, 1949.

Laymen as well as scholars are eager to have the entire story of this "epoch-making discovery." Since these reports appeared in different publications I shall present the various versions.

In the *Biblical Archæologist* of September, 1948, Dr. Trever relates that on a Wednesday afternoon (February 18, 1948) he received a telephone call from Father Butros Sowmy, of the St. Mark's Syrian Orthodox Convent in the Old City of Jerusalem, informing him that "while working in the library of the Convent, cataloguing the books, he had come upon five scrolls in ancient Hebrew about which their catalogue carried no information." Owing to disturbances in Jerusalem at that time, Dr. Trever says that he could not go to the Old City and he suggested that Father Sowmy bring the manuscripts to the American School. In commenting upon his first examination of some of the parchments Dr. Trever says, "The script, though obviously Hebrew, looked strange to my inexperienced eyes." Father Sowmy permitted him to copy several lines. "The suggestion," says Trever, "to Father Sowmy that if photographed and published the value of the manuscripts would be enhanced met with a degree of interest on his part." While Trever was copying the passage Father Sowmy and his brother related to him the story of the discovery.

Wandering bedouin, carrying goods from the Jordan Valley to Bethlehem, they said, chanced upon a cave near the north end of the Dead Sea, high up on the cliffs. The cave had partly collapsed. . . . Seeing the scrolls protruding from the fallen debris, the bedouin pulled them out and tore off the cloth wrappings, thereby revealing the ancient contents. They took them to the Moslem Sheikh in Bethlehem, hoping that he would buy them. The Sheikh, however, thinking that the script was Estrangelo Syriac, suggested that they take the scrolls to the Syrians in Bethlehem. When the Syrians saw them, they called their Metropolitan, Athanasius Yeshue

Samuel, in Jerusalem. He offered to purchase them from the bedouin, and thus they came into the library of St. Mark's Orthodox Convent in Jerusalem.

Trever further says,

> Later it was revealed that the bedouin had discovered the scrolls during the summer of 1947. Late in August they guided one of the priests, Father Bulos, from the Syrian Convent to the site of the discovery. The intense heat, however, made it impossible for him to remain longer than a few minutes; for he had no water and only a few melons with him. He recounted how he had seen not only the pieces of cloth wrappings scattered over the floor of the cave, but also numerous fragments of the manuscripts, broken pieces of the jars in which they had been sealed, and evidences of ancient graves nearby. The bedouin claimed that they had taken some of the jars that had not been broken and were using them for water jars. (I suggested to the Metropolitan that he try to purchase them from the bedouin, but all his attempts failed.)

Trever remarked that he finally succeeded in reaching the Old City and was ready to photograph the manuscripts.

> They informed me [he continues] that only very rarely was anyone allowed to photograph anything in their library. My heart sank, but I tried a new attack. Did they realize that by photographing them and getting them widely distributed, their monetary value would be greatly increased—witness the Codex Sinaiticus? This argument seemed to appeal to them. . . .

And that is the story as related by Dr. Trever[1]: In February, 1948, the Metropolitan was not yet aware of the nature of the manuscripts in his possession. Father Sowmy discovered them while cataloguing books in the library and went to the American School to learn what kind of manuscripts they were. Trever was the first to discover that they were ancient Hebrew manuscripts. According to the story they were found in the summer of 1947 by Bedouin carrying goods from the valley of the Jordan to Bethlehem.

Now we turn to the story as related by the archbishop.[2] He relates that he heard about the Jerusalem scrolls "during our Holy Week in the month Nisan (April), 1947, according to the Julian calendar." Hence we must assume that the scrolls were found before the spring of 1947. The narrative continues, "One of our community, a merchant in Jerusalem, told me that some Bedouins[3] had found some Syriac manuscripts. He said that he had been told about it by another member of our community, a merchant in Bethlehem, to whom the Bedouins had brought the manuscripts." The archbishop explains that the scrolls were taken to the mer-

[1] The quotations in the preceding paragraphs are from Trever's article, "The Discovery of the Scrolls," *Biblical Archæologist*, XI, 3 (Sept., 1948), pp. 46-57.

[2] This account, from which the quotations in this and the subsequent paragraphs are taken, is given in the article by Mar A. Y. Samuel, "The Purchase of the Jerusalem Scrolls," *Biblical Archæologist*, XII, 2 (May, 1949), pp. 26-31.

[3] The spellings *bedouin, Bedouins,* and *Bedouin* conform respectively with the two articles and Webster.—Ed.

chant of Bethlehem, "because they thought they were Syriac, and because they had found our merchant there a helpful and trustworthy friend." Thus the Bedouin did not go with the manuscripts to the sheik as was recounted to Dr. Trever by Father Sowmy but to a merchant. The archbishop continues, "A few days later [still in the spring] both merchants came to our Convent . . . with one of the scrolls. I examined it carefully. It was not Syriac as they had said, but Hebrew." He further relates that he tried to reach the Bedouin through the merchants but did not succeed until midsummer. "The third Saturday of Tammuz," he says, "the two Bedouins returned, and the Bethlehem merchant put the scrolls in a bag; and, accompanied by the Jerusalem merchant, they came to see me. I asked them when they arrived about the third Bedouin and the other scrolls, but they said he had taken them to the Moslem Sheikh in Bethlehem. I purchased the five scrolls plus a few fragments which they had brought." He adds that he urged the Jerusalem merchant to go to the cave to check the story of the discovery. "A few weeks later he reported that he had gone to the cave with the Bedouins. He said that there were many pieces of cloth wrappings on the floor of the cave, pieces of broken jars and one complete jar." Then he stated that he sent one of the priests, Father Yusef, "with the merchant to the cave to check the details further." The account given by Father Yusef is similar to that recorded by Dr. Trever, that bits of manuscripts were found on the floor of the cave. He makes the identical statement that unsuccessful efforts were made to purchase the jars.

One discrepancy between these two reports, and a very significant one, is that Dr. Trever did not mention that a merchant went with the Bedouin to examine the cave before Father Yusef did. Professor Albright's sound opinion about the value of the testimony of merchants in such cases is worth quoting here: "The authority of a dealer is generally quite valueless in itself."[4] Furthermore, according to Trever, the Bedouin guided the priest to the convent. According to the archbishop the priest went with the merchant to the cave.

The archbishop further relates that in October the late Dr. Magnes became aware of the existence of the scrolls and sent two men to the convent who asked if they might take some pictures of a few columns. "I said they could," the archbishop adds, "provided they did so in the convent, but they never returned." It is strange that the authorities of the convent would at first not permit Dr. Trever to photostat the manuscripts and only consented when he convinced them that this increased their value; yet the two emissaries of Dr. Magnes experienced no difficulty whatsoever in obtaining permission to make reproductions.

[4] "A Biblical Fragment from the Maccabæan Age: the Nash Papyrus" in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LVI, 3 (Sept., 1937), p. 145, n. 2.

We shall now turn to the account given by Dr. Sukenik. In the introduction to his book, *Megillot Genuzot,* he relates the various details in connection with the discovery. The scrolls, he says, were found by Bedouin in the summer of 1947 in a cave near the Dead Sea. They were hidden in earthenware jars, of which many were broken and the pieces spread over the floor of the cave except *"one or two"* of the jars which were fully preserved. He first learned of the discovery from a Moslem merchant of Bethlehem toward the end of November, 1947. In January, 1948, he received additional information from a Syrian of Jerusalem who had visited the cave with the Bedouin who had originally brought the scrolls for sale. It seems curious that Dr. Sukenik, the director of the Museum of Jewish Antiquities, of the Hebrew University, received his first information regarding the discovery of the scrolls from a merchant of Bethlehem at the end of November, when, according to the archbishop, Magnes, the chancellor of the University, had already during the month of October sent two men from the library staff to the convent to examine the scrolls. It should be explained why Sukenik had to receive his information from a merchant at a later time.

Although Trever, Sukenik, and the archbishop disagree on many details, some of them important, they all agree on several matters: 1. the scrolls were *not* discovered by archæologists or students of antiquity. They were found by Bedouin. The agents in the transaction between the archbishop and the Bedouin were the merchants. The scrolls were brought to the archbishop in a *bag—not* in *jars.* The jars were broken except two which were left intact. Trever suggested to the archbishop that he purchase these jars, but all attempts to obtain them failed. In his letter to the New York *Times* of March 19, 1949, Sukenik explained why Trever and the archbishop could not secure the jars. "The reason for this apparent failure is simple," he wrote. "I had bought them for the University four months before and they are in our possession." Dr. Sukenik in his book, which was written toward the latter part of 1948, says, "but one or two of the jars [are] fully preserved." Hence at that time he could not have had any jars, for he surely would have known the exact number; he would not have said, "one or two." The archbishop had already tried to secure the jars since the beginning of the year 1948, and had not succeeded. I do not question the fact that Dr. Sukenik purchased jars which were of great antiquity, but where is the proof that the scrolls were in these jars? He purchased them from merchants, and one can purchase many old jars in the Near East.

2. Dr. Sukenik and Dr. Trever not only did not interrogate the Bedouin but never met them. Sukenik dealt only with merchants. Trever had contact only with the archbishop. The latter dealt with mer-

chants who *brought* the Bedouin to him. The Bedouin have since disappeared. In a private communication from Dr. Trever, written to me August 1, 1949, he says that many efforts have been made to make contact with the Bedouin, who found the scrolls, "but they have refused to make themselves known." Trever says further that the two men who had dealings with the Bedouin refused to say anything further in the matter, the reason for this being that they were smugglers during the British Mandate. But since the British Mandate had ended more than a year ago, there would seem to be no reason for any fear to identify themselves. Is there, then, not a possibility that they *smuggled in the scrolls?*

Additional accounts are given by O. R. Sellers in the *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research,* April, 1949,[5] and G. L. Harding in the London *Times,* August 9, 1949. Professor Sellers tells of the excavations made in the cave (presumably where the scrolls were found) by G. L. Harding and Père R. de Vaux, in the hope that the Bedouin might have left some scrolls, but that their quest proved fruitless. What they did find were fragments, which they think belonged to the scrolls. They also found cigarette stubs in the debris and, more important, parts of a Roman lamp and a Roman cooking pot, which Professor Sellers holds were "left by a casual visitor"; he later made the suggestion that the visitor was Origen. Why he decided on Origen and not on some other church father, like Jerome, we shall consider later.

We now give the account of G. L. Harding, chief curator of antiquities, Hashamite Kingdom of the Jordan. "One of the goats strayed in search for better pastures, and the goatherd, looking for it up the steep rock hillside, chanced upon a small circular opening in a rock face." Thus the shepherd who was a Bedouin discovered the scrolls. There was another Bedouin, according to Harding, and the two divided the findings. One sold his share to the Hebrew University, and the other took his four manuscripts to the Monastery of St. Mark. The archbishop, however, has said that there were three Bedouin, who were carrying goods through the desert, and that the merchants brought two Bedouin to him. This statement differs from that of Harding who says that there were two Bedouin, who were goatherds. How did Harding ascertain this when the Bedouin had disappeared and *no one* has been able to locate them? Furthermore, if we are to assume that some Bedouin had told Harding this story, can we take the word of Bedouin two years after the discovery? Harding and Sellers maintain that fragments of manuscripts were found, but the archbishop says that the *merchants* in the summer of 1947 told him that there were pieces of manuscript on the floor of the cave. The excavators did not find anything new and who can tell what the merchants did?

[5] "Excavation of the 'Manuscript' Cave at Ain Fashka," pp. 5-9.

Harding says, "It became clear that there had been an earlier disturbance of the cave, in the Roman times. In this connexion there is a suggestive note in the writings of Origen, who records that in the reign of Caracalla, about A.D. 217, there were found scrolls of books of the Old Testament wrapped in linen and stored in jars, near Jericho." The editor of the *Biblical Archæologist,* September, 1949, apparently concurs *in this opinion that Origen was a visitor in the cave,* for he says, "Since we know that Origen obtained manuscripts from a cave 'near Jericho,' and since the cave contained some intrusive Roman lamps and a Roman cooking pot of the second or third century A.D., Mr. Harding is willing to give credence to the unprovable but not improbable theory that Origen is responsible for removing the bulk of the library."[6] Eusebius, in his *Ecclesiastical History* (vi, 16) states that Origen, in preparing his Hexapla, searched for different manuscripts of which to make use. One was found at Nicopolis, another "in such other place." A third one "was found at Jericho in a jar in the time of Antoninus, the son of Severus [Caracalla]." No mention is made of a *cave,* nor does his statement square with Harding's assertion that the manuscript was "wrapped in linen and stored in jars near Jericho." The use of these manuscripts by Origen is evident in his Hexapla. Judging from the finding of the Roman lamp and cooking pot, we should have to assume that Origen spent some time in the cave copying biblical manuscripts. If so, then why did he not make use of them? Why have not the scholars shown the influence of the variant readings of Isaiah and the Commentary of Habakkuk upon the Hexapla? Had this wild hypothesis not come from men of such repute, we should have considered it a hoax: but unfortunately it has been taken seriously even by the authorities at the Library of Congress.

Professor Albright, on the other hand, is of the opinion that somebody about the third century C.E. visited the cave, and that as a result some scrolls were removed. We may just as well assume that someone placed the scrolls in the cave at that time. We may even postulate that somebody, not a student of antiquity and not knowing the distinction between potteries of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, *placed* these jars in the cave.

The finding of the scrolls is shrouded in mystery. We do not even know whether the scrolls were in the jars or beside the jars at the time of their discovery. We are not interested in the authenticity of the jars: the question for us is the authenticity of the scrolls. Hence, archæology is eliminated as the decisive factor in judging their antiquity. The fact that Harding and Sellers found pieces of pottery and fragments of manuscript containing writing similar to that of the scrolls is not a proof of

[6] Vol. XII, 3, p. 65.

their antiquity. As mentioned before, merchants had been in the cave in 1947. Harding and Sellers also said that there had been unauthorized excavators there before them, and we do not know what these visitors did in the cave.

An effort has been made to establish the antiquity of the scrolls through palæography, on the ground that the script of the Hebrew scrolls is similar to that in the Nash papyrus. But the antiquity of the Nash papyrus is contested and far from certain. Professor Driver, in his article in the *Jewish Quarterly Review,* October, 1949, has well said that the effort to fix the date of this manuscript by the nature of the script is but an attempt to establish *ignotum per ignotius.*

It has also been stated that an examination of the ink revealed it to be carbon, and that hence the date of the scrolls must go back to the hellenistic period. But it is a fact that the Jews of the Middle Ages used carbon ink, not iron ink, in the writing of their holy scrolls. A year ago I urged that the ink and the parchment be chemically analyzed in a laboratory. At least we could learn whether or not the ink is modern. To this date no official announcement has been received from any reputable laboratory as to the composition of the ink.

The only criterion to determine the antiquity of the scrolls is a literary examination, and this reveals that they are unmistakably of the post-Christian period. I pointed out that the usage of the term "teacher of righteousness" in the Commentary on Habakkuk demonstrates that this commentary was composed in the post-Christian period, since this term came into vogue after the sixth century of our era. The use of the term *El* (God) instead of *Jehovah* is another indication that the manuscript is not of the pre-Christian period. The use of these and other terms, which I pointed out in my articles in the *Jewish Quarterly Review,* has not been challenged. Professor Albright's answer was that he was not competent in rabbinics to express an opinion here. The Commentary on Habakkuk and the so-called "sectarian scroll" are full of rabbinical terms, and only those who are well versed in the rabbinic literature of the Middle Ages are qualified to express their opinion. Furthermore, even the script and orthography of the scrolls are not of the pre-Christian period.

A few words should be said as to the methods that have been employed in determining the antiquity of the scrolls. Instead of leaving the matter to the academicians the scholars have presented the discovery before the public at large. Moving pictures, television, and radio have been used. Since the first news flash came from Palestine, we are constantly reading new reports in the press. This is indeed a menace to scholarship. Professor Driver was right when he said, as reported in the New York *Times* of August 2, 1949, "The idea of taking the scrolls to

America seems to have been: How much money can be made out of it?" The type of publicity employed concerning the discovery of the scrolls does not popularize but vulgarizes scholarship. Through this sort of publicity the discovery of the scrolls became such an absorbing topic in the minds of the average layman that even schools of learning have also succumbed to it. One Jewish institution of higher learning dramatized on the air the discovery of the scrolls by the scholars who excavated the cave. No *scholars* discovered the scrolls. They were brought to the archbishop by merchants accompanied by Bedouin. This type of publicity leads to a dissemination of pseudoscholarship and is a disservice to sound learning.

Lately the Library of Congress exhibited the Book of Isaiah, Commentary on Habakkuk, and the so-called Jewish Sectarian Scroll. No one can object to such an exhibition, but the releases sent to the press by the authorities of the Library are not authentic and, to put it mildly, lead to confusion. In release 611, p. 3, the following statement is made, "Dr. H. J. Plenderleith, chief chemist of the British Museum, who has been working on the fragments, declares that there can be no possible doubt as to their antiquity." Where did Dr. Plenderleith make such a statement? In a letter to me, dated August 31, 1949, he stated that he is in no sense qualified to take part in this discussion. Furthermore, he says that he is a museum scientist entrusted with the preservation of fragments of old parchment. I have been told by those who ought to know that Dr. Plenderleith is not a chemist at all.

In conclusion, I repeat what I have stated in my articles published in the *Jewish Quarterly Review:* In my judgment the scrolls are not of the pre-Christian period and have no value for the history of Judaism and early Christianity.

THE HOUSE IN CAPERNAUM

WILLIAM K. PRENTICE
Princeton University

In Matt. 4:12-13 and 17, it is said: "Now when Jesus had heard that John was cast into prison, he departed into Galilee; and leaving Nazareth, he came and dwelt (κατῴκησεν) in Capernaum, which is upon the sea coast [that is, on the shore of the Sea of Galilee]." "From that time Jesus began to preach." That is something more than what is told in Mark, for there (1:14) we read only: "After that John was put in prison, Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the gospel of the kingdom of God." Of course the statement in Matthew, that when Jesus returned to Galilee he left Nazareth and lived in Capernaum, may be merely an inference, perhaps from Mark 1:14-21; but at least it is consistent with all the information we have about this matter from any source, and it explains some other statements which otherwise might be obscure. For example, Mark 1:16-20 and Matt. 4:18-22 tell how Jesus, walking by the Sea of Galilee, saw two brothers, Peter and Andrew, casting a net into the sea, and when he had gone a little farther he saw two other brothers, James and John, mending their nets: he called these four fishermen to follow him, and they appear to have been the first of his intimate disciples. It would not be easy to understand why Jesus, if he was living at Nazareth, was walking along the shore of the lake; but it is most natural if Jesus was then living at Capernaum while the others were living at Capernaum or at Bethsaida. For Nazareth was about twenty miles inland, while Capernaum and Bethsaida, which was close by, were both on the shore.

Mark 1: 16 ff., after telling the story of the calling of Peter and the other three fishermen much as it is told in Matt. 4:18-22, adds: "And they went into Capernaum. . . . And forthwith, when they were come out of the synagogue, they entered into the house of Simon and Andrew, with James and John." In this house, according to this narrative, Jesus cured Simon's wife's mother. Apparently this was not the house in which Jesus was then living. John 1:44 implies that the house of Andrew and Peter was in Bethsaida, not Capernaum; but even so it was not far off. Mark 1:32-33, however, seems to refer to a house, probably in Capernaum, in which Jesus was living: "At even, when the sun did set, they brought unto him all that were diseased, and them that were possessed with devils. And all the city was gathered together at the door." In Mark 2:1-2 it is said: "And again he entered into Capernaum after some days; and it was noised that he was in the house [in the Greek the text is *in a house* or *at home*]. And straightway many were gathered together, insomuch that

there was no room to receive them, no, not so much as about the door: and he preached the word unto them." Here, according to Mark, the paralytic was let down through an opening made in the roof of the house, and was cured by Jesus (Mark 2:3-12; *cf.* Matt. 9:1-8, and Luke 5:17-26). Then, in verse 13, it is said: "He (Jesus) went forth again by the sea side; and all the multitude resorted unto him, and he taught them."

Again, in Mark 2:15-17, it is said: "As Jesus sat at meat *in his house,* many publicans and sinners sat also together with Jesus and his disciples: for there were many, and they followed him. And when the scribes and Pharisees saw him eat with publicans and sinners, they said unto his disciples, How is it that he eateth with publicans and sinners? When Jesus heard it, he saith unto them, They that are whole have no more need of the physician, but they that are sick: I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance." In Matt. 9:10-13, where the same story is told, it is said that the scene took place, not in *his* house, but in *the* house. Compare also Matt. 13:1 and 36. In Luke 5:29-32 the scene took place in the house of Levi, a publican. But I think that the passage in Mark is the original version of the stories in Matthew and Luke, and if it is true, it presents a picture of the life in Jesus' house in Capernaum, a picture hard for most modern Westerners to visualize, but easy enough for those familiar with life in the Near East, even nowadays, to understand.

This house of Jesus in Capernaum does not seem to have belonged to Jesus' family, whether he lived there alone or not. This is indicated by Mark 3:19b-21 and 31-35. In the first of these passages, after the twelve apostles had been chosen, it is said in the *King James Version:* "And they went into an house." But the Greek words, *καὶ ἔρχεται εἰς οἶκον*, properly mean *and he goes home, i.e.,* to the house where he is then living. Our common version then continues: "And the multitude cometh together again, so that they could not so much as eat bread. And when his friends (*οἱ παρ' αὐτοῦ*) heard of it, they went out (*ἐξῆλθον*) to lay hold on (*κρατῆσαι*) him: for they said, He is beside himself." Doubtless these "friends" were relatives of Jesus, who came from somewhere, doubtless from Nazareth, because they thought that Jesus was insane, and that an obligation rested on his family to take care of him. The second passage begins with what seems to be a restatement of verse 21, leading to a metaphorical expression of the idea that all who do the will of God are akin: "There came then his brethren and his mother, and, standing without (*ἔξω στήκοντες*) sent unto him, calling him. And the multitude sat about him, and they said unto him, Behold thy mother and thy brethren without seek for thee. And he answered them, saying, Who is my mother, or my brethren? And he looked round about on them which sat about him, and said, Behold my mother and my brethren! For whosoever shall do the will of God, the

same is my brother, and my sister, and mother." Here it is evident that the mother and brothers of Jesus were not in the house, apparently because they did not live there, and that they could not enter the house because of the crowd. Essentially the same story is told in Matt. 12:46-50, and in Luke 8:19-21. The idea that Jesus' family did not move to Capernaum with him seems to be contradicted by John 2:12: "After this [*i.e.,* after the marriage at Cana] he went down to Capernaum, he, and his mother, and his brethren, and his disciples: and they continued there not many days." But I think that this statement in John is inaccurate, and perhaps the words *and continued there not many days* were added to reconcile this statement with the more common account which is given in Matthew, Mark, and Luke. It is hard to believe that the family of Joseph the carpenter moved with Jesus from Nazareth where their business was.

It is not known who lived with Jesus in the house at Capernaum, or with whom he lived, or how long he lived there. Of his earliest and most intimate disciples some, at least, Simon and Andrew, James and John, Philip and perhaps Matthew, perhaps others also, lived in Capernaum or in the neighboring Bethsaida, and could be with Jesus a good deal while still living in their own homes. There is no reason to suppose that any of his disciples lived in the house where Jesus lived. Evidently his own family did not live there. It is possible that Jesus lived in Capernaum with some other family which gave him lodging in their house; but if so he seems to have acted as if the house belonged to him, and received many visitors there so that the house was sometimes crowded to the doors and beyond. John 1:35-39 reports that when two of the disciples of John the Baptist, one of whom was Andrew, asked Jesus where he lived, he said, "Come and see": "They came and saw where he dwelt, and abode with him that day: for it was about the tenth hour." That would indicate that Jesus was living in a place to which he could invite guests; but if the account in John is historical, this place was not in Galilee, for, after Andrew had brought his brother Simon to Jesus, it is said, in verse 43: "The day following Jesus would go forth into Galilee, and findeth Philip, and saith unto him, Follow me, etc." However, as I have said elsewhere, the conversations reported in John 1 can hardly have taken place at the time to which they are assigned, and it seems to me very doubtful that they took place at all.

How Jesus obtained an income for his expenses, either at Capernaum or earlier, is another and a more interesting question. The only evidence that Jesus was a carpenter is in Mark 6:1-6. Here it is said that when Jesus was teaching in a synagogue, apparently in Nazareth, many were astonished, saying: "Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary, the brother of James, and Joses, and of Juda and Simon? and are not his sisters here with us?" In the corresponding passage in Matt. 13:54-58,

however, the people say: "Is not this the carpenter's *son*?" Of course it is possible that Jesus was both the son of a carpenter and a carpenter himself. But it looks as if the passage in Matthew was derived from Mark, for the wording in both is almost identical. In that case, either the words *son of* have somehow been omitted from the original text of Mark, or else the words in Mark have been altered by the author of Matthew. It does not seem probable that the author of Matthew would have altered his source in this way unless he had had in other tradition some reason for the alteration. In Luke 4:22 the people say: "Is not this Joseph's son?" In John 6:42, where the scene seems to be laid in Capernaum, the people say: "Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? how is it then that he saith, I came down from heaven?" Consequently, there is no convincing evidence that Jesus was ever a carpenter.

It is probable that as soon as he was old enough Jesus began to work in his father's shop. But afterwards, for perhaps ten or fifteen years (Luke 3:23), we know nothing at all about Jesus' life. At the beginning of his public career Jesus appears frequently, if not regularly, in a synagogue on the Sabbath, and conducts the service or at least preaches there. In Mark 1:21 it is said: "And they went into Capernaum; and straightway on the sabbath day he entered into the synagogue, and taught," and in verse 39: "And he preached in their synagogues throughout all Galilee." Compare also Mark 6:2; Matt. 4:23; 9:35; 13:54; Luke 4:15 and 44; 6:6; 13:10; John 6:59. It does not look as if these passages were based merely on an assumption that the synagogue was the natural place for anyone to preach to Jews unless the crowd of hearers was too large. And it seems hardly possible that a man who was a carpenter and nothing more was allowed to preach in a synagogue.

In Luke 4:16-21 it is said: "As his custom was, he went into the synagogue on the sabbath day, and stood up for to read. And there was delivered unto him the book of the prophet Esaias. And when he had opened the book, he found the place where it was written, The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor; he hath sent me to heal the brokenhearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised, to preach the acceptable year of the Lord. And he closed the book, and gave it to the minister (ὑπηρέτῃ), and sat down. . . . And he began to say unto them, This day is this scripture fulfilled in your ears." Jesus could not have read aloud from the Hebrew Bible, or from an Aramaic translation of it if there was such a translation in use in synagogues of his time, unless he had had a good deal of education. However, the words in Luke appear to be a paraphrase or summary, perhaps from memory, of Isa. 42:1-9. In our English Bible—and the Septuagint version

is no nearer to the text of Luke—we read in Isa. 42:1: "Behold my servant . . . I have put my spirit upon him," and in verse 7: "To open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison house." If the passage in Luke is a paraphrase or summary of this, it is not very accurate. One may wonder whether some other text of Isaiah, different from that which we now have, was current in Jesus' time. But it looks as if the whole passage in Luke was composed by someone to show that Jesus fulfilled Old Testament prophesy, and to attach the authority of "Scripture" to the Christians' belief that Jesus was the Christ. Perhaps Jesus never did read the ancient Scriptures aloud.

In the Greek gospels Jesus is addressed sometimes as *Κύριε*, translated in the *King James Version* by *Lord* or *Sir*, sometimes as *Διδάσκαλε*, *Ἐπιστάτα*, or *Ῥαββεί*, all these last three titles being translated generally by the English *Master*. The title *Ῥαββεί* (or *Ῥαββουνεί*) is given to Jesus twice in Matthew (26:25 and 49), in both cases by Judas; four times in Mark (9:5; 10:51; 11:21; 14:45) by Peter and others; and nine times in John (1:38 and 49; 3:2 and 26; 4:31; 6:25; 9:2; 11:8; 20:16) by various persons: it does not occur in Luke. Three or more of the passages listed here are of doubtful authenticity; but in the others it appears that Jesus was addressed as Rabbi quite naturally, not only by his disciples but also by others.

It is generally believed that in the time of Jesus *Rabbi* was not an official title, that is, that there was no office in Jesus' time to which this title and anything like a regular salary was attached. Yet there were, even then, rabbinical schools of some sort, or opportunities for young Jews to learn the knowledge and the doctrines of the scribes (*νομικοί*.) St. Paul seems to have had such a training, for, in a speech ascribed to him in Acts 22:1-21, it is said: "I am verily a man which am a Jew, born in Tarsus, a city in Cilicia, yet brought up in this city at the feet of Gamaliel, and taught according to the perfect manner of the law of the fathers, and zealous toward God, as ye all are this day. . . . As also the high priest doth bear me witness, and all the estate of the elders (*πᾶν τὸ πρεσβυτέριον*): from whom also I received letters unto the brethren, and went to Damascus, to bring them which were there bound unto Jerusalem, for to be punished." Doubtless this is not actually a speech by Paul himself, but composed by the author of the Acts, like other speeches in Acts and in the works of other ancient historians including Thucydides. But it is probable that such definite statements as these in these speeches were commonly based on known facts. If so, then Paul, some time before Jesus' death, did have such a training, and soon after Jesus' death was sent by the high priest and elders of the Jews to Damascus with some sort of authority to bring back from there certain dissenters for punishment. Certainly it is possible

that Jesus also had such a training, at Jerusalem or somewhere else. This would account for those years of Jesus' life about which we know nothing, between his boyhood and the beginning of his career as a preacher when he was about thirty years old (Luke 3:23). There is no evidence that Jesus was ever commissioned as an agent by the "elders" of the Jews, as Paul seems to have been, since the words in Luke 4:43, *for therefore am I sent* (*for therefore came I forth,* in Mark 1:38) most probably mean *sent by God.* But it seems to be clearly evident that, when Jesus began to preach, he was allowed to preach in synagogues and even to conduct the regular service there, as if the propriety of his doing so was unquestioned.

If Jesus was for a time a student at some rabbinical school or under some rabbi, his expenses as a student may have been paid by his family. It is also possible that the Jewish religious organization accepted young men of promise and supported them during the years of their training: this organization must have had to recruit new candidates, and provide for a succession of rabbis and teachers. Such a student, if he became an itinerant preacher, might have lived from the hospitality of those among whom he came; but when he had a home and was living there, as Jesus lived at Capernaum, he must have had some other support. And he must have known or believed that he would have this support when he first settled in Capernaum and began his preaching. In Luke 8:2-3 certain women are mentioned—Mary of Magdala, Joanna the wife of Chuza Herod's steward, Susanna, "and many others, which ministered unto him of their substance." But these women can hardly have known much about him or have been devoted to him until *after* he had moved to Capernaum, unless he had already been preaching for some time. Is it possible that, after all, some sort of stipend was sometimes paid by the Jewish organization to such preachers, or that at services in the synagogues collections were sometimes made for the preacher?

The scribes and Jewish leaders were very much concerned about Jesus' teaching. They came from Jerusalem (Mark 3:22), from every town of Galilee, and Judæa, and Jerusalem (Luke 5:17). They heard him speak, questioned him, and criticised him (Mark 2:16, 18, and 24; Matt. 12:1-8; Luke 5:21 and 30; 6:2); they asked him for a sign (Matt. 12:38); they "watched him . . . that they might find an accusation against him" (Luke 6:7); they "began to urge him vehemently, and to provoke him to speak of many things: laying wait for him, and seeking to catch something out of his mouth, that they might accuse him" (Luke 11:53-54). The opposition to Jesus grew. In one synagogue all the congregation "rose up and thrust him out of the city" to kill him (Luke 4:28-29). It is not possible to be precise about the relative chronology of these events in Jesus' life; but in all our accounts all mention of his

preaching in synagogues ceases at about this stage. It seems to have been about this time also that "the Pharisees went out, and held a council against him, how they might destroy him" (Matt. 12:14), or "took counsel with the Herodians against him" (Mark 3:6), or said to him: "Get thee out, and depart hence: for Herod will kill thee" (Luke 13:31). Apparently Jesus' preaching had now become so popular that it was not possible to stop it by excluding him from the synagogues, and besides, the crowds who came to hear him were now too large to assemble in a synagogue. But it seems evident that his preaching began in synagogues.

Jesus must have had some income, or must have counted on some income, when he moved into the house in Capernaum. He seems to have lived there for some months, perhaps for a year or more, making journeys from there out and back, and receiving there those who came to see him and hear him, as far as the size of the house permitted. We know practically nothing about the life in that house during that very important year. Those who wrote our gospels, some time after Jesus' death, knew chiefly, perhaps only, the oral traditions. These traditions consisted chiefly of stories of his miracles, which were popular and widely disseminated, as such stories commonly are among credulous and uncritical people, and of the more striking of his sayings, which were remembered chiefly because they were striking and unusual. It seems most strange that the authors of the gospels knew so little of, and seem so little interested in, the facts of Jesus' life. And now, under the influence of a very long tradition, it seems shocking and sacrilegious to many even to inquire into the practical details of Jesus' life on earth.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

LAST EVENING I chanced to overhear two ministers discussing a series of essays by a prominent Catholic priest which had recently run serially in the daily press. To one of them, not unnaturally, they had proved highly unsatisfactory. He referred with particular amazement to the one dealing with accumulated merits which could be transferred through what might be flippantly styled a sort of ecclesiastical double-entry bookkeeping.

I quite agreed with him. To me too it seemed curious and repulsive. But as I listened, a line from an old hymn which, as a boy, I had often heard and sung ran through my mind: "By thy merits we find favor." And as is often the case, both in church and out, I no longer heard what was being said, for the verse had started a disquieting train of thought. Other lines in that same old hymn came to mind, among them: "There for sinners thou art pleading" and "Ever for us interceding." And then the opening verses of Montgomery's famous "In the hour of trial, Jesus plead for me" hummed themselves as a sort of accompaniment to the persistent query: "What is the essential difference? Is this not all in essence the same? And honestly, is it not fraught with real peril?"

I am inclined to think that it is. Some years ago a father reported to me the observation of his youthful son at the dinner table after a session in Sunday school. Said the youngster, "I love Jesus, but I hate God." Now it is easy to brush that aside as an immature and flippant wisecrack designed to get the limelight. Every parent knows them, and if he has any common sense and consideration for his fellow men, he lets most of them pass unbroadcasted. But occasionally "out of the mouths of babes" profoundly honest and jolting observations come. And to me this seemed one. It still does.

How much there is in what passes in many circles for good theology which when realistically pondered could elicit that devestating confession. What a commentary on the early Christian confidence that the especial consequence of Jesus' advent was that thereby men could know aright the Father! Many the sorrows and heartaches which the Nazarene had to bear—and which, not unnaturally, we are wont to say he continues to bear. It is not easy to conceive a more bitter one than the realization that through their love for him men have been led to hate the Father who sent him. But to many thoughtful and reverent men it has seemed that in some of the logically—even theologically—perfect but morally shaky forms which the doctrine of the atonement has been made to assume precisely

this is the peril: gratitude to Christ for his generous and self-sacrificing devotion; a far different feeling for the one appeased.

And from that most unsatisfactory and disquieting way station my mind kept on. How frequently we end our prayers with the familiar words, "And this we ask for Jesus' sake." To omit them would be as unthinkable for many, it may be hazarded, as to omit the word *Amen* itself. They authenticate, make really Christian, make effective our petitions. But they seem to me to strike a wrong note and one which may well lead others than the aforementioned precocious child eventually to unwholesome conclusions.

Is is not our proudest confidence and conviction, as Protestants, that each one of us has immediate access to the Father, without the need of priest or any other intermediary? that God's love and care may be—nay, must be—sought directly? We think by human analogies. As a father, I should hate to feel that a child of mine felt the need, when asking of me what he needed and I could give, of buttressing his eminently proper request by an appeal that I do it "for the sake" of any one else, however dear he or she might be to me. He asks it for his own sake, and so I grant it.

Analogies may at times be imperfect and misleading. I do not feel that this one is. Thus for many years I have refrained from such a conclusion to my prayers—private or in the pulpit—with a deliberate and it seems to me warrantable confidence that it would be out of place, would strike a wrong note, is not what the Father wants. And many a time in its stead I have found myself concluding: "In the spirit of Jesus and for my (our) own sake(s)." It would be a hard task to convince me that that is not in the truest sense Christian.

Perhaps some who read these words will feel that I am making a mountain out of the proverbial molehill, that I see perils which do not exist, that I am letting a prosy and fussy literalness invest words and phrases which are not intended to be more true and exact than is poetry. I am not disposed to argue. Nevertheless I am sure in my own mind that before I can join wholeheartedly with my good friend, to whom I referred in the opening sentence, in his amazement at the absurd and crude notions anent "treasuries of good works" in the thinking of our Catholic brethren we must do quite a bit of belated spring-cleaning in our own Protestant attics.

From Off the Campus and On

With the dawn of another year go hearty greetings from Crozer Quarterly to its many readers. Your letters are always welcome. The large increase in the list of subscribers this year, especially during the last weeks of 1949, is naturally very heartening. New friends are always more than welcome. Old ones are assured of an increasing place in our affection. Finally, after twenty-six years, we have been forced to raise the subscription price. Even this modest advance nowhere near covers the actual cost, but it will, we hope, ease the load a little and be a bit more realistic. We believe most of our subscribers will applaud our decision. No one, however, will be forced to drop his subscription because of the increased price. We know that some of our subscribers have to watch slender budgets. We shall continue to do everything in our power to keep Crozer Quarterly available to all. And so once again: Happy New Year!

Occasionally even an editor lays aside modesty and crashes his own pages. In addition to editing Crozer Quarterly Mr. Enslin has been professor of New Testament at Crozer for the past twenty-five years and lecturer in patristics in the Graduate School of the University of Pennsylvania. He holds degrees from Harvard, Newton Theological Institution, and Colby.

It is with distinct pleasure that we welcome Mr. Shute to our pages. A Southerner and one who has had a long and intimate acquaintance with public affairs in North Carolina, his pointed essay will not only catch the attention of all Southerners but, we hope, of many Northerners too. He has served as State senator and as chairman of several Union County boards. He is now in his second term as mayor of Monroe, and was recently elected president of the North Carolina League of Municipalities. He is the president of several corporations, including the J. R. Shute Company, the author of a number of books, and a trustee of the International League of Freemasons (Geneva).

In this issue we are happy to print the second half of Professor Buckler's "The Twin Tragedy of Today." The first essay, "The Tragedy of Religion," appeared in July, 1949, at which time Dr. Buckler was introduced to our readers. For those who do not have that number at hand it may be repeated that he has been since 1925 professor of church history at Oberlin. He is a distinguished historian and orientalist whose achievements, if printed in full, would quite overrun the modest amount of space available. Nor is he a mere docile student of the past. He has ideas, as these two essays make very clear, and he is not afraid to express them.

Dr. Zeitlin is no newcomer to our pages. Many of our readers will remember his essay, "Antisemitism," which appeared in 1945. In the midst of the flurry of discovery and pronouncement, which, especially in the public press, has largely dispensed with the restraint and guarded statement becoming in highly debatable matters still far from settlement, and where the expert alone should speak, and he with caution, this present *caveat* should prove of interest. Dr. Zeitlin, one of the world's great talmudic scholars, has for years made an especial study of the period within which the manuscripts have (tentatively) been placed. He was

educated at the Sorbonne in Paris, and holds the degrees of Rabbi and Th.D. from the École Rabbinique and Ph.D. from Dropsie. For many years he has been on the faculty of the latter institution and the editor of its distinguished *Jewish Quarterly Review.*

Professor Prentice is a classicist of international reputation. For nearly fifty years he was a member of the faculty of Princeton University, becoming professor *emeritus* in 1941. His books and articles have been many and significant. He has long been interested in the origin of Christianity. In the present essay he raises a question which may well interest not alone his theological colleagues but the general reader as well. It is a pleasure to welcome back to our pages this eminent scholar whose studies have not infrequently refused to stay within the neatly confined limits of what "everyone knows to be true."

To those interested in new books our reviewers—thirty-six of them—present what will surely prove an acceptable New Year's gift. And once again all the editor can do in the space at his disposal is to identify them barely and say "Thank you" to these good yokefellows. Dr. Aubrey is professor of religious thought in the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Beck is professor of Bible at Syracuse. Professor Brush has the chair of church history at Andover Newton. Dr. Bundy is professor of English Bible at De Pauw. Dr. Clements is minister of the Bryn Mawr Presbyterian Church. Dr. Davis is professor of theology at Crozer. Dr. Enslin has already been identified. Dr. Fallaw is professor of religious education at Andover Newton. Dr. Ferm is professor of philosophy at the College of Wooster. Dr. Foote is a former Harvard professor and a retired Unitarian minister. Dr. Garrison is literary editor of the *Christian Century.* Dr. Grant is professor of New Testament in the University of the South. Dr. Hamilton is professor of the philosophy of religion and missions at Oberlin. Dr. Harkness is professor of church history at Crozer. Dr. Haydon is professor *emeritus* of the history of religions at the University of Chicago. Dr. Herrick is president *emeritus* of Andover Newton. Dr. Hudson is professor of church history at Colgate-Rochester. Dr. Knudson is dean *emeritus* of the Boston University School of Theology. Professor Marcus is a member of the department of oriental languages at Chicago. Professor McCasland has the chair of religion at the University of Virginia. Dr. Miller is professor of classics at Lincoln University. Dr. Moehlman is professor *emeritus* of church history at Colgate-Rochester. Dr. Oates is chairman of the program of humanities at Princeton. Professor Post has the chair of Greek at Haverford. Mr. Scholefield is minister of the First Unitarian Church, Philadelphia. Dr. Smith is professor of theology at Duke. Mr. Starr is librarian at Crozer. Dr. Steere is professor of philosophy at Haverford. Dr. Stevenson is a member of the faculty of the Westminster Choir College and a visiting lecturer at the University of California. Dr. Van Dusen is president of Union Theological Seminary. Dr. Watson is professor *emeritus* of sociology at Haverford and was visiting lecturer at Crozer the first term. Mr. Westphal is minister of the Lansdowne (Pa.) Baptist Church. Dr. Willoughby is professor of New Testament at Chicago. Dr. Wolf is professor of theology at the Episcopal Divinity School, Cambridge. Dr. Wright is professor *emeritus* of philosophy at Dartmouth. Dr. Young is assistant professor of New Testament and dean of students at Duke.

BOOK REVIEWS

Jesus Then and Now: Thoughts on the Continuity and Survival of the Christian Religion, by Willard L. Sperry, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 224, $2.50.

This is a great little book. It deserves to be read and reread. In fact it must be reread if the reader is to realize the values of the book for an approximation of their worth. At the first reading one is impressed by the magnitude of the issues presented, by the vast range of the author's thought through main phases of human religious and intellectual experience, and by his inerrant sense for the meaningful association of related ideas. His exceptional command of memorable literary formulations of significant points of view, in both poetry and prose, is obvious from the very first. Thereafter the author deserves a thoughtful rereading to enable one to follow intimately the steady progression of his line of reasoning, the amazing candor of his delineation of arguments pro and con, and the closely-knit character of his logic. Whether the reader agrees or disagrees with the author, he cannot fail to realize the deadly seriousness of the debate and effectiveness with which it is carried forward.

These chapters include the John C. Shaffer lectures delivered in the auditorium of the ultramodern school for engineering at Northwestern University in the spring of 1948. With this series the Shaffer lectures of Northwestern University achieve a position, alongside the Haskill lectures of Oberlin or the King's Chapel lectures of Boston, as a lectureship to be watched with expectancy by scholarly-minded religionists.

The author's main commission in this lecture program was to show "how and why the Christian religion, which began as an obscure sect in a remote province, took root so surely and spread so rapidly during the first three centuries of our era." This enormous main undertaking Dean Sperry amply discharges, with dispatch and accuracy and inclusiveness, in the Shaffer lectures proper which constitute the first four chapters of the present volume. On pp. 138 and 139, in five terse paragraphs, are summarized the five main reasons that he isolates for the phenomenal social triumph of the Christian religion in the Roman world. From a religio-historical point of view, the matter has scarcely been more accurately summarized.

A secondary commission of the lectureship committee to the author was "to discover whether there were lessons to be learned from this early history which might have some relevance in our own much later times." This more searching injunction Dean Sperry accepted quite as seriously as his main commission, and he fulfilled it quite as competently. In each one of the four Shaffer lectures, and in each chapter in this volume, at least one third of the time, effort, and space has been invested in making explicit the current problems and urgencies that are directly related to the ancient developments that the author has just surveyed. Many readers of this volume will doubtless find keenest interest in the concluding sections of each chapter where up-to-date modern problems are analyzed in the light of early Christian effort and experience.

For example, Dean Sperry's initial conclusion that gospel records enable us to form reasonably distinct conceptions of the personality, activity, and teachings of Jesus, leads him to question pointedly: "Has the long and painful pilgrimage by which we have recovered the Jesus of history proved religiously self-defeating, in that we have merely found a person so far removed from us that he can be of little help to us?" Dean Sperry does not think so.

Or again, on the problem of the relation of Christianity to contemporary culture,

ancient or modern, the Dean puts the alternative clearly: either religion as a thing-in-itself apart from contemporary involvements, or else religion operating energetically as an integral part of contemporary human culture and for its betterment. To him this option is momentous and involves concrete possibilities for the improvement of human living.

Or yet again, in considering the respective rôles of the great man (Jesus or Paul) and the religious community (the Christian church) in human history, Dean Sperry has some very concrete suggestions to make as to how Christian groups today can reaffirm the spirit and enthusiasm of the early Christians. His proposals are specific and are well ahead of the present.

In estimating the over-all situation in Protestantism today relative to Jesus Christ, Dean Sperry sees a near deadlock already developed. Continuing liberals have concentrated on the religious values of the Jesus of history, and have given only peripheral attention to the Christ of Christian faith. "Neoörthodox" Christians, on the other hand, have concentrated on a new Christ myth of their own, and are ignoring Jesus of Nazareth. As the Dean sees it, the liberals have not yet discharged their potential contributions to ongoing Christian faith; and the "neoörthodox" have not commended themselves to students disciplined in critical-historical processes. Are the two groups capable of learning each from the other?

Lest the reviewer should seem to be in uniform agreement with the author throughout, it must be recorded in honesty that there are several particular points on which it seems to him that the position taken by the Dean is debatable. Did Peter's confession at Cæsarea Philippi express the mind of Jesus regarding himself? Were the basic materials that went into the composition of the synoptic gospels actual memoirs of companions of Jesus? Was the earliest gospel composed as early as A.D. 60? The very formulation of these questions shows that the reviewer's disagreements are mainly in the area of New Testament criticism. Also they are minor disagreements in comparison with the importance and vitality of the issues that mainly concerned Dean Sperry in his admirable Shaffer lectures.

To dramatize his very high evaluation of the volume, the reviewer is shelving it in his library beside *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* by Albert Schweitzer and the great triology of volumes on Jesus by the late Shirley Jackson Case.

HAROLD R. WILLOUGHBY

Religion in the Twentieth Century, edited by Vergilius Ferm, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1948, pp. xix, 470, $5.

The veteran editor, Professor Vergilius Ferm, has done an excellent job of demonstrating the inadequacy of traditional religions in the modern world by making them parade under the title, "Religion in the Twentieth Century." In an age when change is king, it is amazing to discover that of the twenty-seven "religions" represented in this volume only three at most seem to recognize the radical nature of the adjustment necessary if religion is to meet the challenge of the new world. Most of them are still oriented to a spiritual other-world; some are proud to be timeless and changeless; some make a great stir to trim the ship with all sails set for change but are careful to keep the anchor firmly fast in the fundamentals; many remain limited by racial and cultural heritages or by proud claims of superiority; all but one are heavy-footed and resistant to change because of the vested interests of institutions and their officials.

Of the twenty-seven religions treated, eleven are forms of Christianity, three of Judaism, two of Islam; nine are Oriental; Ethical Culture is a radical development

from the Jewish-Christian heritage and Naturalistic Humanism breaks with the past to create a religion of science and democracy. The work is done by scholars, but there is great diversity of treatment. Some offer a cross section, many a neat historical sketch of the development of a religion. All too little attention is given to modern trends. Hinduism is presented as though it were centred in the thought-forms of the Vedanta. It would have been much more revealing if the author had told us what is happening to the *dharma* of the joint-family, the village, guild, and caste under the novel conditions of today. After all, Hinduism has been historically "what the Hindu does," not what he believes. Dr. Chan gives an excellent historical picture of Confucianism, but at the end we are startled to find that "Heaven" has become "purposive." Is it T'ien or Dr. Chan that has been Christianized? Judaism is well represented, and Reconstructionism might point the way to the reorientation of religion in the modern world if it were not bound so firmly in loyalty to the cultural heritage of a single people. Why is Orthodox Judaism omitted? And why is there no spokesman for Protestant Fundamentalism? The author of the chapter on Conservative Protestantism is too clever, too sophisticated and too modernistic to speak for the Fundamentalists. And where is Neoörthodoxy, the mystifying modern mythology of the Christian theologians? The attitude of arrogant superiority and dogmatic authoritarianism of the chapter on Roman Catholicism makes one blush with embarrassment to have Christianity so presented in a symposium of world religions. The statement may be accurate, but it seems certain that no such system could prevail in the modern age unless the fires fail on the altars of science and the ideal of democracy dies. It may continue as a powerful church with vested interests but not as a vital religion. Many of the religions have realized the necessity of meeting the practical problems of everyday living in a chaotic world; yet most of them still keep their primary loyalty to the "spiritual" realm. The Salvation Army has won admiration everywhere for its practical service, but we are told that all this is merely incidental. Their main interest is in saving the souls of men.

Professor Conrad Moehlman in a wise and temperate chapter on Liberal Protestantism remarks: "Any liberal movement which refuses to change its platform disintegrates in a changing world." Change has taken place in all religions through the centuries. If this process had not been at work, the religions would have died. But change in the past was slow. It was a matter of reform, not radical transformation—a rationalizing or reconstructing of the tradition. Leaders of religions have not been able to realize the radical nature of the change needed today. Everything that the old ideas, techniques, and ideals referred to has either vanished or been fundamentally altered. It is doubtful whether any of the old religions can serve except as transient palliatives in the new world. Loyalty to the past may be a betrayal of religion.

We must see clearly that there is no such thing as "religion" in the abstract. There are only men and women trying to find the things that make life beautiful, noble, and satisfying. Living folk with their hopes and needs and desires have been from the beginning and still are the creators of religions. They will find the way to orient life to the universe, to solve their problems, to realize their ideals in this age. They will be the embodiment of religion in our era. Institutions with vested interests, priests with their special privileges, these will try to preserve the old; but modern men can no longer tolerate leaders and guides whose eyes are turned to the past and who are unable to to chart a path through the confused maze of social living today.

"The painful reconstruction of our thinking during the modern age has been calling to us to fashion a new synthesis adequate to life in 'one world,'" says Dr.

Moehlman, and he adds that a new religious synthesis based upon science and the democratic faith is in the making. In the light of this hopeful statement, this book has pathos. It is clear that most of the leaders of the religions represented in its pages will give no help to any such ideal. Surveying the panorama of religions, the editor asks: "How in the name of a good God, can religions continue to divide with so many things at stake in the world?" Perhaps the question should be: How can religions oriented to yesterday hope to keep the loyalty of awakened modern man? A new cultural synthesis is needed. Only a religion that includes all of life, that is the dynamic of every phase of culture, that is attuned to science and capable of practical guidance through problems to ever fuller and more abundant life for everyone can claim the future.

A. EUSTACE HAYDON

History of New Testament Times with an Introduction to the Apocrypha, by Robert H. Pfeiffer, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. xii, 561, $4.

This companion volume to the author's *Introduction to the Old Testament* has the same admirable qualities as the earlier work—great fullness and accuracy of detail, independence of judgment, impressive *Belesenheit,* and quiet humor.

In two respects, however, Professor Pfeiffer has done himself an injustice. In the first place the title is misleading, since the work is not primarily a history of New Testament times in the same sense that Schürer's *Geschichte* is. Of about 500 pages of discussion the chapters on Palestinian Judaism, Hellenism, and Diaspora Judaism take up only about 160 pages; the rest of the first part deals briefly with Palestinian and Alexandrian literature in about 60 pages, while the second part on the Apocrypha proper covers about 300 pages. Thus the work might more accurately be called "An Introduction to the Apocrypha with a sketch of the political-religious background and Intertestamental literature."

The second injustice which the author has done himself is setting at the head of his Foreword a quotation from Wilson Mizner, "If you steal from one author, it's plagiarism; if you steal from many, it's research." Pfeiffer has not stolen from any author but has freely helped himself to the results of the research of many scholars, always with full acknowledgement of his indebtedness and always with critical appraisal.

While the chapters on the political-religious background of intertestamental Judaism and on hellenistic culture are exceedingly good, considering their brevity, the book should be judged primarily as an Introduction to the Apocrypha, since it is in the second part of the volume that Pfeiffer has made his chief contribution—a contribution great enough to earn for him the distinction of having written the best *Introduction* to this literature in any language.

In reviewing a work that contains so many hundreds of facts and theories it is difficult not to be somewhat arbitrary in selecting passages for comment. With this caution the reviewer would like to call attention, first to some passages which seem unusually commendable, and next to some which the author may care to revise in preparation for the next edition. That there will be other editions of this book seems a reasonable expectation in view of its great merit as a work of reference.

The treatment of hellenistic culture (called Hellenism) in chapter IV of Part I is no mere listing of names and doctrines but is a really perceptive and broad presentation of the subject. Pfeiffer has also done a good job in establishing the inner Jewishness of the Diaspora communities (pp. 180 ff.) and in disposing of earlier theories about the "legalism" of postexilic Judaism (pp. 187 ff.). He shows originality in

relating the story of the Three Youths in I Esdras to Ahikar and Iranian folk stories though his suggestions are meant to be tentative and not final (pp. 252 ff.). He makes out strong cases for the Palestinian origin of Tobit (pp. 273 ff.) and the Egyptian provenance of the Greek Esther (pp. 310 ff.). Very convincing is his argument for assuming that the Wisdom of Solomon was all written by one man in Greek (pp. 320 ff.). He has shown considerable skill in bringing out the resemblances and differences between Sirach and Proverbs and in his literary analysis of the former (pp. 400 ff.). There is also much useful and new material on the Additions to Daniel and on folkloristic parallels (pp. 445 ff.). The most informative and thorough discussions in the *Introduction* are of those of I and II Maccabees. In these chapters the author has given abundant materials for the study of the historical, literary, and religious problems in the two books. But there is not a single book of the Apocrypha on which Pfeiffer has not said something new or enlightening.

Since, as we have said, this volume is certain to become a standard work of reference, the following queries and corrections may possibly be of use to the author in preparing the inevitable second edition.

"Cellar repository" is not quite the right translation of *genizah* (p. 57, n. 15). Apollonius Rhodius deserves mention as an important exponent of romantic love (p. 104). The Epicureans believed, not that the swerve of atoms was due to their collisions, but that their collisions were due to their swerve, *cf.* Lucretius, *De Rer.Nat.* ii. 216 ff. (p. 119). Plato's attitude toward the Orphics was unfriendly (p. 131, n. 46). In the literature on Posidonius the work of Karl Reinhardt should certainly be included (p. 143, n. 74). When the author calls December 21 the shortest day of the year, he seems to have forgotten the precession of the equinoxes and the fact that two thousand years ago the shortest day was December 25 (p. 164). To the literature on Nicholas of Damascus, Jacoby's *Fragmente* should be added (p. 209, n. 13). Pfeiffer seems not to give enough weight to arguments for the Jewish rather than Samaritan character of the fragments of Theodotus (p. 211). Perhaps when he refers to the Golden Rule he ought to remind his readers that the negative formulation is found not only in the saying of Hillel but also in Paul (Galatians) and the Didache (p. 284). The bibliography is excellent but has at least one notable omission, the collaborative Hebrew translation with commentary of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha edited by A. Kahana.

Since this review is limited in space, the present writer must reluctantly resist the temptation to close with an extended appreciation of Pfeiffer's book. He must content himself with saying very earnestly and warmly that the history of New Testament times is an unusually good summary of the subject and that the introduction to the Apocrypha is an incomparably fine presentation of a related subject.

RALPH MARCUS

God Was in Christ, by D. M. Baillie, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. 213, $2.75.

Few books of its kind have been more widely acclaimed by American Christians than the present work. Its popular favor is probably due in large measure to its singularly balanced perspective, its keen awareness of the new issues confronting Christology, and its unusual lucidity. On all these counts it is worthy of commendation.

From the very outset Professor Baillie forces one to see that Christology is faced with a new sort of problem by the emergence of certain biblical and theological trends. As he observes, the "Jesus of history" movement is today repudiated by a

group of scholars who nevertheless accept (at least theoretically) the real humanity of Jesus and who also subscribe, as a rule, to a radical form of gospel criticism *(Formgeschichte)*. While these scholars profess no sympathy with Docetism, they at the same time, curiously, are indifferent (if not antagonistic) toward the effort to recover the earthly life and character of Jesus of Nazareth. In reality, they preoccupy themselves with Christology and are skeptical of the value of what they disdainfully call "historicism."

This one-sided tendency, Professor Baillie contends, bids ill for a true insight into the person of Jesus Christ. A Christology which cuts loose from the historical Jesus is as truncated as was the older type of life-of-Jesus study that refused to have anything to do with Christology. He who travels either road alone, says the author, is on a wrong trail. If one takes the Incarnation seriously, the historical life of Jesus cannot be ignored. Besides, says Baillie, "it is absurd to suggest" that either the gospels or the letters of Paul reveal no interest in the personality and teaching of Jesus.

It is from this realistic perspective that Professor Baillie seeks to reinterpret the Incarnation and the Atonement. He introduces the former doctrine by a critical analysis of three Christological views which seem to him to fall short. One of these is a version of the ancient doctrine *(Anhypostasia)*, that Christ was not a human person, but a divine person who assumed human nature without assuming human personality. Both Emil Brunner and Leonard Hodgson, says the author, are deficient in their Christologies at this point; neither of them makes enough room for Jesus as a real human personality. The second type of theory that betrays inadequacies is kenoticism, since it makes Christ first divine, then human, and then divine again. Still another inadequate doctrine is that advanced by Karl Heim. His "leadership" *(Führership)* theory, in which Jesus is presented as "Our Contemporary," neither gives enough attention to the historical Jesus nor does it clarify his relation to God.

With the way thus cleared, Professor Baillie proposes a fresh clue to penetrating the mystery of the Incarnation. It is his thesis that the Christian's paradoxical experience of grace casts a revealing light on the Incarnation. The essence of the "paradox of grace" is the conviction that all that man is and does is ascribable, not to himself, but to God. It was succinctly expressed by St. Paul: "I worked harder than any of them, though it was not I, but the grace of God" (I Cor. 4:10). All great Christians, it is said, have duplicated this paradoxical consciousness of Paul.

Against this Christian testimony, the author asks: "If the paradox is a reality in our poor imperfect lives at all, so far as there is any good in them, does not the same or a similar paradox, taken at the perfect and absolute pitch, appear as the mystery of the Incarnation?" (pp. 117-118). It is his belief that this analogy holds. In support of his view he says that the New Testament, and especially the Fourth Gospel, reveals Jesus as a preëminent example of this paradoxical consciousness. Since he claimed absolutely nothing for himself, but everything for God, he alone was the "God-Man."

Now this unique suggestion has at least the merit of presupposing the real humanity of Jesus. On the other hand, Baillie believes that "the Word became flesh." This poses the problem with which classical Christianity grappled and which it tried to solve under the two-natures theory. It is at this point (as it seems to me) that the human experience of grace reveals its limitation. One may, indeed, show that there is a similarity in the psychological consciousness of Jesus and that of other men, but yet not clear up the age-old problem of how the preëxistent Word was united with

the human Jesus of Nazareth. Obviously, therefore, the analogy employed does not explicate this mystery.

This section of the book culminates in a chapter on the Trinitarian background of the Incarnation. The most interesting part of it is a good analysis of two current ways of interpreting the distinctions in the Godhead. One of these it typefied by Barth, who holds that it is misleading to use the term "person" in defining the members of the Trinity. For him, it is much more accurate to speak of God in three "modes of being." If this suggests some sort of modalism, it is enough to remember that Barth is vigorously critical of anything bordering on Sabellianism. The other school of thought, led by certain Anglicans, notably Leonard Hodgson, moves in the opposite direction, even to the extent of believing that the Godhead embodies a kind of celestial society. On the surface this has the appearance of tritheism, but its adherents would deny any such implication. Unfortunately, Baillie does not take sides on this important issue beyond offering a mild remonstrance to those who loosely use the term "social" to describe the unity of God.

The second main division of the book discusses the Atonement. Nothing said on this subject bears anything like the freshness of the treatment of the Incarnation. For Baillie, as for evangelical liberals in general, God's atoning work begins and continues in love, and therefore the old judicial and penal schemes are given no sanction. Interestingly, he is critical of the sharp disjunction between the "objective" and "subjective" types of atonement theory, and he seems to favor a doctrine that transcends the traditional dichotomy and at the same time embraces a valid objective aspect. God is viewed as directly engaging in sin-bearing. It is this costly action that renders his love inexorable to sinful men, and that provides the context (which is both subjective and objective) within which forgiveness is effectively realized.

One more aspect of the treatment of the Atonement is worth mentioning in this connection. God's atoning activity, says the author, is not to be limited to the historic episode; it has been in operation since the foundation of the world. This echoes the noble sentiment of Horace Bushnell, who in his great book, *The Vicarious Sacrifice,* said, "There is a Cross in God before the wood is seen upon Calvary."

Professor Baillie's rare lucidity may beguile one into assuming that his ideas are easily digested. That was my first impression, but a second and a third reading disillusioned me. His thought is far more intricate than a surface impression suggests. But one who will take the time to camp leisurely with his book will find it richly suggestive.

H. SHELTON SMITH

Story of American Protestantism, by Andrew Landale Drummond, Edinburgh, Oliver & Boyd, (American agent, Blessing Book Stores, Chicago, $8.), 1949, pp. xii, 418, 30/.

For most British and Continental students of the history of Christianity, the story of religion in America is something that can be relegated to a footnote, or at most can be handled by a few brief references to those three well-known American eccentricities—extreme sectarianism, revivalism, and activism. It is therefore something of an event, regardless of the quality of the work, when a British scholar writes a solid and substantial history of American Protestant Christianity. This phenomenon suggests Dr. Johnson's famous and derogatory remark that a woman's preaching is like a dog's dancing—"One is surprised not that it is well done but that it is done at all." But here there is no ground for derogatory comment, for the improbable is not only done but well done.

It could not be expected that, for a work of this character written from the standpoint of a foreign observer, there would be much use of source materials or any

important contribution to the total body of knowledge that was already easily accessible in other standard works on the subject. But the author has used the most reliable secondary sources, and a great variety of them. His bibliography is ample and excellent, and it is evident that he himself made diligent use of it. The factual content of the book is large, and its average of accuracy is high. No less admirable is the evident fairness of the author's mind. He has nothing to sell, no grudges to pay off, no favorites to exalt above their deserts, no thesis to prove. His errors on several minor matters of fact are due to inadvertence or to misinterpretation of his sources in some areas with which he probably had no acquaintance until he sat down to write this book. Most writers who undertake to cover wide fields in some detail have to employ a good deal of material collected *ad hoc*, and the process is not without risk. Drummond's percentage of error is well within the limit of a reasonable tolerance.

In his evaluations of men and movements, his relative emphases upon different factors and his construction of the total picture, the author's judgment is always unprejudiced and generally sound. This is not to deny that his British (or at least non-American) point of view is sometimes evident. It is, I think, especially conspicuous in three things: his apparent failure to recognize the source of the passion for religious solidarity, and the consequent absence of religious liberty, in early colonial days; his correlative failure to grasp the full significance of the separation of church and state and the development of the system of free and voluntary churches with the beginning of the federal period; and his somewhat disproportionate emphasis upon the crudities of the frontier age in comparison with the more sketchy treatment of what happened after the passing of the frontier. These three points call for brief comment.

It was not primarily from the Old Testament, as Drummond thinks, but from the universal theory and practice of European Christianity from the fourth century to the sixteenth, that the colonists in America (except Baptists and Quakers) derived the idea that every state must support one recognized form of religion and must permit no others to exist. The ancient Hebrew regime furnished an analogy and the Old Testament provided textual support, but both were incidental. The main reason for state churches in the colonies was that for more than a thousand years nobody had ever thought of any other kind of church. The basic reason for intolerance in the colonies was that intolerance had been a universally accepted principle of social and political philosophy, as well as of ecclesiology, since the days of Constantine. Given the theory that religious solidarity is essential to the stability of the social order and the security of the state, intolerance of dissent becomes an axiom both of politics and of churchcraft. Throughout the Middle Ages this meant that the Roman Catholic Church maintained a strict monopoly of religion and that the state—in self-defense, according to the theory—furnished the legal machinery and the police power to enable it to do so. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it meant *Cuius regio eius religio*, alike in Catholic and Protestant principalities within the empire. In England, through those same centuries, it meant the long and bitter struggle to suppress all dissent from the national church—Catholic, Episcopalian, or Puritan, as the case might be. Out of that melee came colonists to America. What need to go back to the Old Testament to find the pattern upon which they at first began to mold religiously homogeneous communities?

The abandonment of that system of enforced conformity—or of penalized, if permitted, nonconformity—and everything that went with it, in both theory and practice, was the most crucial achievement in the history of American Christianity.

Drummond mentions it, but evidently does not grasp its importance in the stream of history for both church and state. "Establishment" is so much a part of the religious regime in which he has lived and breathed that the American system of "voluntaryism"—which was also, of course, the system of the first three Christian centuries—apparently means nothing to him except "the substitution of shifting 'denominations' for the ideal of the Holy Catholic Church." A sounder judgment than this might, I think, be reasonably expected from one who has been in this country at least long enough to take a degree at Hartford, in addition to his Ph.D. from Edinburgh. I still say that he is a scholar of fair and unprejudiced mind, but even such a one can have a point of view from which some things of great significance cannot be seen.

For a parallel case, it may be recalled that Mr. Cecil Northcott, an eminent English nonconformist, in his generally excellent little book entitled *Religious Liberty* (Macmillan, 1949), writes off the separation of church and state in the United States as a matter of little or no consequence, regards the system of voluntarily supported free churches as merely an American idiosyncracy, and holds up England as "an example to the rest of the world" because full political rights are now, at long last, enjoyed by the members of the dissenting bodies which exist under the shadow of the established church!

The third item which reveals a point of view—the treatment of the frontier and of postfrontier conditions—is one which I will not press. On second thought, it perhaps shows nothing more than the natural tendency of any writer to give the emphasis of space and detail to that part of his material which is most colorful and most in contrast with the commonplace realities of contemporary life. The facts of American expansion on the frontier are dramatic and picturesque. I know some American writers of history (and perhaps I am one of them) who have had difficulty in balancing their accounts of the pioneer period with corresponding treatment of the slower and less spectacular developments across the continent after the frontier had gone roaring by. On the whole, probably Drummond has done this about as well as any of us.

In general, I like the book very much. It is intelligent, honest, fair, and clear. And it is very good reading.

W. E. GARRISON

The History of the Primitive Church, by Jules Lebreton and Jacques Zeiller, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. 1272 (2 vols.), $16.50.

These two large volumes represent the fruit of many years' study and teaching by two eminent French Catholic scholars in Paris. They are only the beginning of a series intended to cover the entire history of the Catholic church. In a foreword, the general editors of the series state their aim as the production of a "scientific and synthetic" work "in line with the progress of modern critical research." The work is intended to deal with both the external and the internal history of Catholicism. The present volumes, accordingly, are largely compiled from Lebreton's chapters on Christian literature and theology and Zeiller's chapters on institutions and political history.

What is their conception of "scientific" history? Presumably it is that set forth in the foreword, where we find this statement: "Every Christian who is loyal to his faith accepts the government of the world by Providence, but this does not prevent him from studying scientifically the action of second causes." These "second causes" are the materials of historical writing. And we may say at once that in the latter portions of this history they are investigated, studied "scientifically," and handled in a fairly impartial way (except perhaps where the development of the papacy is con-

cerned). The first part, dealing with the New Testament, and above all with the gospels, presents a striking contrast. The gospels, to be sure, are called "catecheses," and the individuality of their authors is noted. They are documents of religious history rather than biographies of Jesus (p. 85). On the next page, however, Lebreton states that if they presented "facts . . . which were not true," their witness would be a lie. This statement he regards as a paraphrase of I Cor. 15:14-15, which is not dealing with what we call "facts."

On the basis of this axiom, Lebreton then proceeds to harmonize the gospels, taking a detail here, a detail there, and giving an account of the ministry of Jesus which can hardly be called "scientific," or for that matter, "historical." He draws extensive conclusions from editorial materials, uses the Fourth Gospel as if it were just like the others, speaks incidentally (p. 111, n. 39) of Mary "who had decided to remain always a virgin (Luke 1:34)," (!) and treats miracles as if they took place in the same sense as ordinary human events. The crucifixion and resurrection scenes are constructed by weaving together the various gospel accounts.

The same situation is found in Lebreton's treatment of Acts, where he uses Lucan summaries as if Cadbury had never written, takes Stephen's speech as if it had been dictated, and apparently denies the possibility of *any* psychological understanding of Paul's conversion. Of course Paul wrote both Ephesians and the Pastoral Epistles.

Our objections to this kind of "history" are basically due to theological and epistemological considerations. We do not think that "religious history" is as objective and reportorial as Lebreton makes it. We believe that much of the time it is not concerned with facts but with suprahistorical realities which cannot be expressed either through facts or through definitions. Religious history is largely the product of the imagination rather than the record of sense-perceptions. There is thus no further reason for us to criticize the findings of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, within whose borders Lebreton's history comfortably lies. The commission too presupposes what we can only regard as a false objectivity. None of these writers takes fully into account the environment of ardent expectation combined with strong otherworldliness out of which Christian memories drew their recollections of Jesus.

Once we pass beyond the New Testament and reach the hellenistic Christianity of the second century we are on firmer ground. Here our authors' genuine zeal for "objectivity" does not lead them astray. The *ars nesciendi* is allowed a freer scope. The long section on the apologists would have profited, however, by greater precision in the examination of the philosophical environment to which the apologies are directed and out of which they come. *Tout court,* it is Middle Platonism.

When we come to the second volume we find the same lack. Middle Platonism, not Neoplatonism, influences Celsus, Clement, and Origen, and explains many of the utterances of Marcion and the Gnostics, especially Basilides and Valentinus. Lebreton's treatment of them is decidedly unsympathetic. He never quite explains why they existed. On the other hand, he is rightly enthusiastic over Origen's work, and does Origen the justice of considering him a theologian rather than a philosopher. But for Paul of Samosata no terms are harsh enough (pp. 1051-1054). Here Lebreton has been led astray, I believe, by the rage of Paul's unsophisticated opponents. Both Bardy and Loofs are more sympathetic toward him.

A few minor difficulties may be noted. The authors do not seem to have reached agreement on the use to be made of the *Scriptores historiæ Augustæ* (pp. 758; 800, n. 1; 891, n. 4). We may observe that, in spite of their denial, Origen does approve of the medicinal lie (p. 1080; cf. *Contra Celsum* iii. 52; *In Jer. hom.* xx. 3). It is pointless to list errors in a generally fluent translation, especially since I do not

possess the French text; but to the curious we may remark that French phrases are a little too obvious on pp. 629, 815, 823, 853, and 904, n. 37.

What is the place of Lebreton and Zeiller among modern church historians? Obviously in regard to completeness and the correlation of great numbers of facts their rank is very high. Apart from the earliest period of Christianity, their story is clear and thorough. To combine these two characteristics is no slight achievement. On the other hand, their ability to interpret the story—to relate it to its environment and explain the obscure motivations which brought about the events—seems less satisfactory. The history of Lietzmann remains preëminent; and we must not forget Duchesne. Goguel too, though working in a narrower field, has understood the historian's task more adequately. Nevertheless, for completeness and for convenience, for their emphasis on the place of Christian thought, the work of Lebreton and Zeiller possesses great value.

ROBERT M. GRANT

The Reality of the Religious Life: A Study of Miracle, Providence and Prayer, by Henry Bett, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. 160, $2.25.

The problem of the relation between science and religion is by no means settled. What we need is not theological tirades against science, or a bland subordination of religion to scientific theories, but a significant working partnership with mutual support and criticism. The present volume is an effort in this general direction, but the attempt is not entirely successful.

Mr. Bett has, however, addressed himself to the real problem, which is a problem in the philosophy of science: the nature, scope, and adequacy of scientific method. With this problem as it is discussed in recent literature he is familiar, but the issues are not always clearly defined.

His concern is to show that science, while making tremendous contributions to our knowledge through the rigorous application of its methods of quantitative measurement and its working assumption that all events embody mechanisms of natural activity, cannot give us an explanation of the ultimate source or end of the world. Where scientists assume that their methods and mechanistic assumptions are adequate to account for the universe, they move into the realm of philosophy and display in that area considerable naïveté. On the other hand, the author insists, the very confidence of science in orderly natural sequences implies that there is some cosmic Intelligence which is purposive rather than arbitrary. Once God is introduced by such implication, then it is quite reasonable to believe that his purposive control transcends all our understanding of natural law. It follows that miracles may be the workings of a higher consistent process beyond the categories of scientific explanation, that providence is operative in the concatenations of physical and historical events through which natural forces express themselves in mysterious ways, and that prayer addressed to God may well result in changes in the natural order under the all-coördinating will of its Director.

These propositions are familiar enough, but it is the author's support of them from the side of critical philosophy that challenges our attention. Now the first task of philosophical criticism is careful definition of the terms of debate, because a problem may be foreclosed by defining the terms in such a way as either to exclude the opposition (as when a fundamentalist denies that another man is Christian because a Christian is one who accepts the verbal inerrancy of Scripture), or to remove the bone of contention by broad definition (as when a theist might welcome the atheist into his camp by saying that God is only another name for natural law). It was precisely at the point of definition that this reviewer found his difficulty. Let

us look at Mr. Bett's definitions of natural law, mechanism, and chance on the one side, and of miracle, providence, and prayer on the other.

In his opening chapter he declares that "there is no inherent impossibility in any event, when considered merely by itself," then goes on to say that "the total cause of any single event is ultimately everything else in the universe past and present," from which he concludes that "no one therefore has any conceivable right to declare that a miracle, or a strange providence, or a wonderful answer to prayer is impossible." We may pause to note that the second statement in this argument involves a logical difficulty: if every contemporaneous event is the cause of every other, then any given event is the cause of its own cause and the notion of causality becomes meaningless. Thus concomitance and causality are synonymous (*i.e.*, everything that happens at the same time as a given event is a cause of it) but it is precisely the task of science to separate mere coincidence from causation. The corollary of his argument is that temporal succession—the basis of his whole conception of divine purpose—becomes inconsequential.

But let us go on to his defense of miracle by a critique of the concept of natural law. He objects to Tennant's attack on the idea of a "higher law." Tennant had said that the defense of miracle by reference to some higher law beyond natural law is always open to the fatal possibility that this higher law may be later subjected to natural explanation. Mr. Bett replies that the miracle would still be a miracle *at the time* since it was "incompatible with the natural laws that men had known up to then." The word "incompatible" is, however, confusing. Does he mean, as he seems to, that the "miracle" does not fit into the extant scientific knowledge of events in that area of experience? Or does he mean that the miracle is quite incompatible in the sense of being discontinuous with the principles of scientific inquiry?

The author himself insists, as the scientist would also, that radio communication would appear so far outside the scope of Galileo's understanding as to seem a miracle. But the scientist would insist on the continuity of understanding (*i.e.*, of scientific explanation) from Galileo to Clerk Maxwell and Marconi. In other words, the "unknown laws" discovered later, do not contradict the earlier "natural laws" but represent a greater specifity in the understanding of them by virtue of which the scientific explanation is revised. This idea of continuity in scientific research does not receive adequate attention in the volume before us. The question is not whether the starting event was a miracle to those who first recorded it, but whether it is such for us.

No responsible scientist will deny that there are processes operative in nature that he does not understand, but because he believes in the consistency of the universe he presses on by experiment and observation along the continuum of growing knowledge. For him the laws of nature have a double meaning. He agrees with Mr. Bett that the formulated laws of cause and effect are summaries of experiences, describing rather than prescribing how nature behaves. But he also believes the concept of natural law stands for something objective and universal: a perennial way-of-behaving of things. That various patterns of behavior in nature affect each other only adds to the complexity of his problem. If he arbitrarily excludes certain of these conditions for experimental purposes, he is making a conscious abstraction without being deceived by it.

The real problem appears where the exclusion is made *without* the scientist being aware of it, and he may fall victim to self-deception. But the cure for this is not an obscurantist leap to notions of supernatural agency. It is, rather, a patient extension of his range of investigation. The term "chance," against which the

author inveighs, is only a recognition of an unexplained factor in the causal chain, even though people may speak as though it were some active force itself. However, he does not himself reckon sufficiently with the element of contingency in nature, though at the very end, in dealing with providence, he admits an "irrational element" in the universe. This irrational element he attributes, however, either to human sin or to "a malignant and maleficent will at work in the universe," *i.e.,* the devil.

When we turn to the positive declarations of the author—and they are much smaller in bulk than the critical sections—we find candid admission of difficulty in the old dogmatic theologies; but the alternatives offered suffer once again from confused definition: a miracle is not a contravention of natural law, but an event the unfamiliarity of which makes it excite our wonder; providence is the universal direction of events whereby a complex of natural contingencies may bring about or prevent the occurrence of some particular happening; answer to prayer is "connection between the mental and moral, on the one hand, and the merely physical, on the other . . . in the wider universe" outside the human body, "in accordance with the laws and conditions of the spiritual life, which are a part of the ordered system of the whole universe."

Each of the definitions and the argument which it subtends is really an evasion of the fundamental difficulty which the "unbeliever" raises; and while it appears to solve his problem, it merely restates it in different terms so that a positive answer can be given to the restated question without really meeting the original difficulty. Only on second thought will the inquirer realize that what he has understood as miracle, providence, and answers to petitionary prayer are not really affirmed after all.

There is one exception to this: the miracles of Christ are affirmed here quite flatly on the ground of the miracle of the Incarnation itself which guarantees them. And this of course begs the whole question.

I have reviewed this book at such length because it typifies so much current theological apologetic for the supernatural, which uses a polemic against scientific naturalism to arouse pious skepticism and then offers a vague positive alternative as basis for faith.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

The Reunion of the Church, by J. E. Lesslie Newbigin. New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 192, $3.

By common acknowledgment, the bringing into being of the new united Church of South India is the most important single achievement of church union within Christian history. Within the leadership of that church, the influence of Dr. Lesslie Newbigin, formerly a missionary of the Church of Scotland and one of the newly consecrated bishops of the South India Church, is outstanding. Nor is his influence confined to that land and church. At the first assembly of the World Council of Churches a year ago, he emerged as one of the most vigorous and positive younger theologians in the world church; his hand had a major share in drafting both the message of Amsterdam and its report on "The Church's Witness to God's Design." Inevitably, a full-length discussion by him of the cause which commands his ardent devotion is a work of first importance.

Both the scope and the limitations of the book are suggested in its subtitle: "A Defence of the South India Scheme." It deals with the major theme, the reunion of the church, only in the setting of South India. And its purpose is a "defence" of that scheme; its mood is apologetic, indeed polemical. Moreover, it has in view, and is oriented toward, objections to the South India union from only one side, that of Catholic critics, whether Roman or Anglican. Indeed, through much of the most

important part of his treatment, Bishop Newbigin pits his own argument deliberately and squarely against that of Father M. J. Congar in his *Divided Christendom*. Scant attention is paid to difficulties which loom large for those of Congregational or "Free Church" affiliation. This necessarily gives the exposition a somewhat one-sided cast. A further limitation lies in the fact that what is here presented is very much of a *personal* defense. The author views all issues in the perspective of a theological outlook which commands his convinced allegiance, an outlook largely controlled by the neoörthodoxy or neo-Calvinism which holds sway among the younger thinkers of Scotland at the present time. Here, again, one is led to query how far leaders in South India, whether Indian or European, who differ from Dr. Newbigin in theological lineage and point of view would accept his interpretation of the union as their own. Perhaps a more accurate entitling of the book would be "A Scots Presbyterian Defense of the South India Scheme."

Bishop Newbigin dogmatically affirms the ideal of complete organic union leading toward a single church as the only one compatible with either New Testament teaching or the basic principles of Christian faith:

> The unity of the Church is of its essence. This unity is a spiritual unity. It is also a corporeal unity. . . . The common use of the phrase "spiritual unity" to refer to something which is understood to be preferable to corporeal unity, something indeed which makes corporeal unity unnecessary, is totally irreconcilable with the teaching of the New Testament. . . . Nothing could more completely reverse the meaning of the New Testament insistence on the spiritual nature of the Church's unity than to say that it meant that visible, corporeal unity was of secondary importance. . . . There is one Spirit, and it follows that there is one Body (pp. 50-54).

Here is unqualified identification of "Christian unity" and "church union." This is not the place to examine the validity of this interpretation. It is sufficient to query whether Paul ever envisioned a "visible, corporeal unity" of the kind which the writer has in mind. In any event, this conception and the biblical interpretation upon which it is based are rejected by a large proportion of the most ardent devotees of Christian unity. Bishop Newbigin presupposes a normative conception of the church which is widely assumed as axiomatic, though largely unexamined and uncriticized, in ecumenical circles. It is high time that Faith and Order studies came frankly to grips with this assumption.

Again, Bishop Newbigin accepts the "historic episcopate" as "that which has been and may be again the organ and expression of the Church's unity," the "proper expression" though not the "guarantee" of "a continuous historical order and a ministry carrying the unbroken authority of the whole Church" (p. 109). To be sure, he recognizes that the basis of union justifies episcopacy as "needed for the shepherding and extension of the Church in South India" and he appears to assume that this justification is identical with his own, whereas many supporters of the South India plan have found one of its greatest elements of strength precisely in the fact that it does *not* affirm the historic episcopate as essential to reëstablish status within the "catholic" tradition but as "needed" for the present work of the church. As the Reverend Oliver Tomkins rightly pointed out some time ago, the deepest division among those who are seeking a theological basis for Christian unity "resolves itself broadly into those who hold that the Catholic order of the threefold ministry is of the faith of the Church and those who hold it to be either of convenient administration or a corruption of New Testament order." Dr. Newbigin appears to take his stand with the "catholic" position. Does he speak for the Church of South India in this matter, or is its position that of the documents of union, that episcopacy is "of convenient administration," to use Mr. Tomkins' phrase?

The writer's principal quarrel with "catholic" critics is that they almost wholly

disregard justification by faith which is, to him, the very heart of evangelicalism. Here we detect in him the determinative impact of current European revivals of Reformation theology. Once more, one is led to wonder how far he speaks for his colleagues in South India.

Despite these and other queries, this book has much to teach all those seriously interested in the "gathering tide of Christian union" which has been rightly recognized as not only one of the notable developments within Christian history but also one of the all too few hopeful features of the world's life in our time. It will illumine the most essential elements in this epoch-making achievement in South India, for it contains full and clear expositions of the principal features of the plan. It will sharpen the reader's understanding of pivotal issues in Christian unity, all the more if he dissents from the writer's views on some of those issues. And it will introduce him to the thought and faith of one of the strongest younger leaders of Christendom, whose influence seems destined to carry increasing weight in the days ahead.

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

The Realities of American-Palestine Relations, by Frank E. Manuel, Washington, Public Affairs Press, ©1949, pp. viii, 378, $5.

The story of American participation in establishing the new Jewish state of Israel in Palestine—for that is what this book is—is one that is well worth telling, and, so far as I can see, this author has assembled the relevant facts in a reasonably objective and unbiased way. That he is an ardent political Zionist is obvious from the beginning, but generally he shows fairness and restraint in presenting his evidence; so that by discounting this presupposition with which the book has been written, the reader is able without difficulty to form a clear picture of what has happened.

It was in 1799 that President John Adams sent a commission to arrange a treaty with Turkey. This was the beginning of our official relations with Palestine. But it is typical of the Turkish political mind that thirty years were required to bring the negotiations to maturity. Yet one has only to bear in mind that the treaty involved the "capitulations" which compromised Ottoman sovereignty by granting the rights of extraterritoriality to America. European nations had long before humiliated the Turks in this way, and they resented it, although their own inefficiency and corruption made such treaties inevitable. Under this treaty the American consul in Jerusalem had judicial authority over all cases involving American citizens for practically a century—in fact, until Britain was securely established as the mandatory power after the first world war.

The first consuls at Jerusalem served without pay, their only compensation being the local prestige which the office carried. The first consul was one David Darmon, a French Jew, whose high-handed airs made it necessary for his chief, the American minister at Constantinople, to drop him in short order. Warder Cresson, the second consul, was obsessed with the idea that biblical prophecies were being fulfilled as Jews reoccupied the Holy Land. One has to give him credit for his convictions, for he not only wrote numerous pamphlets to prove his position, but became a Jewish convert himself, married a Jewess, adopted a new Jewish name, and actually founded an agricultural settlement and undertook to launch a colonization movement supported with funds from abroad, to enable Jews who desired it "to settle in the land given by the Almighty in Covenant to Abraham and his seed forever." His fellow Christians of Pennsylvania referred to him as a "religious maniac," but he deserves credit for being the first of the modern Zionist colonizers. The settlement came to

naught, and he died there in 1860. He had been repudiated as a "madman" by the minister at Constantinople in 1844.

After 1856 consuls at Jerusalem were paid a salary and they were fairly competent. Their full reports on economic and social conditions in Palestine are valuable as well as interesting. The duties they discharged were various and not too well defined. One of the most important was to serve as a sort of unofficial protector of Jews of the orthodox community, whose national status was often insecure. These persons, as if instinctively, turned to the American consul as the representative of freedom and hope, and the consul frequently was able to afford them protection through influence which he was able through open, but also devious, ways to exert. It was this tradition of American assistance to the Jews of Palestine which reached its culmination with the immediate recognition of the government of Israel, when its independence was declared May 14, 1947.

When America first began to take an interest in Palestine, about 1800, there were only about twenty thousand Jews there. They were a small segment of the 150,000 Sephardic Jews who lived in the Turkish empire, whither they had fled from Spain centuries before in times of the awful persecutions. The Moslem Turks received them hospitably and allowed them complete autonomy in their own communities. (There was no fundamental hostility of Moslems toward Jews before the rise of political Zionism, although minor irritations and sporadic outbreaks occurred.) By 1850 a few thousand Jews of Central and Eastern Europe, the Ashkenazim, infiltrated into Palestine. The first American congregation, which was Ashkenazic, was organized in 1879.

The American reader may be startled to discover that the community of Jews at Jerusalem was supported almost entirely by alms contributed by their fellows from all over the world. The Palestine community sent its messengers to the prosperous congregations in every nation to beg, and it was not unusual for the collectors to absorb as much as forty per cent of the take. The Jerusalem Jews felt that they were making a vicarious sacrifice on behalf of the Jews of the world and that they were entitled to support. They jealously opposed the coming of other Jews, who would thus cause the general living standard to be lowered, and they fought bitterly against efforts to develop agricultural communities and industries, because such things would tend to cause the Jewish world to believe the alms might be decreased. With the development of full-scale political Zionism the leaders have had to combat this dog-in-the-manger attitude of the Jerusalem Jews whose main achievement has been to make the Wailing Wall famous. Notable and substantial progress has been made in agriculture and industry in recent years; yet the funds for the enterprises are still being raised from levies on Jews in all lands.

The major immigration began in connection with the leadership of Theodore Herzl about 1900, but with the first world war and the achievement of freedom for so many small minority groups, Jewish nationalism got lost in the shuffle. It had lost most of its drive when Hitler began his paranoic attempt to regiment the Jews into his nazi fanaticism. His effort to regiment and exterminate the Jews did for the Zionists of our time what the Pharaoh "who knew not Joseph" did for Moses and what Antiochus Epiphanes did for the Maccabeans. Each of these great efforts at extermination resulted in the rise of a new Jewish nation. In the present case there was the notable difference that Jews who enjoy the citizenship of other nations, especially Britain and the United States, made use of their favored position in those countries to bring every conceivable type of propaganda and financial and political

power to bear in their efforts to get them committed to the support of the modern Jewish nationalism.

The Zionists have been conspicuously successful in this. In the desperate days of the first world war they got the Balfour Declaration in favor of a Jewish homeland in Palestine as the price of their support of the allied cause, and very soon thereafter they got Woodrow Wilson to give the enterprise his approval. Yet basic political policy in Britain has always opposed a Jewish state in Palestine, as it endangers her position in the Arab countries. Britain's right hand never let her left know what it was doing. Certainly, her deepest fears are being realized, for she has already had to withdraw from Palestine, and her general position in the Middle East is far less secure. With it all, Jewish hatred for Britain now is probably second only to that of Hitler Germany, although the Balfour Declaration was the first great political victory of modern Zionism.

The American attitude toward Zionism has been similar in many ways to that of Britain. Wilson at first gave his support to Zionism in an idealistic sense, just as he also sympathized with all minority groups, but toward the end of his life he was increasingly irritated by the importunities of the Zionists and declined to be used as their tool. The reverse was true of Roosevelt. For three terms he refused the bait, but in 1944, when the possibility of defeat by Dewey loomed, he not only permitted his party platform to incorporate a strong Zionist plank but came out with a strong personal endorsement of the movement. Truman followed suit. In those drab preëlection days, when everybody, including Truman, expected him to be defeated, in outright repudiation of his official State Department policy, he came out with an enthusiastic commitment for immigration to Palestine. He wanted 100,000 Jews admitted at once. Dewey went him one better by calling for the admission of "several hundred thousand." Ever since the Balfour Declaration, however, the best hunting ground for American Zionists has been the Congress, where the favorite device was to pass fine-sounding resolutions in support of a home for Jews in Palestine without assuming any responsibility for carrying the policy out.

The statements of Truman, Dewey, and the Congress were enough to upset the British régime in Palestine completely, and they left with uncertainty with reference to the future of their power in the Orient, but feeling definite enough about the lack of conscience in America at election time.

The only consistent policy in the American government came from the State Department, which through all the years of the Zionist agitation took the position that American policy must oppose aggression against the territory of other nations, on behalf of the Jews or any other nationalism. Such aggression, it held, is a violation of the principles of freedom and self-determination which we have championed from the beginning of our history. In this they agreed with the general British policy. The State Department is composed of men who receive their tenure by appointment. They are not so readily responsive to the election appeals, and often they were obliged to carry out policies to which the country was committed by a President who was not at the time in a position to think with such objectivity.

But the Zionists did not trust the politicians whose support they had secured. In one way or another they had continued to get more Jews into Palestine. They supplied them with funds; they smuggled in arms and good military equipment; and they organized and drilled the young Jews into a powerful army. This was done mainly by American money and under the direction of American citizens. When Britain left Palestine and the Arabs began to move in, the Zionist army was ready

not only to defeat the Arabs but to drive them back and seize other territories, taking over the homes of hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees for fellow Zionists.

For two thousand years, indeed since the Maccabean times, nothing has stirred and thrilled the Jews of the world like the new Israel. However, the little state has less than a million inhabitants, and only the future holds the answer as to its permanence and significance. There are some twelve to fifteen times that many Jews in other parts of the world.

We are indebted to Mr. Manuel for giving us so much of the factual material leading up to the origin of Israel.

S. VERNON MC CASLAND

Dogmatics in Outline, by Karl Barth, New York, Philosophical Library, no date, pp. 155, $3.75.

This book consists of twenty-four lectures delivered at the University of Bonn during the summer of 1946. These lectures present what the author calls a "paraphrase of the Apostles' Creed." He had already published two such paraphrases, one in 1935 and the other in 1943. Much that is essentially new is, therefore, not to be expected in this third exposition of the doctrinal content of the Apostles' Creed. There is, however, this difference between the present paraphrase and the other two. The lectures comprising the present volume were delivered without a manuscript. This was something the author tells us he had never done before. What we have in the book, consequently, is not a finished treatise but "a slightly polished and improved shorthand transcript" of extemporaneous discourses. The result is a somewhat more flexible and popular treatment of the subjects discussed than we have become accustomed to expect from Barth.

The method he here adopts is one traditional with German professors. The main proposition of each chapter is printed in italics at the beginning, and the discussion follows in ordinary type. The twenty-four chapters vary in length from three to ten pages, but most of them are six or seven pages long. The titles of all the chapters, except the first, follow closely the text of the Apostles' Creed or are suggested by it. This provides a natural and logical outline for such a summary discussion of Christian dogmatics as is here presented.

The main features of the Barthian theology are here reaffirmed but they are so well known that I need not dwell on them. There are, however, some phases of the present exposition that may be noted. One is Barth's criticism of the traditional theological "opposition to reason." "Christian faith," he says, "is not irrational, not anti-rational, not supra-rational, but rational in the proper sense. *Pistis* rightly understood is *gnosis;* rightly understood the act of faith is also an act of knowledge" (p. 23). But it is not a knowledge that man himself can acquire. God "cannot be known by the powers of human knowledge." Human reason cannot establish the existence of God. All proofs of the divine existence are futile. The reason that inheres in faith is divine, not human. From the purely human standpoint we must then regard faith as nonrational and in this sense irrational. Barth does not so express himself here, but it is a correct statement of his position. His repudiation of the human reason as a source and ground of the Christian faith or in other words his fundamental philosophical skepticism is properly described as theological irrationalism.

Another point of interest in the book is the way in which Barth speaks of human freedom. "Man's freedom to decide, as it is given to man by God," he says, "is not a freedom to decide between good and evil. Freedom to decide means freedom toward the Only One for whom God's creature can decide . . . that is, for obedience.

But . . . should it happen that the creature makes a different use of his freedom than the only possible one, should he want to sin . . . what else can happen than that, entered into contradiction to God's will, he is *bound* to fall by his disobedience, by the impossibility of this disobedience, into this possibility not foreseen in creation?" (pp. 56 f.). As one reads such paradoxical utterances as these, common among the neoörthodox, one could wish that they would heed the biblical admonition and let their yea be yea and their nay, nay.

A third point to be noted is Barth's interpretation of the Trinity and the Person of Christ. In his conception of the Trinity he is a modalist and to that extent modernistic. The Christian God, he says, is "One in three ways of being." The idea of three persons in the Godhead is "as illsuited as possible to describe what God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is" (p. 43). But while this is clear, its bearing on the doctrine of the Person of Christ is left uncertain. In this doctrine "actually nothing more or less is involved," we are told, "than that the divine nature has come nigh unto us" (p. 86). But what we are to understand by the divine nature is not made clear. The personal pronoun is often applied to each of the "three ways of being" in a manner that suggests a theory of three distinct Persons, but that, of course, was not intended.

In a recent article Barth said that he found American theology "uninteresting" because it failed to give due prominence to the idea of "mystery." In reply it might be said that the average American theologian for the opposite reason finds the Barthian theology not necessarily uninteresting but rather bewildering and in that respect unprofitable. The mystery and inconceivability, attributed by Barth to the fundamental concepts and doctrines of the Christian faith, seem to us to confuse faith rather than strengthen it. No doubt this appeal to mystery with its emphasis on the absolute uniqueness of the Christian faith has rendered an important service to the church by way of reaction against a one-sided humanistic trend in modern Protestantism. But it has also had a narrowing influence. In the words of Reinhold Niebuhr the Barthian movement "has affected the thought of the church profoundly, but only negatively; and it has not challenged the thought outside of the church at all."

But whatever may be our personal attitude toward the movement, it represents a leading, if not the dominant, trend in current Protestant theology, and as such needs to be understood by all teachers of religion. And no better or more authoritative summary of its teaching is to be found than that given us by Barth in his *Dogmatics in Outline*. Incidentally, it may be added that the book contains in its eleventh chapter a suggestive and impressive discussion of anti-Semitism.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

The Quaker Story, by Sidney Lucas, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 144, $1.75.

The story of the life and achievements of a truly great man or men to whom the world is indebted for insight and perseverance in endeavoring the establishment of peace among mankind may well be told and retold for the sake of vindicating the convictions which sustained them. How many Lives of Jesus have been written? Has research into the "mystery of Lincoln" been exhausted?

So another Quaker story is welcomed. Little has been added to what William Sewel wrote in his comprehensive *History of the rise, increase and progress of the Christian People Called Quakers* published in the early eighteenth century, save that Mr. Lucas carries the story to the present day, and is somewhat more critical of his

people than was the older writer. In this little handbook, it may be said, the entire story is told with such conciseness and clarity that the reader readily finds himself fully informed as to the beliefs, practices, and peculiarities of the Society of Friends.

Mr. Lucas reveals historical perspective to no small degree. He acknowledges that Quakerism is the flowering of a long period of development in English political and religious individualism. "The times were ripe for Quakerism." The civil war was on in England, and scarce three years after Fox heard the voice, "There is one, even Christ Jesus, that can speak to thy condition"—at which his "heart did leap for joy"—the people of his country had destroyed royalty by beheading their king. Seekers and Baptists, addressing one another with *thee* and *thou*, were flooding the land, and they heard this indigent, wandering preacher glady, confirming them in their rebellious endeavor to overthrow arbitrary, external authority in the search for the assurance of the inner conscience.

Anarchy, of course, threatened. Men and women disregarded law and order, delighting in extravagances of conduct bordering at times on improprieties if not immoralities. Fox walked barefooted through Lichfield; Barclay through the streets of Aberdeen in sackcloth; men and women entered crowded market places naked. Thus James Nayler was led—similarly attired—on a horse into Bristol while his adoring followers shouted "Holy, Holy, Holy," he himself asserting that he was the Son of God though he had "many brethren."

Such prejudicial irregularities necessarily had to be disciplined. And it is a credit to the good sense and sincerity of the early leaders that a movement beginning with its stress on individualism could and did curb these excesses. The *light* or the *truth* that was in each person must accord with that possessed by all. Thus the individual must be subject to the best findings or enlightenment of the Society.

That authority of the movement, however, was not by "official designation, but was the natural outcome of their spiritual depth and moral integrity." Mr. Lucas is accordingly historically and ethically correct when he says, "Of religious movements founded upon real dependence on the movings of the Spirit, Quakerism is one of the few to survive the centuries." Contemporary with the Quakers in their rise were the Ranters, Diggers, Levellers, Fifth Monarchy men, all of whom have disappeared and have so because, for one reason at least, there was lacking this "spiritual depth and moral integrity."

Such control was naturally opposed by many as being a denial of those divinely ordained principles in which the movement had its origin, and Fox endured bitter attacks from certain followers, of unquestioned character and highest idealism, who possessed a firm reliance upon their own ability to know and do the truth. "Was the Society any more infallible than the individual?"

As a matter of fact, this measure of enforcing conformity, necessary as it was, did result in driving the body into a conservatism—"tradition-bound"—distrusting and rejecting anything new or contrary to the discipline that had been adopted. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries little "appeal was made to a young man's sense of sacrifice, enterprise or romance." Living on the glorification of the past, as a people distinct from the world, the Quakers became a "closed community," withdrew farther from the world and, trading chiefly among themselves, "by the negative process of not spending" became a people of wealth.

The renewal of the Friends as an active body in world affairs came not from within but from without, according to the author. The evangelical movement, the new scientific spirit of inquiry, political changes, and the gospel of social redemption all forced upon the Society a new consciousness of obligations and responsibilities.

"While others were striving to overcome poverty and unemployment and starvation, how trivial became petty regulations on buttons and bonnets and ribbons."

True, Mr. Lucas does not spare the chastisement of his own people for their pride and arrogance, their former indifference to human need, and their consignment of holiness to an indifference to style and personal appearance which, after all, assured their economic well-being. Yet he himself, at times, betrays this same attitude. Under Charles II's Declaration of Indulgence of 1672, he tells us, the Quakers, late in the year, secured pardon for 491 prisoners for conscience sake, among them some non-Quakers. "To this generous gesture," we are told, "John Bunyan, whose first book was against the Quakers, owed his freedom." But this indulgence was for all non-conformists alike, and John Bunyan's license to preach again was granted as early as May 9, 1672. Moreover, Bunyan's "first book," the title of which is not now known for a certainty, was not so much an attack upon Quakerism as it was upon witch-craft, which was to be found among the Quakers, as George Fox himself ruefully admitted and righteously condemned. Be it remembered also that if John Bunyan slandered the Quakers it was the wordy battle of the kettle and the pot. George Fox and Roger Williams did not hesitate to call each other a liar. Evangelists and theologians in that day joyfully and right manfully engaged in the tactics of the squared ring—no holds barred.

It is also surprising to find on p. 85 the statement that "Rhode Island provided the first opportunity for Quaker government." It is true that prior to and after receiving Charles II's charter of 1663, granting complete religious freedom, through the instrumentality of Roger Williams and Dr. John Clarke, both Baptists, Rhode Island had both as governor and deputy governor for a number of terms two Quakers, William Coddington and Nickolas Easton. But was it a Baptist government when Roger Williams and Thomas Olney—and other Baptists—held these offices? Did the United States have a Quaker administration when Herbert Hoover was President or is it now Baptist?

America will forever be in debt to the Quakers for their sacrificial service, even unto death, in forcing the amelioration of Massachusetts' intolerable religious laws of uniformity and conformity, but it must never be forgotten that they made their assault upon this evil from a fortress made safe and secure by the religious freedom fully granted by Rhode Island's first constitution of 1636.

The fact of history is, as Mr. Lucas admits, that Quakers never could and never did succeed in conducting government, much less in establishing it. After the Act of Toleration of 1688 the London Yearly Meeting, according to Mr. Lucas, advised all its members to keep "out of all airy discourses and words," that is, to take "no interest in government." Even William Penn wrote to his children: "Meddle not with government; never speak of it, let others say or do as they please." So the holy experiment failed.

Thus, though commending the book for its general fairness and impartiality, I nevertheless am forced to be a little suspicious, especially when I read the commendation by Elton Trueblood found on the front cover of the jacket: "A complete and much needed short history of Quakerism, *well designed to introduce the Quaker movement to any genuine seeker.*" The italics, needless to say, are mine.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

The Philosophy of Anaxagoras, by Felix M. Cleve, New York, King's Crown Press, 1949, pp. xix, 165, $3.

This book represents the fruit of some thirty years' investigation and study of the philosophy of Anaxagoras. Starting with the conviction that the pre-Socratics were the great creative giants of Greek philosophy, who have been unfortunately overshadowed by Plato and Aristotle, Cleve undertakes to reconstruct the system of Anaxagoras whom he considers one of the greatest early thinkers. Cleve's critical method cannot be questioned. He assumes that Anaxagoras was not a "babbler," but a coherent thinker. Therefore, all the authentic fragments can be fitted together into a system which can stand the test of philosophical consistency. Thus Cleve quite properly insists that no philosophical conceptions or modes of philosophical analysis which are post-Anaxagorean should be invoked in the attempted reconstruction. Perhaps the most important result of this critical approach is that the thought of Anaxagoras is made to stand by itself, completely unconditioned by Aristotle's interpretation. As Cleve points out, Aristotle's version of Anaxagoras has tended to dominate all subsequent criticism of his position, whereas actually it is not difficult to show the exact points at which Aristotle has distorted the genuine views of the earlier thinker. Cleve therefore finds himself aligned with other recent scholars, notably Cherniss in his book, *Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy,* who have come to realize that Aristotle's word on his predecessors is not to be trusted implicitly.

With considerable ingenuity, Cleve argues that Anaxagoras held a view of "things" as "molecular aggregations," the ultimate particles of which are the opposites, bright and dark, rare and dense, dry and moist, and the like. These "qualities," as Aristotle would call them, are not "qualities" in the Aristotelian sense, but rather are "particles," entities which possess spatial extension, though as ultimate "particles," they never exist in isolation. *Nous,* which Cleve calls "the ruler element and construction engineer," like the other Anaxagorean elements also has spatial extension, and is completely homogeneous, in that it never genuinely mingles with the other elements. It is the ruling element, but its power is limited by "the mechanical possibilities which lie in the elements" (p. 25). If one should ask where *Nous* is, Cleve replies, "Every molecule is flowed around by *Nous* on all sides; *Nous,* as 'the thinnest of all the elements,' fills up all the spaces between the molecules; *Nous* is the non-molecularized medium in which the molecules are embedded" (p. 37).

Cleve next analyzes the cosmogony of Anaxagoras. From the primordial condition when "all things are together" *Nous* proceeds to introduce the changes which have resulted in "the world's thousandfold variegation" (p. 38). Cleve's account of the "cosmopœia" of Anaxagoras is most impressive, and for the most part seems to be supported adequately by the evidence. However, Cleve argues that Anaxagoras held to a cyclic notion of some such sort as this: when the cosmogony is complete, there supervenes a period of decay and destruction until the primordial state of "all things being together" is reached again, whereupon the process begins anew. Actually, the sources do not appear to support Cleve's interpretation, which rests ultimately upon the argument that the Greeks did not characteristically think of anything like a "creation," a beginning of the cosmos in time. It is true that the Greek usually thought in cyclic terms in this connection, but we should not forget Plato's explicit doctrine in the *Timæus,* where in the myth of creation the Demiurge goes about his task, and "time" begins with his act of creation.

Anyone interested in these fascinating early stages of Western thought will be grateful for the light which Cleve throws upon Anaxagoras. Every aspect of his

thought, insofar as it is recoverable, has been submitted to detailed scrutiny. The reader will be particularly rewarded by the section which deals with the World-*Nous* and the separate *Nous*-individuals, as well as by that which describes the relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. The latter Cleve regards as an ungrateful disciple of Anaxagoras who listened to his master's lectures and then rushed to "publish," as his own, a highly garbled version thereof. The whole book is admirably organized, but it is regrettable that it was not submitted to a more careful editing in order to eliminate the many Germanicisms which mar the style and not infrequently impair the clarity of expression.

No doubt many of our contemporary philosophers will find much that is congenial in the position of Anaxagoras. Cleve sums it up in an epilogue, part of which runs, "This *Nous,* Lord of the World, is neither a kind-hearted father nor a spiteful demon, but an ingenious mathematician and physicist entirely devoid of sentiment." One cannot help but be reminded of the passage in the *Phædo* (which, by the way, Cleve does not exploit as fully as he might) where Socrates recalls with what great eagerness he looked forward to reading the works of Anaxagoras, the man who announced that *Nous,* intelligence, ordered the world. But Socrates' final reaction was one of bitter disappointment, when he discovered that Anaxagoras, even with his conception of *Nous,* never gave him any light on "the nature of the best."

WHITNEY J. OATES

The Gospel and Our World, by Georgia Harkness, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 126, $1.50.

Georgia Harkness' books do not touch some of us. I do not mean to be unkind. I mean only to make honest confession. She strikes one as trying to ride too many horses: she wants to be liberal, but she is committed to traditionalism; she admits the need of an open theology, but she steps not far from the closed type; she hopes to be somewhat prophetic, but her interpretations fit lock-and-key with what is expected by the house of ecclesiasticism; she urges more open-mindedness, but she is committed to a kind of piety which constricts. All in all, the whole result is a kind of neutral broth with the usual strong taste and odor of safe-and-sane conservatism.

Two troubles beset the church and religion, she says: lack of a Christian theology understandable to laymen and of a real evangelistic fervor to go with it. The book—six brief chapters—is an attempt to reënlist apathetic and unspirited church people by explaining what the gospel is, what's wrong with the world, what's right with the church, what ministers should try to do, how to solve the problems of contemporary living. The conservatives she likes because they have fire. And she likes the liberals—up to a point—where they do not depart too far from traditional theology; she thinks the church is faulty but not too faulty; she praises the preachers as high-minded and low-salaried and says that they can do better; she likes the neoörthodox emphasis on sin but hopes that sin will not be thought of in too general terms and that we do not forget that sin, after all, is a hurt against God. The gospel is explained simply as a theological *evangel*—period!

Miss Harkness does not know the people outside her theological caste, people who think in different patterns. I know many of them as students and educators. They are not of her fold, but I am sure they are Christian in spirit and heart. She writes as if she knew (and so says) the campus mind. True, she knows the Epworth-league type of mind (bless them!) and they are on many campuses. But

there are "other sheep" of the fold whose conception of the Christian religion is not so constricted. They are brushed by in this book.

I hope I am forgiven for this forthright testimony of reaction. But I am as honest as the author is sincere. Some of us are tired of the type of books which editors of denominational publishing houses are publishing as outreaches to the modern mind but which, after all, are *in*reaches of stale and safe viewpoints. We need prophetic books with a stir—at least for a lot of those whom the Harkness book does not even try to know or understand.

VERGILIUS FERM

Theologia Germanica, edited by J. Bernhart, New York, Pantheon, ©1949, pp. 240, $2.50.

Once more the Pantheon Press and its distinguished editor, Kurt Wolff, have done the English-speaking world a spiritual service by bringing into print again the pre-Reformation devotional classic, *Theologia Germanica*, which for two decades has been almost unobtainable. The service, however, is even greater, for this beautifully printed little volume is not a reprint of the standard Winkworth translation but is instead a thorough modernization and reworking of this translation by Willard Trask following Joseph Bernhart's new German rendering of Uhl's edition of the oldest available fifteenth-century Germany text. It also includes Joseph Bernhart's long introduction and his extensive and valuable notes on the text. The result is a highly readable and effective text that will do much to make this little book serve its readers in our generation.

The only criticism of the volume and of its usability by American and British readers is that the introductory essay which is as long as the text itself somewhat overshadows the text, and is more comprehensive than is called for in attempting to give background to the slender facts which are actually known about the origin of the *Theologia Germanica*, facts which could all be set down on less than a single page. As an essay on German mysticism, however, Joseph Bernhart, a south German Roman Catholic *Privatgelehrte* who has spent his life in studying and writing on the German mystics, has produced a skillful and comprehensive dissertation. Beginning with examples of Taoist, Buddhist, Sufi, and classical Christian mysticism, he shows the universal tendency of the mystics to recognize the world "as less than and different from, what it pretends to be . . . the real world is seen as the inadequate symbol of a better and truer world which lures and woes from behind it . . . the 'this and that' may well be vain and ephemeral, but under the running tide the firm ground rests; what matters is boldly to cast anchor there" (p. 35).

Bernhart goes on to interpret the mystic as one for whom unity with this beloved hidden reality is self-justifying, is its own reason for being, is all that matters. In Bernhart's estimation, the mystic, as such, is oblivious to and utterly unconcerned about knowledge, about ethical action, about the experience of beauty. Hence for Bernhart, if mysticism is not crossed with and permitted to fertilize and to be fertilized by the religious, social, and historical institutions of society, it may result in either a few quietistic specimens of personal satisfaction or more likely in a mass of group extravagances which neither reason, nor social or spiritual welfare, nor even the interests of good political order can in any way control. In Augustine, Bernhart finds a well-formulated sacramental doctrine which at its best the mediæval church carried out, and which furnished a river bed that could carry this mystical torrent and enable it to be immensely fruitful.

In German mysticism the tide of its yearning continually threatened to leave

the church's well-marked-out stream bed. According to Bernhart, complex Gothic man, in the person of the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Germany was swept by a fierce surge of longing for union with God. This longing and its fulfillment was not content with the moderate Latin interpretation of its being a union of wills, but demanded that it be a union of man's very substance with God, that man actually becomes God. And in the face of this yearning, the authority of the church and the firm orthodox Augustinian doctrine of the sacramentalism of the church tended to drop into second place.

Joseph Bernhart would have strengthened this section of his essay if he had explained how the Roman Catholic church's internal struggles and her struggles with secular authorities often resulted in the imposition of interdicts and the withholding of the sacraments from such a city as Strasbourg for decades at a time, which left the common people with no alternative but to find some inward substitute for their participation in the sacraments.

In spite of the fact that much of the great German mystical tradition remained firmly anchored in Dominican channels or spread among the ordinary people (Friends of God) who remained devoted to the church even when deprived of the sacraments, Bernhart sees this Teutonic mystical wave as especially vulnerable to pantheistic, libertinistic, and even dæmonic excess. Although the character of such movements as the Cathari and the Brethren of the Free Spirit is almost wholly known to us today from the documents of the orthodox churchmen who were bent on exterminating them, it is clear that serious excesses did exist in this period. The *Theologia Germanica* is at pains again and again to distinguish its position from those who substitute a reckless for a "noble freedom."

In this analysis of mysticism, Bernhart would seem to be on the same solid ground as his fellow countryman, Friedrich von Hügel, in recognizing that mysticism requires the fructifying effects of the other elements of religion, such as the historical and intellectual, for its greatest contribution to man. Yet both Bernhart and von Hügel leave a further question almost unanswered, which, if it could be adequately dealt with, would broaden and shed much light on their own valuable contributions. The question is, what do both the historical fact and the inward symbol of Jesus Christ supply to the apperceptive mass of the Christian mystic that changes what in the Orient is an amoral mysticism into a mystical experience that energizes and steels the will and that lays, on those who have it, an unlimited liability for their fellows? If this question could be worked at with a realization that this has happened both within and without the Roman Catholic setting, and both within and without the practice of the formal Christian sacraments, it might broaden the issue and make a place for understanding how this peculiar Christian mysticism, vulnerable as it is to occasional excesses, has been tugging at the heart of Western man since the advent of Jesus, kindling his prophets, renewing and freshening and deepening his sense of social responsibility, and periodically softening up and reshaping his self-petrifying institutions.

There are a few minor personal opinions of Joseph Bernhart that are open to question: his extremely low estimate of the worth of the pseudo-Dionysian writings as "a weak decoction of neo-Platonic mysticism"; his readiness to pass off Bernard of Clairvaux's fierceness, now in piety and now in statesmanship, to "Bernard's unstable French blood"; or his strictures against the devout sixteenth-century spiritual reformer, Sebastian Franck, as a "pantheistic zealot and would-be humanist." But these are trivial details that do not obscure the brilliance of the long essay itself and of Joseph Bernhart's admirable notes to the text.

The text of the *Theologia Germanica* is too well known to need much citation here. It glitters with great lines like: "I fain would be to the Eternal Good what a man's hand is to a man." "Nothing burns in hell but self-will." "The more the Mine, the I, the Me, that is, the I-hood and self-hood abate in a man, the more does God's I, that is, God, Himself, increase in him." No modern psychological treatise focuses more on human egocentricity than does this little book. It is the number-one personal enemy of man. No less than twelve times in the course of its hundred pages, it attacks directly "the *I*, the *Me*, the *Mine*" and draws the reader toward the strait gate.

It is to be hoped that this wise and fertile little classic will be widely read and pondered, for its message and its idiom are intensely relevant today.

DOUGLAS V. STEERE

These Also Believe, by Charles Samuel Braden, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xv, 491, $6.

Thirteen of these modern American cults and minority religious movements are reviewed in this book by Dr. Braden, who is professor of the history and literature of religions at Northwestern University. Not only did a wide reading of their publications go into its preparation but personal conferences with many of the leaders as well. From firsthand knowledge, then, Dr. Braden claims to give his readers an insight into the religious conceptions, doctrines, and practices of these many sects in our nation. Included in the study are such well-known groups as the Peace Mission movement of Father Divine; Psychiana, founded by Frank B. Robinson ("I talked with God"); Christian Science; the I Am movement; Jehovah's Witnesses; the Oxford Group movement; and Mormonism. In addition, Appendix B ("A brief dictionary of modern cults and minority religious groups in America") lists eighteen others, among which are the Amana Church Society, the Ammish Mennonites, the Bahai faith, House of David, Humanism, the Shakers, Swendenborgianism.

One unmistakable fact is that none of these minority bodies—of either division—stresses the doctrine of the atonement as do the older Christian denominations. Indeed, few of them make any reference whatsoever to it. They are very practical, some communal, seeking a satisfactory social order here and now.

That is a circumstance the traditional churches may well heed and ponder. Most of these "modern cults" are composed of folks from the lower strata of society and are growing rapidly. It is another proof that religion is man's search for the good life, victory over distress, poverty, cultural lacks, human indignities, and the enjoyment of socially recognized personal worth.

It would appear that too many of the people are not finding those practical and spiritual values in the older Christian order, but they seemingly do find in these sects a satisfying response to that innate, perennially insistent demand for the complete and full welfare of life. May it be that the cults will prove the real answer to the spread of communism?

Certain criticisms may be made of the textual mistakes for which the author is responsible. Two only of the many will be mentioned: "The tuft of hair was laying on his desk the next morning" (p. 94); ". . . . there is not much that can be called specifically moral teaching in the writings of Dr. Robinson. His assumption is that when one possesses the God Law or consciousness, mortality takes care of itself" (p. 106). When one meets with these errors, a shadow of doubt may be cast on the authenticity of the conclusions drawn from the studies.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

Sam Higginbottom: Farmer—An Autobiography, New York, Scribner, 1949, pp. viii, 232, $3.

The autobiography of Sam Higginbottom is a book that makes highly interesting reading. It made *Time* soon after its publication. It is also a book of valuable information about agricultural missions and India. If one believed, after the manner of some of our fathers, in providential leading, he would find his belief greatly fortified by this book. Through all his life, doors seemed to open unexpectedly or close disappointingly, and all of them led him to the purpose which he formed—and which he believed to be God's will for him. This resulted in the establishment of the Allahabad Agricultural Institute, the monument to him and his wife who shared with him his dream and its fulfillment.

His chldhood and early youth were spent in England and Wales in a devout Christian home that shifted between economic ups and downs and made him familiar, from early life, with struggle and toil. Coming to America, through the help of an older brother, he worked his way through Mount Hermon, two years at Amherst, and two years at Princeton from which he graduated. A returned missionary who was unable to go back to India because of the illness of his wife picked him to succeed him and prevailed upon the Presbyterian Board to appoint him. He had come under the influence of D. L. Moody at Northfield, and of the Student Volunteer Movement while in college. He was therefore ready to welcome this unexpected opportunity. After reaching India, the Presbyterian Mission decided that, instead of carrying out the original plan, he should go to the University of Allahabad and teach economics. In addition to that, there was soon placed in his hands the home for the blind and the leper colony of the mission. This was far different from what he expected but it unfolds as a part of the plan.

It was while he was teaching economics that he visited with some of his students the Naini Central Gaol, where Colonel Hudson, the superintendent, had introduced modern and scientific methods of agriculture. There were 3,500 prisoners. He found that the land and the dairies which the prison maintained were productive and successful, and the prisoners well fed, while all about him were the starving millions and the primitive and erosive methods of farming. As soon as his purpose was formed, he returned to America and took a graduate course in agriculture at Ohio State University, and began the difficult task of winning friends and support for his project. The book is crowded with stories within the total story—obstacles, inertia, opposition, met and overcome. All this may be illustrated in two head-on collisions. One was with the North India Presbyterian Mission and is understandable in our country. It was the familiar objection to the social gospel. If earnest evangelizing missionaries could have the money that Higginbottom was spending on agricultural equipment they could, so they maintained, reach many more souls. This opposition became so bitter that the Institute was withdrawn from the mission and sponsored as an independent project by the American Board, having the support of Dr. Robert E. Speer. To the credit of the mission, it should be added that after five years the Institute was voted back into membership.

The other conflict was with Hinduism directly. This happened when the fabulously rich maharajah of Gwalior became interested and turned over to him for experimentation over 700,000 acres of land and abundant means to support the work. In a village selected for demonstration, there was a temple which provided a good living for the priest. This living was threatened by the new methods. The priest called in other priests, and it became a twentieth-century instance of "Great is Diana of the Ephesians." In spite of the vast wealth and power of his patron the effort had to

be largely abandoned. There is a very discerning chapter about Ghandi and Nehru, and a word of heartening hope for the vast subcontinent at the end. The best word one can say for the book is—Read it!

E. C. HERRICK

Holy Wisdom, by F. Augustine Baker, New York, Harper, no date, pp. xxvi, 667, $5.

The publishers have reprinted an 1876 edition of this compilation "extracted out of more than Forty Treatises" written "by the Ven. Father F. Augustine Baker, a monk of the English Congregation of the Holy Order of S. Benedict." Sweeney's preface to the 1876 edition is reprinted, and here we learn that "David, known in religion by the name of Augustine, Baker" (1575-1641) spent two years at Oxford and subsequently studied law. Reared a Protestant, he turned Catholic after a religious awakening, and went on to take Benedictine orders. He won repute for his scholarship and his piety. Much of his time was spent on the Continent, but near the end of his life he obeyed a summons to the dangerous "English Mission," and in his native land had to move from place to place to avoid persecution.

Readers of serious works on prayer and devotion, especially those by Roman and Anglican Catholic writers, will recall frequent citation of Baker. The new interest in the devotional life and the impulse behind such works as Merton's *Seven Storey Mountain* may help explain the reappearance of *Holy Wisdom.* Protestants, except for a handful of specialists, will find it tedious reading, and largely irrelevant to life as we live it in our time. This is a book for the monastery. The active and the contemplative life are sharply contrasted, to the heavy shadowing of the former. For wearisome, long-drawn-out casuistry on the problems of the monk, turn to the discussion on scrupulosity (pp 278-309). Luther doubtless followed reams of counsel of this sort, and came to grief, until he arrived at gospel faith and scriptural simplicity. Yet one must respect the spiritual insight and the common sense with which Baker handles the subtleties of the monastic quest for union with God. His references to the particular problems of women in the life of prayer are always illuminating, and may often draw a chuckle from the modern reader.

The reader who seeks to understand the Catholic contemplative idea of prayer might well turn to p. 341 and read on from there. The goal is to make life one unceasing prayer to God: "internal prayer" is the right term. It is "an elevation of the mind to God, or more largely and expressly thus: prayer is an affectuous actuation of an intellective soul towards God, expressing, or at least implying, an entire dependence on Him as the Author and Fountain of all good, a will and readiness to give Him His due, which is no less than all love, obedience, adoration, glory, and worship, by humbling and annihilating of herself and all creatures in His presence; and lastly, a desire and intention to aspire to an union of spirit with Him" (pp. 341-342).

The writing is clear, though the excessive Latinity, as revealed near the beginning of the above quotation, and by the use of such words as *contristated, perfectuated, endamaged, subreption, deordinate, inconciliate,* and a hundred others, show us how the church of the Vulgate tended to make our nervous pungent English, such as Baker's Puritan contemporaries were using, a more ponderous instrument. The English translations of the modern papal encyclicals bear out this reflection.

Father Baker's encyclopædic work on flight from the world is not going to find many new readers, we will predict. Yet who can withhold admiration from such a conscientious and laborious elucidation of that lofty ideal of spiritual culture which the Catholic mystics and monastics worked out? Surely not we of the Protestant leadership in church and seminary, failing as we so widely do our people who look to us for clearer guidance in the life of prayer and in the way to holiness and peace.

JOHN W. BRUSH

The Populace in Shakespeare, by Brents Stirling, New York, Columbia University Press, 1949, pp. 203, $3.

Professor Stirling, of the University of Washington, has gathered together into convenient and accessible form material previously published in *Modern Language Quarterly* (September, 1941) and the *Huntington Library Quarterly* (May, 1945). In 1941 Professor Stirling commented on the inherent antidemocratic attitudes found in Shakespeare's plays. Shakespeare, he observed, proved no friend of the democratic ideal, but rather the plays (*Julius Cæsar* and *Coriolanus* in particular) "could have been no less than verbal feasts for Elizabethan anti-democrats," and the "intemperate blasts" against mobs as such "must be presumed to have been designed for anti-democratic consequences."

The Populace in Shakespeare enlarges on this thesis, adumbrating as test cases from the plays the Cade scenes in *2 Henry VI* in addition to the scenes dealing with mobs in the Roman plays, *Julius Cæsar* and *Coriolanus*. In his 1941 article Professor Stirling said: "Interesting developments may be expected from examination, now in progress, of published sermons." During the summer of 1942, therefore, he examined in minute detail the sermons of representative Elizabethan preachers now collected at the Huntington Library.

From a study of these Elizabethan sermons Stirling arrived at the following conclusions: 1. that during Shakespeare's time a specific fear of popular revolt, distinct from the well-known fear of baronial or aristocratic rebellion, was maintained by pulpit and press, as well as by the stage; 2. that the goal of such revolt was publicized as one of social and economic leveling, a charge which was denied with vigor and, for the time being, with futility; 3. that dissenters and separatists were the targets of this publicity; and 4. that the indiscriminate association in contemporary propaganda of these groups with Jack Straw, Wat Tyler, Jack Cade, and other traditional popular rebels was fostered in stage literature. Shakespeare was guilty of intentional, albeit shrewd, manipulation of the history incorporated into his plays. Always his deft hand is seen manipulationg the scenes in ways which reduce mobs to contemptible and disgusting spectacles.

In order to reinforce this interpretation of Shakespeare, Stirling studies a mass of contemporary Elizabethan plays by other playwrights. He finds a strongly marked tendency to identify all yearning for social amelioration or change in social gradation as an expression of incipient revolt against the crown. Nonconformity is excoriated in the sermons Stirling has examined not only, not even primarily, as a religious movement, but rather as an incipient political uprising. How right the preachers at Paul's Cross were in linking nonconformity with rebellion against the crown was demonstrated in the events linked with 1649.

Stirling proves most provocative when he draws an analogy between the current tendency to label all liberalism as communist ideology and the Elizabethan tendency to label all nonconformity as disguised anarchy. Sixteenth-century horror of Anabaptism is thus connected with twentieth-century horror of Marxianism.

There is a recurrent tendency to restate every position in the book in terms of scenes drawn from only three plays, *2 Henry VI* (certainly not the most useful play in the canon), *Julius Cæsar,* and *Coriolanus*. A paucity of material dealing with mobs in the plays themselves does not, however, prevent Professor Stirling from erecting a rather formidable edifice on only a slender number of lines drawn from the immense bulk of Shakespeare's plays.

For a reader already acquainted with Professor Stirling's magazine articles his book adds nothing significantly new, but does provide certain significant helps in the

way of added documentation and an index that lists more than mere names and places. But for the reader who does not know the articles the book shapes into an interesting whole the results of ten years spent in Renaissance studies. No clergyman will be surprised to discover added confirmation in Stirling's book of the generalization: Preachers reëcho the popular ideas of their own epochs, and preach not so often for eternity as for their own particular times.

ROBERT STEVENSON

Cornerstones of Religious Freedom in America, edited by Joseph L. Blau, Boston, Beacon, 1949, pp. ix, 250, $3.

This is the fourth volume in the grand series of Beacon Press *Studies on Freedom and Power.* It consists of a general Introduction and ten well-chosen selections, with sufficient introductory comment, from the American struggle for religious freedom, beginning with *The Bloudy Tenet of Persecution* by Roger Williams, 1644, and concluding with Mr. Justice Frankfurter's *Concurring Opinion* in the Vashti McCollum Case, 1948. In this three centuries of struggle for freedom *of* worship, freedom *from* religion, and freedom *for* religion, the various phases of the contemporary conflict emerge. The dependable enlightening, critical comment which precedes the separate selections clarifies the issues. Freedom of conscience, the wall of separation between church and state, the civil rights for religious minorities, resistance to enforced Sabbath observance, keeping religion out of politics, resistance to prescribed religious forms, keeping formal religion out of public schools and the name of God out of the Constitution, and the fight against "released time"—all receive serious attention. We are tempted to comment at length on each and every one of these items.

But the general Introduction beckons more, lest it be passed by in the perusal of the volume. This valuable study deserves a much better fate. Equipped with subheadings, it merits republication as a tract for our times. It is one of the most discerning analyses of American church-state relations published in many years—*multum in parvo.*

The author finds freedom of conscience to be a negative rather than a positive right, while freedom of religion is a right to do not, that is, to refuse to do. Freedom of worship is the positive side of freedom of religion subject only to a due regard for prevailing social or moral standards. It is wrong and immoral to say, "Yes, we believe in freedom of religion but not in freedom of error, and all beliefs other than our own are error." The guarantee of the free exercise of any religion by the religious clause of the First Amendment was supplemental to the outlawing of all religious tests for holding civil offices by Article VI of the Constitution. Since 1791 the principle of freedom of religion has been attacked repeatedly but not destroyed. "Public schools should in no way contribute or call attention to differences in the religious beliefs of pupils or teachers."

There are many Americans "whose religion is freedom *from* religion," such as atheists and in part liberals, secularists, and anticlericals. One can be an anticlerical without being antireligious. Secularists (defined as believers in the absolute and complete separation of church and state) make up the majority of orthodox Protestants. Militant atheists in American life have always been a very slight minority. But even they have a right to express themselves.

Here is a sample of the author's criticism of some Christian churches:

> . . . gambling in comparatively innocuous forms has long been the main support of many churches in . . . New York City. Some years ago the city administration conducted a crusade against gambling. Betting parlors, gambling dens, and private homes were raided by the police to the accompaniment of clerical cheers. But when the same police, in the same crusade, attempted to stop the gambling in churches, the clerical cheers changed to protests; the all-out effort to com-

plete the extermination of gambling was decried as persecution of religious bodies, and hence interference with religious liberty (p. 17).

Similary, the invasion of New Mexico public schools by religious teachers as summarized on p. 19 makes sorry reading.

We quite agree with an "editorial in the *Christian Science Monitor* for October 20, 1948, which in commenting upon the recent World Council of Churches at Amsterdam, said, in part, that 'the Christian conscience in society, not the Christian church in politics, holds the hope for the future'" (p. 29).

CONRAD H. MOEHLMAN

Christ, by Maxmilian Beyer, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. ix, 284, $5.

The author of this book takes a very adverse view of the gospels as literature. He speaks of them, in their present form, as badly written, incoherent narratives. He accepts the Fourth Gospel as the work of John the Apostle and as the "best authority on all the facts of the life of Christ (p. 3). "Only John approximated a fair understanding of this great thinker and religious genius" (p. 25).

The author devotes the first part of his book, some sixty pages, to the revival of a variation of the ancient Jewish aspersions called forth by the Christian tradition of the virgin birth. This tradition arose to cover up, what the author calls, "a premarital misstep" on the part of Jesus' parents. It was Jesus' later knowledge of "irregularities" in connection with his birth that planted the germ for "his own great system of thought which divorced religious values from purely physiological functions" (p. 62). This was the great heresy, and Jesus, the great heretic. "The religious views of the early stages of Jesus' teaching were decidedly not those which he held at the close of his career" (p. 79). On the basis of John 8:57 the author estimates that the public career of Jesus extended over a period of twenty years.

Jesus' mature "message, reduced to simple but comprehensive language, was this: *Seek the truth—discard all error—and both of these mental processes will make you free; will put you in close contact with the true Deity*" (p. 164). The greatest achievement of Christ, appreciated only by the "understanding John," was "Mental Re-Birth—to be born again of the spirit" (p. 208).

The author's primary interest centres in the healing stories, the key to the understanding of which he believes he possesses. "The performance of the miracles was made possible by Jesus' own great discovery in the field of religious philosophy and a working knowledge of the art of healing as practiced in his day" (p. 178). The art of healing Jesus learned in India. "His discovery was the product of his own mind" (p. 178). "The discovery that enabled Christ to perform most of his healing miracles consisted of recognizing the Judaistic doctrine of sin as the cause of all functional mental and emotional disorders" (p. 194). "In removing such disorders, Christ eradicated from the individual's mind the disorganizing concept that sex is sin together with the Jahve conception of the Deity. In consequence of the removal of these two concepts the individual's accumulated mass of guilt and its resulting mass of fear disappeared—and the symptons of mental and emotional disorders, whether grouped about mental processes or bodily organs, vanished" (pp. 196 f.)—a method verifiable today (p. 202).

In his treatment of the gospel materials the author arrives at conclusions with no reference to the generally established positions of gospel research. As a result, his conclusions are often fanciful, bizarre, and generally unconvincing. The book as a whole has a highly sectarian cast and color. In its imaginative conception and depiction it will take its place among the modern apocryphal lives of Christ.

WALTER E. BUNDY

BOOK NOTICES

The Purpose of the Gospels, by Ernest F. Scott, New York, Scribner, 1949, pp. vii, 171, $2.50.

This is in many ways the most striking of the more recent publications of Dr. Scott. Against the extreme critics who would claim that the evangelists were essentially "inventors" of a mythical gospel history, Dr. Scott replies with the strong claim that, first and last, these men were concerned with Jesus as a living person. "Their method is simply to authenticate the facts of the life of Jesus. Here they discover the ultimate ground of the Christian religion. It rests on things which once happened and cannot be doubted, and for this reason the believers can hold to its message and proclaim it to all mankind." The very aim of the evangelists, Dr. Scott contends, was to counteract these heretical tendencies to depreciate the historical life of Jesus and see him only as a "divine being, separate from all transient needs and circumstances." To the Gnostics of all ages, who would resolve Jesus into a "mere symbol of truth," the evangelists reply that when Jesus is thus understood Christianity loses its meaning. They state their claim on the actual life of Jesus. Lest anyone should believe that the apostle Paul is the chief offender, Dr. Scott includes a brilliant, if brief, treatment of Paul. He concludes that "the evangelists were at one with Paul." If we understand both aright, then we realize their work "was the outcome of his teaching, and could never have been done without him. He had shown that the Christian message was bound up inseparably with the history of Jesus." And to those who would isolate the Fourth Gospel from the Synoptics he writes: "His Gospel is thus essentially the same character as the others. It is an historical record." Dr. Scott's book represents an extreme reaction to much that has transpired in New Testament studies during the last century. The work will be criticized severely from many quarters. Even those who are in general sympathy with the author will regret the frequency with which he arrives at certain highly debatable conclusions without more elaborate discussion of the problems involved. One thing is certain: he has thrown down the glove to the skeptics. Perhaps it is just as well that his views have been presented in a "popular" book that will insure a wider audience. But those who appreciate the scope of the problem (or problems) involved would eagerly respond to a more technical volume elaborating upon the conclusions reached by the author.

FRANKLIN W. YOUNG

America's Real Religion, by A. Powell Davies, Boston, Beacon, 1949, pp. 87, $1.

This paper-bound booklet by the distinguished minister of All Souls Church, Washington, is his response to a recent attack upon "the cult of democracy" by Father Ellis, of the Catholic University. Dr. Davies views the incident as a manifestation of the "struggle for the mind of America" in which the Catholic hierarchy is seeking to undermine the faith upon which the founding fathers built the republic, and to replace it by a social order dominated by the Roman church. He regards this as "the main question [now] before the American people" to which there is urgent need that their attention should be drawn. Dr. Davies points out that America's real religion "is not opposed to Christianity—if Christianity means the precepts taught by Jesus," but that its essential basis is freedom rather than dogma, and that it is the social and political expression of the religious principle that all men are brothers and man-

kind one family. He fortifies his thesis by admirably chosen illustrative quotations from a long list of distinguished Americans, expressions of faith in the ideals which have made America great. The alternative before us is the choice between adherence to this higher religion based on freedom and brotherhood, or a reversion to a backward looking religion leading to superstition and subjection. The author's booklet states the issue briefly, perhaps hastily, but it is a useful compilation, expecially when read as a supplement to Blanshard's *American Freedom and Catholic Power,* and is heartily to be commended to all those whose minds are awakened to the issue involved. It is interesting to note that this defender of "America's real religion" was born in Wales and educated in Great Britain, and that he did not come to this country until he was a grown man already in the Congregational ministry; yet he is better informed about the highest ideals for which this country should stand, and more eager to promote them, than the great majority of our native-born citizens.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE

You and Thousands Like You, by Owen Francis Dudley, New York, Longmans Green, 1949, pp. 157, $2.50.

In this little book a Roman Catholic priest, himself a convert from Anglicanism, appeals to the "separated brethren." The book is in the form of a personal communication to the unbeliever. The style is simple, direct, and at times even moving. Father Dudley begs leave to take the individual inquirer by the hand and lead him step by step to the doors of the church. Of special interest to the non-Catholic are chapters dealing with devotion to the Blessed Virgin, the meanings of being in good or bad faith as these things relate to salvation outside of the church, and the treatment of confession. Father Dudley naturally treats the figure of the Catholic priest with a great deal of sympathy and with realism. Protestant ministers and "modernists" do not fare so well, but become men of straw in his deft hands. The book is pervaded with a deep sense of concern over the steadily mounting tension between soviet communism and the Roman Catholic church. The church is portrayed as the guardian of civilization and the true leader of those who would intelligently combat "Red Atheism." Though there is a grave sense of the dangers of materialistic totalitarianism, there is, of course, no acknowledgment of the dangers implicit in the "spiritual" totalitarianism characteristic of a church which has no hesitation in proclaiming its own infallibility. The feeling of this reviewer was that he would courteously drop the friendly hand of Father Dudley fairly early in the journey. With all respect for the faith of this priest and thousands like him, with all respect for the magnificent achievements and contributions of the Roman Catholic church, the reviewer must confess to a bias against all infallible institutions, both those that are political and those that are religious in character. It may be as Father Dudley asserts, that Roman Catholics are superlatively rational in their religion. But it was no less rational a personage than St. Ignatius Loyola who said in the sixteenth century: ". . . the white that I see I would believe it to be black, if the Hierarchical Church were so to rule it." And while there may be a modicum of truth in the following statement, it will appear to many, both Catholic and Protestant, that Father Dudley overreaches himself when he writes: "Every person who submits to the Catholic Church is a person who uses his reason: every person who uses his reason rightly submits to the Catholic Church. . . . . A Catholic school boy knows more of the universe than the greatest agnostic cosmologist: for he looks through an open window whilst the agnostic gropes about in a shuttered room."

HARRY B. SCHOLEFIELD

Art and Scientific Thought, by Martin Johnson, New York, Columbia University Press, 1949, pp. 200, $3.

Originally published in England in 1944, this book is addressed by a scientist who enjoys and respects art to such as do not. It consists of essays on Beethoven, Chinese jade, the sculpture of Chartres, a Russian ballet, the poetry of Walter de la Mare, and aspects of astronomy in Bagdad and Peking, as well as a longer final discussion of the personality of Leonardo da Vinci. The author notes that science and art both involve patterns, communication, and symbols. But while science is one and the same for all communicants, the message of art is personal to the recipient. Patterns in art are significant if they communicate insight and produce results. There is a chapter entitled "Symbolism as a future clue to conciliation between science, religion and art." It is pointed out that the experience known as worship is not limited to any one field. Symbols may communicate or record the experience of worship, as in science they convey or record insight into facts. So considered, religion is not obliged to argue with others about its faith and "also loses the right to be exclusive and the call to proselytise." The subjects chosen for essays bear out the impression that the author is chiefly concerned with æsthetic values in religion. He knows that art and religion may strengthen ideals and character, and that philosophy should be more than an analysis of the findings of science, but seems to take the claims of morality and goodness for granted. He suggests that to combine artist and man of action would be a good thing. The essays on astronomy are intended to illustrate the danger of mixing æsthetics and science. I suggest that æsthetics in excess may be detrimental to moral and political rightness. The urge to act lies neither in the field of science nor in that of art. Ballet finds a place in the book because it is the only stage art "emancipated from the tyranny of the spoken word." Art, however, I submit, can depict man as a thinking and responsible agent only when it uses words. Art begins in the service of religion, but too often ends in idle luxurious tastes. Truly religion speaks in this book with a still small voice. The essays, taken out of context, are admirable for learning and varied appreciation of art. It seems hardly fair to blame æsthetics for the failure of the astronomers of Bagdad to see planetary orbits as ellipses when Copernicus himself failed similarly. Leonardo da Vinci is interpreted as a solitary scientist who passionately worshiped nature and in his drawings shows nature annihilating mankind. I agree with the author that worship is more fundamental than belief or unbelief. He has written an informing and stimulating book. The sixteen photographic illustrations add greatly to its value.

L. A. POST

Recovery of Man, by F. R. Barry, New York, Scribner, 1949, pp. viii, 109, $2.

The Lambeth Conference of 1948 requested Bishop Barry to assist in its report. Further study of the doctrine of man led the bishop of Southwell to write an impassioned plea for a return to Christian humanism as the only means of arresting the dry rot in Western culture. The analysis follows fairly consistently the one made by Lewis Mumford in his *Condition of Man*, with the addition that the author uses the Christian doctrines of man, of the Incarnation and the Atonement, as the final criteria beyond Mumford's evaluation. The book is crisp in phraseology, and its examples should bear conviction with an open-minded secularist. The relevance of Christianity to social and political planning is stressed. There is a sustained argument against the materialism of the welfare state as destructive of the personal, the highest human value. "If man is but a creature of time, drowned in the relativities of history, then it is very hard to resist the argument that the State matters more than its citizens; it is not 'eternal' but it endures much longer, and can enfold far

more stable values than the brief years of the fleeting individual; but if man is heir to everlasting life, then it is men and women who endure, while the State (and the 'undying race') are transitory, and State exists for men—not men for it" (p. 64). The book tends to dismiss some issues without adequate discussion, as when modern theology is labeled "inhuman" without further documentation and prosecution of so serious a charge. In his preface the author writes: "if there is to be a rebirth of Christianity—which can only come by the gift of God—an antecedent condition on man's part may be a renaissance of Humanism, with its social and educational implications." The reviewer feels the hypothetical antecedent condition is overemphasized at the expense of God's freedom.

WILLIAM J. WOLF

Japan Begins Again, by William C. Kerr, New York, Friendship Press, ©1949, pp. vi, 180, $1.50.

For anyone wishing a clear and up-to-date view of the Christian and general religious situation in Japan, there is no better introduction than this little book. Dr. Kerr has had long experience in both Korea and Japan. He has been for many years a missionary, and is now adviser on religious affairs to occupation officials. This gives him unusual basis for insight into postwar situations about which American Christians wish to know. The author's characterizations are apt and untechnical. They are true to political and religious history but briefly and simply set forth. One sees the ancient traditions with which Christianity has had to reckon. One learns the psychology of the people in their thinking and living. One understands the factors—economic, political, and spiritual—which led to the grasp at empire and the disillusioning end of that dream. In the midst of it all appear the Japanese churches, struggling, suffering, tenacious, as they face the severe choices—between Japan and the West, Cæsar and God, myth and fact, totalitarianism and individualism. Conditions favoring Christianity which have come with liberation from the old order are noted. So also are the challenges involved. Present status of Christian work is frankly but constructively set forth. On the whole, the impression is clear that a door is now wide open for Christianity in Japan, but that devoted coöperation of Christians is required for making the opportunity count. Four pages of informative notes and an excellent selected reading list are appended. These add to the value of the book. Vivid bits of personal observation, drawn from various writers and prefixed to the several chapters, enhance interest. Mission study groups will find satisfaction in this text. The general reader will find it rewarding.

CLARENCE H. HAMILTON

The Small Sects in America, by Elmer T. Clark, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, rev. ed., ©1949, pp. 256, $3.

Elmer T. Clark has made an important contribution to the understanding of the American religious scene with his study of the smaller religious groups. The original edition of his book was published in 1937 and has been out of print for some time. The present edition contains only minor revisions. Some of the statistical material has been brought up to date, a few cavalier judgments have been deleted, and several additional religious groups are described under the original five classifications. Judaism is perhaps the most important of these. An important addition is the recognition of two more categories of religious bodies not identified in the first edition. They are what the author calls the egocentric or "new thought" bodies and the esoteric or mystical groups. It is to be regretted that it did not seem possible to do more than barely indicate the existence of these groups in the appendix. A discussion of their peculiar emphases would have been helpful. One may question the wisdom

of the author in attemting to categorize the various religious groups in terms of a single characteristic. Most of them do not fit readily into such a neat classification. One may indeed be communistic, but it is also apt to be legalistic, adventist, and charismatic. A more useful distinction perhaps would be in terms of fundamental cultural attitudes—between those groups which are forward-looking and those which are backward-looking; between those which attempt to come to terms with modern culture, incorporate current novelties and fads into their systems, and produce new authoritative scriptures, and those which seek merely to recover and make central a neglected element in past tradition and to remain hostile to the new and the novel. The former are sometimes identified as cults and the latter as sects. Perhaps the major inadequacy of the volume is the author's failure to define what he means by "sect." There are at least four divergent but rather widely accepted definitions of a "sect," any one of which might have provided a satisfactory basis for a discussion of the small sects of America. But since the book lacks a typology of any sort and uses "sect" with varying connotations throughout, the general result is to add further confusion rather than clarification to the field as a whole. This, of course, is not to impeach the very real contribution it makes in terms of valuable discussions of individual religious bodies.

WINTHROP S. HUDSON

Goethe: Four Studies, by Albert Schweitzer, translated, with an introduction, by Charles R. Joy, Boston, Beacon, 1949, pp. 116, $2.50.

This is a Schweitzer year as well as a Goethe year. Three addresses (two of which have appeared before in English), and an article, brought out in French in 1932, are published together in this volume because of the present interest in both author and subject. Every celebration brings with it excessive praise and the publication of books which add little to our knowledge. Goethe's fame is secure and Schweitzer's reputation is solid. This volume contributes little to either. But there are two thoughts, underlined by Mr. Joy in the introduction and developed by Schweitzer in the fourth essay, which are of importance: the influence of Goethe upon Schweitzer, and the similarity of their lives. Both Goethe and Schweitzer hold to the same general philosophy of nature. Both have a deep reverence for life. Both men swim against the intellectual currents of their time. Both are men of intellectual distinction and achievement who devote themselves to benevolent enterprises. Both undertake large administrative duties which have no direct relation to their intellectual labors. Just as Wilhelm Meister becomes a surgeon to alleviate the sufferings of refugees, so Schweitzer has given the latter half of his life to medical work among African natives. Just as Faust, at the end, applies himself to the reclamation of land for agriculture, so Schweitzer, following in his steps, uproots the virgin forest to make room for a plantation for his hospital. The two essays, *Goethe the Philosopher* and *Goethe as Thinker and Man,* belong together. The latter is a revision of the former. Goethe continued Spinoza's tradition of a nature philosophy at a time when Spinoza had been forgotten. Goethe learned much from Kant and admired Hegel, who, incidentally, championed his scientific theories. But Goethe could not follow the system builders because, by their categories, they hindered the understanding of nature. They forced nature into foreign molds. Just as Goethe mounted guard for naturalism, so Schweitzer mounts guard for the same philosophy today. The fourth essay (Goethe Prize Address, 1928) is an intimate paper in which Schweitzer reveals how Goethe influenced him in various periods of his life and how he is aware of his likeness to Goethe in his struggles. It is this thought which makes the volume autobiographical. To stress the autobiographical is evidently the purpose of the book, for the editor says: "It is when we bring Goethe and Schweitzer face

to face that comprehension begins" (p. 15). The book, then, gives us more light on Schweitzer but hardly any more on Goethe. PHILIP S. MILLER

The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, edited by Kathleen Coburn, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 480, $7.50.

From December 1818 to March 1819 Coleridge delivered in London fourteen public lectures, outlining concisely but brilliantly the whole history of European philosophy from Thales down to his own time. Notes of the lectures were taken by a stenographer who seems on the whole to have been accurate, but who did not always catch technical philosophical terms, or words at the ends of sentences when Coleridge lowered his voice. The editor has carefully gone over this stenographic report, comparing it with the notes which Coleridge had before him when he talked, and with whatever other sources are now available. She has succeeded in reproducing the lectures with what appears to be substantial accuracy. The lectures are of interest for several reasons. They constitute, as I suppose, the first attempt ever made in English to give a brief but comprehensive survey of the whole history of European philosophy. They are an eloquent presentation of Coleridge's philosophy of religion at the period in his life when they were delivered. At this time he has become an orthodox and conservative clergyman in the Church of England, but he has not yet acquired the reactionary attitude of the closing years of his life. While, therefore, there is nothing startling in Coleridge's philosophy of religion as presented in these lectures, they constitute a very earnest and eloquent defense of the traditional Protestant faith. More attention is given to Plato and Aristotle than to the other ancient philosophers, although mention is made of all of any importance. The account of mediæval philosophy and theology is scholarly, but to this reader for the most part rather dull, although Coleridge is enthusiastic and in consequence interesting in what he says about Anselm, Duns Scotus, and o few others. Most of the more important modern philosophers are well though often briefly discussed, with considerable emphasis upon Kant. Hegel and Schelling are passed over rather rapidly, probably because by the time that they were reached Coleridge was ready to bring the lectures to a close. All students of Coleridge will be grateful to the editor for making these lectures available, as well as every one who is interested in the English origins of the study of the history of philosophy and theology. WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

Introduction to Comparative Mysticism, by Jacques de Marquette, New York, Philosophical Library, 1949, pp. 229, $3.75.

Books on mysticism are well-nigh legion and most of them fail to do justice to the full sweep of mystical religion. The present volume is no exception. Claiming to be a study in comparative mysticism, it yet has nothing to say concerning the mystical dimension in Zoroastrianism, Jainism, Sikhism, Taoism, and Shinto. Attention is concentrated only upon mystical states in Hinduism, Buddhism, Greek religion, early Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The initiate to mysticism could lay down the volume believing that mysticism is something less than a practically universal element in the religions of mankind. Even in the religions studied the treatment of mysticism turns out to be one-sided, particularly in the consideration of Christian mysticism. One is left with the impression that the stream of negation mysticism which flowed into Christianity out of Neoplatonism by way of St. Augustine and the *Pseudo*-Dionysius, to culminate in the Spanish mystics, St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross, is the whole of Christian mysticism. Only passing mention is made of the Friends of God of the thirteenth century and the Brethren of the Common Life of the ensuing century, while Protestant mystics like Boehme, Fox, and Woolman are

not even so much as mentioned. In short, the study is sadly out of balance. There is such a reality as affirmation mysticism. While the former is not the classic type and fits more nearly the world view of modern man than does the dualism of ancient Greek thought out of which negation mysticism sprang, it should have at least some treatment in any study which claims to be comparative in character. The omission is fatal to the balance of the book. The thorough student of mysticism will also be troubled by the author's failure to consider at all the pragmatic justification of the mystic way. "By their fruits ye shall know them." One of the strongest indications of the validity of mystical experience lies in the fact that the great mystics, in every religion, have been men of force and action. No awareness of this fact is to be discovered in the present treatment, which should have some consideration to give mysticism its due in our pragmatic age. Within the limits of its treatment, probably determined by the fact that the material of the book was first presented as a series of lectures, the volume will have value to the student of mysticism. Yet it should be read only with the knowledge of such deficiencies as this review points out.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Secular Illusion or Christian Realism? by D. R. Davies, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xv, 111, $2.

This little book from the pen of the English "Niebuhr," D. R. Davies, affords us a lucid exposition of that type of pathological theology which stems from the earnest pessimism of Karl Barth. With uncompromising directness the vicar of Holy Trinity, Brighton, condemns man as universally evil and holds forth no shred of hope for his salvation by his own efforts, whether they be pursued in the realms of science, society or politics. Only in the miracle of salvation afforded by Jesus Christ through His sacrificial death on the cross can man find release from the depravity of his soul, and only as such "released" persons operate as a new society in the church can there be any hope for the healing of human nature. The arguments presented by the author are calculated to disarm the humanist and confound the optimist. Too much of so-called Christian love is sheer sentimentalism, because after all you just cannot make people good by loving them, and the reason pacifism failed to stop Hitler is that it was founded on the illusion that man is basically good. "Evil in man is fundamental. That rock bottom ego is devil, not angel. Hence, sentimental appeals to that subterranean gentleman will be useless" (p. xi). The value of this book cannot be adequately appraised by this reviewer because he is probably as irrationally an optimist as the author is a pessimist. It can be honestly said, however, that probably no previous volume from the Barthian camp has achieved greater lucidity of statement or contrived to make more obvious the despair of those Christian thinkers whose reading of world events has almost convinced them that Satan is "hardly less powerful and much more interesting than God."

MILTON C. WESTPHAL

Evangelism According to Christ, by Gaines S. Dobbins, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 224, $2.50.

Readers of this journal probably will want to examine Professor Dobbins' book in order to see to what extent it offers help to liberal churches from which the fires of evangelism have gone out. But they will do well to prepare themselves for the author's belief that John the beloved disciple wrote the fourth Gospel, that Jesus was born of a virgin and went about performing miracles while proclaiming himself the Messiah. The author does not in any sense rudely press his views about the miraculous and the literal accounts of the life of Christ; indeed he exercises gentlemanly restraint and goes out of his way to offer moderate suggestions to evangelistic

extremists who clamor for their particular brand of gaudy and narrow evangelism. Flatly Dr. Dobbins says: "There is no set procedure according to which the lost are led to Christ" (p. 201). He argues effectively for avoidance of stereotyped and formalized methods in witnessing to Christ and reminds us that Jesus met persons where he found them at the level of their needs. This book taps the insights of modern psychology and shows firm reliance on scriptural teachings about winning persons to Christ. Hence it is all the more difficult to understand how a man with the knowledge which Dr. Dobbins possesses of both psychology and biblical interpretation (together with competency in New Testament Greek) can remain so inured to literalism. Yet he does dissociate himself from the Bible Belt fanatics who have prostituted the gospel and violated personality by their revivalistic assaults on ignorant masses and college audiences alike. What Professor Dobbins is attempting in this book ought to serve to improve the understanding and method which a considerable portion of Southern and other preachers use when they set out to enlist men for Jesus Christ.

WESNER FALLAW

Pastoral Leadership, by Andrew Watterson Blackwood, Nashville Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 272, $3.

Andrew Watterson Blackwood is identified on the dust cover of this book as chairman of the practical department at Princeton Theological Seminary. The catalogue of the Seminary lists him as professor of homiletics. He has been at Princeton since 1930, and from 1925 to 1930 taught at the Louisville Seminary. Earlier he served in the pastorate, in Pittsburgh, Columbia, S. C., and Columbus, Ohio. Dr. Blackwood has been a prolific writer, having had published some ten books in the past ten years. One is tempted to conjecture that *Pastoral Leadership* suffers from a lack of that time and attention which are required to convert pages of lecture notes into a thoroughly well-written and useful book. The book is inclusive and comprehensive. There are twenty-eight chapters, with such titles as "The Goals of a Pastorate," "The Attitude toward Equipment," "The Friend of the Musicians," "The Activities among the Women," "The Raising of the Annual Budget," etc. The recent seminary graduate will have had most of the material in the classroom; the pastor who has had experience in anything but the most limited pastorate will not find in the book a great deal that is fresh, stimulating, or suggestive. There are copious references to a wealth of good suggested readings.

REX S. CLEMENTS

The Human Venture in Sex, Love, and Marriage, by Peter A. Bertocci, New York, Association Press, 1949, pp. 143. $2.50.

The question is sometimes asked, "Are you mature enough to stay married?" This little book, by one of the professors of philosophy in Boston University, raises the broader question, "Have the two contracting partners enough character to make marriage a life-long venture in the growth of personalities?" The book is essentially concerned with "values" in sex, love, and marraige. In place of recording what the current facts are, it stresses the possibilities that marriage offers when its potentialities are fully realized. Unlike the recent Kinsey study which restricts itself almost entirely to the biological behavior of the human male in the realm of sexual behavior, this author is rather concerned with the *qualitative values* of sex and love than with its quantitative aspects measured statistically. In short, the study here under review is a study in sexual ethics. The author first discusses the significance of petting in adolescence, and the place of sexual intercourse in human experience. After raising the question, "Are we expecting too much from human nature?" he concludes by

analyzing "Some Roots of Creative Marriage." Throughout the four chapters of the essay, the central thesis is that "human beings have been and are, in fact, losing much of the joy possible in sex and love because they are thinking too much of sex expression, and not enough about expressing values through sex and in love." To achieve this goal, sex must be disciplined for the sake of love. The book is written in an easy style and is an excellent work to place in the hands of young people. The author is realistically aware of the many problems that sex poses in the modern world. He avoids no issues. His emphasis on the qualitative aspects of the problems concerned is a healthy complement to studies like Kinsey's which deal almost exclusively with its quantitative aspects. The former is ethical, the latter scientific; but as Professor Bertocci remarks, "Science, at its best, is not ethics."

FRANK D. WATSON

God's Gold, by Sandford Fleming, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1949, pp. 216, $2.

This volume, from the pen of the history-minded president of Berkeley Baptist Divinity School, telling the story of Baptist beginnings in California (1849-1860), is indeed welcome. There has been all too little work done on the growth and spread of our denomination in the Western States. Dr. Fleming's valuable footnotes, arranged by chapters at the end of the volume, will be appreciated. This book deserves an index, for it presents much new and sought for information. It may be of interest to note that William Dean, the Baptist missionary in Hong Kong, in 1852 sent books in Chinese for O. C. Wheeler to use in California among the Chinese population. Work for the Chinese had begun as early as 1851. By 1860 it was thought there were at least sixty thousand Chinese in California. Dr. Fleming handles his voluminous materials skillfully and with artistry. Abundance of detail paints a vivid picture, and variation in style lends interest. The account is rich with names that we can recall with pride: William Dean, J. Lewis Shuck, James H. Granger, O. C. Wheeler, Zelotes Grenell, F. E. Prevaux, and many others. It is with a deep sense of appreciation, and pride in our denomination's work and progress, that we lay down this volume.

EDWARD C. STARR

How to Teach the Bible, by Joseph M. Gettys, Richmond, John Knox Press, ©1949, pp. 163, $2.

This book is intended for ministers, church-school teachers, and teachers of Bible in high school and college who desire to improve their teaching techniques by up-to-date methods "appropriate to the Christian view of the Scriptures and the Christian view of life" (p. 7). The study is divided into ten units (chapters). Two units present introductory basic beliefs about the Bible and about the best relations between teacher and pupil. Seven units consider practical ways to improve teachings, such as lesson preparation and plans, use of reports and discussion, lecturing and illustration. The final unit is devoted to bringing the lesson to life. A summary and a brief list of questions complete each unit. The volume closes with a short annotated list of books about the Bible for further study. This list might well have included some useful books on teaching such as Lindhorst's, *The Minister Teaches Religion.* Brevity, clarity, repetition, practicality, use of outlines, concrete suggestion, and a devoted loyalty to the Bible are manifest throughout this book. The inexperienced teacher will find sound educational directions, presented from a conservative biblical viewpoint which emphasizes selected religious values rather than historical information. Evidently the age-level of the intended students "young people or adults" (p. 14) covers a very wide range with illustrations aimed for the first group.

DWIGHT MARION BECK

The Communication of Ideas, edited by Lyman Bryson, Institute of Religious and Social Studies (New York, Harper), ©1948, pp. ix, 296, $3.50.

The Institute for Religious and Social Studies is a graduate school conducted with the coöperation of Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant scholars. The present volume is the result of a series of lectures by various scholars delivered at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York City, in the month of November, 1946, centring in the subject, "The Problems of the Communication of Ideas." The study covers a wide range of material, including problems of communication, some cultural approaches to the communication problems, classic theories of communication, speech and personality, the psychologist's contribution to the communication of ideas, communication and the arts, communication in practical affairs, science and writing, radio, attention structure and social structure, and popular art. Besides the editor, the contributors to the series were Margaret Mead, Whitney J. Oates, Harold D. Lasswell, Wendell Johnson, Irving Lorge, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Robert K. Merton, Lennox Grey, Leo Nejelski, James Mitchell Clarke, Charles A. Siepmann, Robert D. Leigh, and Joseph Goldsen, The basic aim of the various contributors was "to describe social or psychological behavior in terms of the factors of communication involved." Hence the wide coverage of human interests including speech, psychology, the arts, practical affairs, science, writing, radio, and the social scene. There is scarcely a person whose communication habits are not dealt with by this series of lectures. The book especially deserves the attention of those whose business it is primarily to communicate ideas. It should prove especially helpful to ministers, radio speakers, lecturers, and others involved in public address in one form or another.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Passionate Tennis Player and Other Stories, by Charles Tekeyan, New York, Pastoral-Universe, ©1949, pp. 86, $2.50.

These five short stories—in addition to the title story they are: "The Worlding and the Nun," "My Pulitzer Prize," "Why the Bronx Express?" and "The Hot Muchacho"—are worth reading and rereading. They evidence a maturity, discernment, and craftsmanship unexpected in so young a man. My impression is that there is more to be learned from them with regard to seemingly ordinary, decent, run-of-the-mill young people than in some far more pretentious and impressive socio-psychological studies. And these stories are easy to read but not to forget. Tekeyan is a name that bids fair to be heard of.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Religion, Diet, and Health of Jews, by J. Ida Jiggetts, New York, Bloch, 1949, pp. xiii, 125, $2.75.

Frankly, this book appears to me to be a stunt volume. It is writen by a Methodist Negress, who is a nurse and social worker who has "studied Jewish history at the Jewish School of Social Research of the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York City," and who has "also studied Hebrew, privately." Neither of these achievements would be evident were it not for the confession in the Introduction. It is the outgrowth of a Master's thesis—and reads like one. It is an olla-podrida, illustrated by a map of Palestine, occasional sketches and graphs, and is equipped with an imposing bibliography which bears no immediately discernible relation to the superficial volume it is printed with. Perhaps the book has some esoteric value in the nebulous reaches of race relations.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

BOOKS RECEIVED

From Statesman to Philosopher, by Walter McIntosh Merrill, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 284, $3.50.

A judicious and useful reevaluation of the real nature of English Deism, with especial attention to one of its most debated figures, Henry St. John Bolingbroke.

**Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums,* by Hans Joachim Schoeps, Tübingen, Mohr, 1949, pp. vii, 526, DM 27.

**World Faith,* by Ruth Cranston, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. xii, 193, $3.

**Hindu View of Christ,* by Swami Akhilananda, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 291, $3.

**The Ancestry of Our English Bible,* by Ira Maurice Price, revised by William A. Irwin and Allen P. Wikgren, New York, Harper, [1949], pp. xx, 349, 53 illustrations, $3.75.

**Service for Peace,* by Melvin Gingerich, Akron (Pa.), Mennonite Central Committee, 1949, pp. xvii, 508, $3.

**The Man from Nazareth,* by Harry Emerson Fosdick, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 281, $3.

**The Life and Times of Jehudah Halevi,* by Rudolf Kayser, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 176, $3.75.

**Jacob Boehme,* by Hans L. Martensen, revised by Stephen Hobhouse, New York, Harper, 1949, pp. xxxiii, 200, $5.

The Snowden-Douglass Sunday School Lessons, 1950, by Earl L. Douglass, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xvii, 467, $2.50.

**Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers,* by Max Planck, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 192, $3.75.

Arnobius of Sicca: The Case against the Pagans, translated by George E. McCracken, (Volume 2), Westminster (Md.), Newman Press, 1949, pp. 375-659, $3.25.

Volume 1 was reviewed in some detail in the last issue (October, 1949), pp. 363 ff. This second and concluding volume evidences the same superb craftsmanship as the first and is a definite contribution to scholarship.

Twilight in India, by Gervée Baronte, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. xix, 382, $3.75

**The Philosophy of Civilization,* by Albert Schweitzer, (first American edition), New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xvii, 347, $5.

**Quaker Education: In Theory and Practice,* by Howard H. Brinton, Wallingford (Pa.), Pendle Hill, 1949, pp. viii, 114, $1.

Letters to My Son, by Dagobert D. Runes, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 92, $2.75.

This little volume can be read in an hour. To forget it will prove a far longer and harder task. Here a tender and moving sympathy; there a flaming defense of his Hebrew heritage—throughout, a penetrating and at times sorely disquieting little book.

**A Philosophy of Life,* by Richard N. Bender, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. xi, 250, $3.75.

**Call to Christian Action,* by D. R. Sharpe, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 123, $1.50.

**The Man Born to be King,* by Dorothy L. Sayers, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp.x, 339, $3.75.

**The Drama of Ancient Israel,* by John W. Flight with Sophia L. Fahs, Boston, Beacon, 1949, pp. xv, 201, $2.75 (with a 47-page *Guide for Teacher,* by Elsie M. Bush).

**Knowing and the Known,* by John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Boston, Beacon, 1949, pp. xiii, 334, $4.

**Renewing the Mind,* by Roger Hazelton, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xii, 192, $2.50.

A Bibliography of Systematic Theology, edited by Kenneth S. Gapp, Princeton, Theological Seminary Library, 1949, pp. 44, 60 cents.

A convenient list of the more important volumes available in English on theology, listed under twenty-five headings.

**Prayers and Meditations,* edited by Gerald Heard, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 153, $2.

**Best Sermons: 1949-1950 Edition,* edited by G. Paul Butler, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. xxii, 325, $3.

The Wit and Wisdom of Schweitzer, edited by Charles R. Joy, Boston, Beacon, 1949, pp. vii, 104, $2.

An attempt to beat off a few more sparks while the iron is still hot on the anvil.

The Wit and Wisdom of John Dewey, edited by A. H. Johnson, Boston, Beacon, 1949, pp. ix, 111, $2.

An easy introduction to the one Whitehead styled "the chief intellectual force providing the North American environment with coherent purpose."

**The Pattern of the Past,* by Peter Geyl, Arnold J. Toynbee, and Pitirim A. Sorokin, Boston, Beacon, 1949, pp. 130, $2.

**Women in the Old Testament,* by Norah Lofts, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xi, 178, $2.50.

**Lust for Power,* by Joseph Haroutunian, New York, Scribner, 1949, pp. xi, 174, $3.

**Melville's Use of the Bible,* by Nathalia Wright, Durham, Duke University Press, 1949, pp. 203, $3.50.

**The Ministry,* edited by J. Richard Spann, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 208, $2.

**Philosophy of Nature,* by Moritz Schlick, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. xi, 136, $3.

**Finding My Way,* by J. Irving E. Scott, Boston Meador, ©1949, pp. 344, $3.

**The New Renaissance of the Spirit,* by Vincent A. McCrossen, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. x, 252, $3.

**The Code of Maimonides: The Book of Judges,* translated from the Hebrew by A. M. Hershman, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1949, pp. xxv, 335, $5.

**The Admonition Controversy,* by Donald Joseph McGinn, New Brunswick (N. J.), Rutgers University Press, 1949, pp. xii, 589, $6.50.

**In the Beginning,* by Solomon Goldman, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. xiv, 892, $5.

**The Philosophy of Personalism,* by Albert C. Knudson, Boston, Boston University Press, 1949, pp. 438, $2.75.

The Home Book of Bible Quotations, selected by Burton Stevenson, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. xxiv, 645, $6.

This sensibly arranged and very fully indexed volume by a veteran compiler should prove useful. It includes some material from such extracanonical books as Ecclesiasticus, Tobit, I Clement, and Barnabas.

**Treatise on Values,* by Samuel L. Hart, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 165, $3.75.

**Les Églises en Allemagne* (The Churches in Germany), by Edmond Vermeil, K. J. Hahn, and Gabriel Le Bras, Paris, Librairie Marcel Rivière, 1949, pp. 118, 200 francs (distributed in America by Columbia University Press, $1.25).

Come unto Me, by Charles Franklin Parker, New York, Rinehart, 1949, pp. 104, illustrated, $3.50.

A somewhat different sort of "book for personal devotions," making effective use of attractive pictorials from the twenty-eight national parks of the United States.

**Gregory of Tours,* by William C. McDermott, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949, pp. xi, 109, $2.50.

**The Cambridge Platform of 1648,* edited by Henry Wilder Foote, Boston, Beacon, 1949, pp. 119, no price.

The Remapping of the Bible World: New Bible Maps, edited by Herbert G. May and Chester C. McCown, New York, Nelson, ©1949, 43 maps, $1.

These black-and-white maps will be of great service to all concerned with biblical geography. The large number of maps allows for a complete location of biblical sites without awkward crowding. The sensible price is refreshing.

**Gospel Parallels: A Synopsis of the First Three Gospels,* edited by Henry J. Cadbury and others, New York, Nelson, ©1949, pp. xii, 191, $2.50.

**T. S. Eliot,* compiled by Richard March and Tambimuttu, Chicago, Henry Regnery, ©1949, pp. 259, $3.50.

*To be reviewed.